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EDITION USED

The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes, (London: Rivington, 1824) (12th ed.).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

z A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION.

{

THE

READER.

z A SECOND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION.

z A THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION.

{ CHAPTER I.

{ CHAPTER II. OF THE MAGISTRATE’S COMMISSION TO USE FORCE IN

MATTERS OF RELIGION.

{ CHAPTER III. WHO ARE TO BE PUNISHED BY YOUR SCHEME.

{ CHAPTER IV. WHAT DEGREES OF PUNISHMENT.

{ CHAPTER V. HOW LONG YOUR PUNISHMENTS ARE TO CONTINUE.

{ CHAPTER VI. OF THE END FOR WHICH FORCE IS TO BE USED.

{ CHAPTER VII. OF YOUR BRINGING MEN TO THE TRUE RELIGION.

{ CHAPTER VIII. OF SALVATION TO BE PROCURED BY FORCE, YOUR WAY.

{ CHAPTER IX. OF THE USEFULNESS OF FORCE IN MATTERS OF RELIGION.

{ CHAPTER X. OF THE NECESSITY OF FORCE, IN MATTERS OF RELIGION.

{ ENDNOTES

z A FOURTH LETTER FOR TOLERATION.

{ ENDNOTES

A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION.

THE

READER.

THE ensuing Letter concerning Toleration, first printed in Latin this very year, in Holland, has

already been translated both into Dutch and French. — So general and speedy an approbation

THE ONLINE LIBRARY OF

LIBERTY

CLASSICS IN THE HISTORY OF LIBERTY

JOHN LOCKE, THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE IN NINE VOLUMES (1824)

VOLUME V: FOUR LETTERS CONCERNING TOLERATION

Updated: April 7, 2004

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may therefore bespeak its favourable reception in England. I think indeed there is no nation

under heaven, in which so much has already been said upon that subject, as ours. But yet

certainly there is no people that stand in more need of having something further both said and

done amongst them, in this point, than we do.

Our government has not only been partial in matters of religion; but those also who have suffered

under that partiality, and have therefore endeavoured by their writings to vindicate their own

rights and liberties, have for the most part done it upon narrow principles, suited only to the

interests of their own sects.

This narrowness of spirit on all sides has undoubtedly been the principal occasion of our miseries

and confusions. But whatever have been the occasions, it is now high time to seek for a thorough

cure. We have need of more generous remedies than what have yet been made use of in our

distemper. It is neither declarations of indulgence, nor acts of comprehension, such as have yet

been practised or projected amongst us, that can do the work. The first will but palliate, the

second increase our evil.

BSOLUTE LIBERTY, JUST AND TRUE LIBERTY, EQUAL AND IMPARTIAL LIBERTY, IS THE THING THAT WE STAND

IN NEED OF. Now though this has indeed been much talked of, I doubt it has not been much

understood; I am sure not at all practised, either by our governors towards the people in general,

or by any dissenting parties of the people towards one another.

I cannot therefore but hope that this discourse, which treats of that subject, however briefly, yet

more exactly than any we have yet seen, demonstrating both the equitableness and

practicableness of the thing, will be esteemed highly seasonable, by all men who have souls large

enough to prefer the true interest of the public, before that of a party.

It is for the use of such as are already so spirited, or to inspire that spirit into those that are not,

that I have translated it into our language. But the thing itself is so short, that it will not bear a

longer preface. I leave it therefore to the consideration of my countrymen, and heartily wish they

may make the use of it that it appears to be designed for.

ONOURED

SINCE you are pleased to inquire what are my thoughts about the mutual toleration of christians in

their different professions of religion, I must needs answer you freely, that I esteem that

toleration to be the chief characteristical mark of the true church. For whatsoever some people

boast of the antiquity of places and names, or of the pomp of their outward worship; others, of

the reformation of their discipline; all of the orthodoxy of their faith, for every one is orthodox to

himself: these things, and all others of this nature, are much rather marks of men’s striving for

power and empire over one another, than of the church of Christ. Let any one have ever so true a

claim to all these things, yet if he be destitute of charity, meekness, and goodwill in general

towards all mankind, even to those that are not christians, he is certainly yet short of being a true

christian himself. “The kings of the gentiles exercise lordship over them,” said our Saviour to his

disciples, “but ye shall not be so,” Luke xxii. 25, 26. The business of true religion is quite another

thing. It is not instituted in order to the erecting an external pomp, nor to the obtaining of

ecclesiastical dominion, nor to the exercising of compulsive force; but to the regulating of men’s

