Unsettled Questions of Political Economy/21
under certain circumstances, produce a division of the advantage of the
trade more favourable to ourselves. In some cases, we may draw into
our corners, at the expense of foreigners, not only the whole tax, but
more than the tax: in other cases, we should gain exactly the tax,—in
others, less than the tax. In this last case, a part of the tax is borne by
ourselves: possibly the whole, possibly even, as we shall show, more
than the whole.
Suppose that England taxes her export of cloth: the tax not being
supposed high enough to induce Germany to produce cloth for herself.
The price at which cloth can be sold in Germany is augmented by the
tax. This will probably diminish the quantity consumed. It may dimin-
ish it so much, that even at the increased price, there will not be required
so great; a money value as before. It may diminish it in such a ratio, that
the money value of the quantity consumed will be exactly the same as
before. Or it may not diminish it at all, or so little, that, in consequence
of the higher price, a greater money value will be purchased than be-
fore. In this last case, England will gain, at the expense of Germany, not
only the whole amount of the duty, but more. For the money value of her
exports to Germany being increased, while her imports remain the same,
money will flow into England from Germany. The price of cloth will
rise in England, and consequently in Germany; but the price of linen
will fall in Germany, and consequently in England. We shall export less
cloth, and import more linen, till the equilibrium is restored. It thus
appears, what is at first sight somewhat remarkable, that, by taxing her
exports, England would, under some conceivable circumstances, not
only gain from her foreign customers the whole amount of the tax, but
would also get her imports cheaper. She would get them cheaper in two
ways,—for she would obtain them for less money, and would have more
money to purchase them with. Germany, on the other hand, would suf-
fer doubly: she would have to pay for her cloth a price increased not
only by the duty, but by the influx of money into England, while the
same change in the distribution of the circulating medium would leave
her less money to purchase it with.
This, however, is only one of three possible cases. If, after the im-
position of the duty, Germany requires so diminished a quantity of cloth,
that its total money value is exactly the same as before, the balance of
trade will be undisturbed: England will gain the duty, Germany will lose
it, and nothing more. If, again, the imposition of the duty occasions such
a falling off in the demand, that Germany requires a less pecuniary