2.3. OS EFEITOS TRANSACIONAIS DAS OPERAÇÕES DE CONCENTRAÇÃO E AS
TENTATIVAS DE REGULAMENTAÇÃO MULTILATERAL DESSAS OPERAÇÕES
O capítulo anterior e o início do presente capítulo trataram sobre a dinâmica das
concentrações empresariais, a sua regulamentação pelo direito antitruste e os modelos brasileiro,
norte
-
americano e comunitário europeu de proteção à concorrência pelo controle dos atos de
concentração econômica.
Conforme AREEDA e KAPLOW (1997, p.3), o direito antitruste lida
fundamentalmente com o controle do poder econômico privado nos setores nos quais a técnica
de controle social aceita é da concorrência e não a da regulamentação ou da participação direta
do Estado no domínio econômico.
No entanto, em virtude de dois fatore
s associados à globalização econômica: a
liberalização do comércio internacional e a atuação das empresas transnacionais
68
, o Estado
nacional passou a não possuir mais os mecanismos necessários para exercer o controle do poder
econômico dos grandes grupos p
rivados, cujas atividades não respeitam as fronteiras nacionais.
Conforme MARQUES (2005, p. 4), o mercado de atuação das empresas deixou de ser os bairros,
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Sobre a forma de atuação transnacional das corporações em relação aos mecanismos governamentais internos de
controle:
Transnational business
regulation has long been understood as a complex matrix of overlapping local,
national, regional, and international legal regimes.
The content of these regimes is the product of a dynamic
interaction between the applicable legal rules and the actions, both
required and discretionary, of regulators and
corporate actors. For example, the transnational regime for antitrust can be seen as the cumulation of national and
regional legal rules given content by the exercise or non
-
exercise of territorial and extra
-
t
erritorial jurisdiction by
regulatory authorities and corporate competitors and of the behavior of corporate actors in relation to the activities
of the regulatory authorities and competitors. In the transnational context, these actions and reactions, asse
rtions of
jurisdiction, failures or refusals to assert jurisdiction, and uncertainties about the scope of jurisdiction combine to
produce moments of both clarity and doubt about the content of legal rules as well as numerous gaps and conflicts
among and be
tween the rules, regulators, and corporate actors. Who makes the rules, fills the gaps, and resolves the
conflicts and ambiguities in this complex transnational regulatory arena? What is the role of corporate actors in
this drama?
To explore these question
s, we need a rough typology of specific modes through which corporate actors create and
shape regulatory regimes. Sometimes corporations contribute through interpretations of or reactions to a legal rule
scheme. Sometimes they supply rules where none exist
. Sometimes they shape the rule scheme through direct
political or economic pressure on regulators. Sometimes they shape it by evading the rule scheme and doing
business elsewhere. Sometimes, to satisfy other business purposes, they adopt more stringent pr
actices than the
applicable rules require.
Sometimes they act on
their own to get a market edge or exploit an opportunity. Sometimes
they act in groups to create a harmonized regulatory environment or to prevent regulation. These diverse forms of
corporate
actions and decisions are related to both the applicable legal rules and the acts and decisions of
regulators, but they are not wholly determined by them. When corporations create or shape the content,
interpretation, efficacy, or enforcement of legal reg
imes and, in so doing, produce effects on social welfare similar
to the effects resulting from rulemaking and enforcement by governments, corporate actors are engaged in
governance.
(DANIELSEN, 2005.p. 412)