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lives according to the rules of virtue and piety. Whosoever will list himself under the banner of

Christ, must, in the first place and above all things, make war upon his own lusts and vices. It is

in vain for any man to usurp the name of christian, without holiness of life, purity of manners,

and benignity and meekness of spirit. “Let every one that nameth the name of Christ, depart from

iniquity.” 2 Tim. ii. 19. “Thou, when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren,” said our Lord

to Peter, Luke xxii. 32. It would indeed be very hard for one that appears careless about his own

salvation, to persuade me that he were extremely concerned for mine. For it is impossible that

those should sincerely and heartily apply themselves to make other people christians, who have

not really embraced the christian religion in their own hearts. If the gospel and the apostles may

be credited, no man can be a christian without charity, and without that faith which works, not by

force, but by love. Now I appeal to the consciences of those that persecute, torment, destroy, and

kill other men upon pretence of religion, whether they do it out of friendship and kindness

towards them, or no: and I shall then indeed, and not till then, believe they do so, when I shall

see those fiery zealots correcting, in the same manner, their friends and familiar acquaintance,

for the manifest sins they commit against the precepts of the gospel; when I shall see them

prosecute with fire and sword the members of their own communion that are tainted with

enormous vices, and without amendment are in danger of eternal perdition; and when I shall see

them thus express their love and desire of the salvation of their souls, by the infliction of

torments, and exercise of all manner of cruelties. For if it be out of a principle of charity, as they

pretend, and love to men’s souls, that they deprive them of their estates, maim them with

corporal punishments, starve and torment them in noisome prisons, and in the end even take

away their lives; I say, if all this be done merely to make men christians, and procure their

salvation, why then do they suffer “whoredom, fraud, malice, and such like enormities,” which,

according to the apostle, Rom. i. manifestly relish of heathenish corruption, to predominate so

much and abound amongst their flocks and people? These, and such like things, are certainly

more contrary to the glory of God, to the purity of the church, and to the salvation of souls, than

any conscientious dissent from ecclesiastical decision, or separation from public worship, whilst

accompanied with innocency of life. Why then does this burning zeal for God, for the church, and

for the salvation of souls; burning, I say literally, with fire and faggot; pass by those moral vices

and wickednesses, without any chastisement, which are acknowledged by all men to be

diametrically opposite to the profession of christianity; and bend all its nerves either to the

introducing of ceremonies, or to the establishment of opinions, which for the most part are about

nice and intricate matters, that exceed the capacity of ordinary understandings? Which of the

parties contending about these things is in the right, which of them is guilty of schism or heresy,

whether those that domineer or those that suffer, will then at last be manifest, when the cause of

their separation comes to be judged of. He certainly that follows Christ, embraces his doctrine,

and bears his yoke, though he forsake both father and mother, separate from the public

assemblies and ceremonies of his country, or whomsoever, or whatsoever else he relinquishes,

will not then be judged an heretic.

Now, though the divisions that are among sects should be allowed to be ever so obstructive of the

salvation of souls; yet nevertheless “adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry,

and such like things, cannot be denied to be works of the flesh;” concerning which the apostle has

expressly declared, that “they who do them shall not inherit the kingdom of God.” Gal. v. 21.

Whosoever therefore is sincerely solicitous about the kingdom of God, and thinks it his duty to

endeavour the enlargement of it amongst men, ought to apply himself with no less care and

industry to the rooting out of these immoralities than to the extirpation of sects. But if any one do

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otherwise, and whilst he is cruel and implacable towards those that differ from him in opinion, he

be indulgent to such iniquities and immoralities as are unbecoming the name of a christian, let

such a one talk ever so much of the church, he plainly demonstrates by his actions, that it is

another kingdom he aims at, and not the advancement of the kingdom of God.

That any man should think fit to cause another man, whose salvation he heartily desires, to

expire in torments, and that even in an unconverted state, would, I confess, seem very strange to

me, and, I think, to any other also. But nobody, surely, will ever believe that such a carriage can

proceed from charity, love or goodwill. If any one maintain that men ought to be compelled by

fire and sword to profess certain doctrines, and conform to this or that exterior worship, without

any regard had unto their morals; if any one endeavour to convert those that are erroneous unto

the faith, by forcing them to profess things that they do not believe, and allowing them to

practise things that the gospel does not permit; it cannot be doubted indeed, that such a one is

desirous to have a numerous assembly joined in the same profession with himself; but that he

principally intends by those means to compose a truly christian church, is altogether incredible. It

is not therefore to be wondered at, if those who do not really contend for the advancement of the

true religion, and of the church of Christ, make use of arms that do not belong to the christian

warfare. If, like the captain of our salvation, they sincerely desired the good of souls, they would

tread in the steps and follow the perfect example of that prince of peace, who sent out his

soldiers to the subduing of nations, and gathering them into his church, not armed with the

sword, or other instruments of force, but prepared with the gospel of peace, and with the

exemplary holiness of their conversation. This was his method. Though if infidels were to be

converted by force, if those that are either blind or obstinate were to be drawn off from their

errors by armed soldiers, we know very well that it was much more easy for him to do it with

armies of heavenly legions, than for any son of the church, how potent soever, with all his

dragoons.

The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion, is so agreeable to the gospel

of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine reason of mankind, that it seems monstrous for men to be so

blind, as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it, in so clear a light. I will not here tax

the pride and ambition of some, the passion and uncharitable zeal of others. These are faults

from which human affairs can perhaps scarce ever be perfectly freed; but yet such as nobody will

bear the plain imputation of, without covering them with some specious colour; and so pretend to

commendation, whilst they are carried away by their own irregular passions. But however, that

some may not colour their spirit of persecution and unchristian cruelty, with a pretence of care of

the public weal, and observation of the laws; and that others, under pretence of religion, may not

seek impunity for their libertinism and licentiousness; in a word, that none may impose either

upon himself or others, by the pretences of loyalty and obedience to the prince, or of tenderness

and sincerity in the worship of God; I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly

the business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie

between the one and the other. If this be not done, there can be no end put to the controversies

that will be always arising between those that have, or at least pretend to have, on the one side,

a concernment for the interest of men’s souls, and, on the other side, a care of the

commonwealth.

The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring,

preserving, and advancing their own civil interests.

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Civil interest I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward

things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.

It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal laws, to secure unto all

the people in general, and to every one of his subjects in particular, the just possession of these

things belonging to this life. If any one presume to violate the laws of public justice and equity,

established for the preservation of these things, his presumption is to be checked by the fear of

punishment, consisting in the deprivation or diminution of those civil interests, or goods, which

otherwise he might and ought to enjoy. But seeing no man does willingly suffer himself to be

punished by the deprivation of any part of his goods, and much less of his liberty or life, therefore

is the magistrate armed with the force and strength of all his subjects, in order to the punishment

of those that violate any other man’s rights.

Now that the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concernments; and

that all civil power, right, and dominion, is bounded and confined to the only care of promoting

these things; and that it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of

souls; these following considerations seem unto me abundantly to demonstrate.

First, Because the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate, any more than to other

men. It is not committed unto him, I say, by God; because it appears not that God has ever given

any such authority to one man over another, as to compel any one to his religion. Nor can any

such power be vested in the magistrate by the consent of the people; because no man can so far

abandon the care of his own salvation, as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other, whether

prince or subject, to prescribe to him what faith or worship he shall embrace. For no man can, if

he would, conform his faith to the dictates of another. All the life and power of true religion

consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith, without believing.

Whatever profession we make, to whatever outward worship we conform, if we are not fully

satisfied in our own mind that the one is true, and the other well-pleasing unto God, such

profession and such practice, far from being any furtherance, are indeed great obstacles to our

salvation. For in this manner, instead of expiating other sins by the exercise of religion, I say in

offering thus unto God Almighty such a worship as we esteem to be displeasing unto him, we add

unto the number of our other sins, those also of hypocrisy, and contempt of his Divine Majesty.

In the second place, The care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power

consists only in outward force: but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of

the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the

understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of any thing by outward force.

Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any such efficacy

as to make men change the inward judgment that they have framed of things.

It may indeed be alleged, that the magistrate may make use of arguments, and thereby draw the

heterodox into the way of truth, and procure their salvation. I grant it; but this is common to him

with other men. In teaching, instructing, and redressing the erroneous by reason, he may

certainly do what becomes any good man to do. Magistracy does not oblige him to put off either

humanity or christianity. But it is one thing to persuade, another to command; one thing to press

with arguments, another with penalties. This the civil power alone has a right to do; to the other,

good-will is authority enough. Every man has commission to admonish, exhort, convince another

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of errour, and by reasoning to draw him into truth: but to give laws, receive obedience, and

compel with the sword, belongs to none but the magistrate. And upon this ground I affirm, that

the magistrate’s power extends not to the establishing of any article of faith, or forms of worship,

by the force of his laws. For laws are of no force at all without penalties, and penalties in this case

are absolutely impertinent; because they are not proper to convince the mind. Neither the

profession of any articles of faith, nor the conformity to any outward form of worship, as has been

already said, can be available to the salvation of souls, unless the truth of the one, and the

acceptableness of the other unto God, be thoroughly believed by those that so profess and

practise. But penalties are no ways capable to produce such belief. It is only light and evidence

that can work a change in men’s opinions; and that light can in no manner proceed from corporal

sufferings, or any other outward penalties.

In the third place, The care of the salvation of men’s souls cannot belong to the magistrate;

because, though the rigour of laws and the force of penalties were capable to convince and

change men’s minds, yet would not that help at all to the salvation of their souls. For, there being

but one truth, one way to heaven; what hopes is there that more men would be led into it, if they

had no other rule to follow but the religion of the court, and were put under a necessity to quit

the light of their own reason, to oppose the dictates of their own consciences, and blindly to

resign up themselves to the will of their governors, and to the religion which either ignorance,

ambition, or superstition had chanced to establish in the countries where they were born? In the

variety and contradiction of opinions in religion, wherein the princes of the world are as much

divided as in their secular interests, the narrow way would be much straitened; one country alone

would be in the right, and all the rest of the world put under an obligation of following their

princes in the ways that lead to destruction: and that which heightens the absurdity, and very ill

suits the notion of a deity, men would owe their eternal happiness or misery to the places of their

nativity.

These considerations, to omit many others that might have been urged to the same purpose,

seem unto me sufficient to conclude, that all the power of civil government relates only to men’s

civil interests, is confined to the care of the things of this world, and hath nothing to do with the

world to come.

Let us now consider what a church is. A church then I take to be a voluntary society of men,

joining themselves together of their own accord in order to the public worshipping of God, in such

a manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls.

I say, it is a free and voluntary society. Nobody is born a member of any church; otherwise the

religion of parents would descend unto children, by the same right of inheritance as their

temporal estates, and every one would hold his faith by the same tenure he does his lands; than

which nothing can be imagined more absurd. Thus therefore that matter stands. No man by

nature is bound unto any particular church or sect, but every one joins himself voluntarily to that

society in which he believes he has found that profession and worship which is truly acceptable to

God. The hopes of salvation, as it was the only cause of his entrance into that communion, so it

can be the only reason of his stay there. For if afterwards he discover any thing either erroneous

in the doctrine, or incongruous in the worship of that society to which he has joined himself, why

should it not be as free for him to go out as it was to enter? No member of a religious society can

be tried with any other bonds but what proceed from the certain expectation of eternal life. A

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church then is a society of members voluntarily uniting to this end.

It follows now that we consider what is the power of this church, and unto what laws it is subject.

Forasmuch as no society, how free soever, or upon whatsoever slight occasion instituted (whether

of philosophers for learning, of merchants for commerce, or of men of leisure for mutual

conversation and discourse,) no church or company, I say, can in the least subsist and hold

together, but will presently dissolve and break to pieces, unless it be regulated by some laws, and

the members all consent to observe some order. Place and time of meeting must be agreed on;

rules for admitting and excluding members must be established: distinction of officers, and

putting things into a regular course, and such like, cannot be omitted. But since the joining

together of several members into this church-society, as has already been demonstrated, is

absolutely free and spontaneous, it necessarily follows, that the right of making its laws can

belong to none but the society itself, or at least, which is the same thing, to those whom the

society by common consent has authorised thereunto.

Some perhaps may object, that no such society can be said to be a true church, unless it have in

it a bishop, or presbyter, with ruling authority derived from the very apostles, and continued

down unto the present time by an uninterrupted succession.

To these I answer. In the first place, Let them show me the edict by which Christ has imposed

that law upon his church. And let not any man think me impertinent, if, in a thing of this

consequence, I require that the terms of that edict be very express and positive.—For the

promise he has made us, that “wheresoever two or three are gathered together in his name, he

will be in the midst of them,” Matth. xviii. 20. seems to imply the contrary. Whether such an

assembly want any thing necessary to a true church, pray do you consider. Certain I am, that

nothing can be there wanting unto the salvation of souls, which is sufficient for our purpose.

Next, pray observe how great have always been the divisions amongst even those who lay so

much stress upon the divine institution, and continued succession of a certain order of rulers in

the church. Now their very dissension unavoidably puts us upon a necessity of deliberating, and

consequently allows a liberty of choosing that, which upon consideration we prefer.

And, in the last place, I consent that these men have a ruler of their church, established by such

a long series of succession as they judge necessary, provided I may have liberty at the same time

to join myself to that society, in which I am persuaded those things are to be found which are

necessary to the salvation of my soul. In this manner ecclesiastical liberty will be preserved on all

sides, and no man will have a legislator imposed upon him, but whom himself has chosen.

But since men are so solicitous about the true church, I would only ask them here by the way, if

it be not more agreeable to the Church of Christ to make the conditions of her communion consist

in such things, and such things only, as the Holy Spirit has in the Holy Scriptures declared, in

express words, to be necessary to salvation? I ask, I say, whether this be not more agreeable to

the church of Christ, than for men to impose their own inventions and interpretations upon

others, as if they were of divine authority; and to establish by ecclesiastical laws, as absolutely

necessary to the profession of Christianity, such things as the Holy Scriptures do either not

mention, or at lest not expressly command? Whosoever requires those things in order to

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ecclesiastical communion, which Christ does not require in order to life eternal, he may perhaps

indeed constitute a society accommodated to his own opinion, and his own advantage; but how

that can be called the church of Christ, which is established upon laws that are not his, and which

excludes such persons from its communion, as he will one day receive into the kingdom of

heaven, I understand not. But this being not a proper place to inquire into the marks of the true

church, I will only mind those that contend so earnestly for the decrees of their own society, and

that cry out continually the

CHUROH, the CHURCH, with as much noise, and perhaps upon the same

principle, as the Ephesian silversmiths did for their Diana; this, I say, I desire to mind them of,

that the Gospel frequently declares, that the true disciples of Christ must suffer persecution; but

that the church of Christ should persecute others, and force others by fire and sword to embrace

her faith and doctrine, I could never yet find in any of the books of the New Testament.

The end of a religious society, as has already been said, is the public worship of God, and by

means thereof the acquisition of eternal life. All discipline ought therefore to tend to that end, and

all ecclesiastical laws to be thereunto confined. Nothing ought, nor can be transacted in this

society, relating to the possession of civil and worldly goods. No force is here to be made use of,

upon any occasion whatsoever: for force belongs wholly to the civil magistrate, and the

possession of all outward goods is subject to his jurisdiction.

But it may be asked, by what means then shall ecclesiastical laws be established, if they must be

thus destitute of all compulsive power? I answer, they must be established by means suitable to

the nature of such things, whereof the external profession and observation, if not proceeding

from a thorough conviction and approbation of the mind, is altogether useless and unprofitable.

The arms by which the members of this society are to be kept within their duty, are exhortations,

admonitions, and advice. If by these means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and the

erroneous convinced, there remains nothing farther to be done, but that such subborn and

obstinate persons, who give no ground to hope for their reformation, should be cast out and

separated from the society. This is the last and utmost force of ecclesiastical authority: no other

punishment can thereby be inflicted, than that the relation ceasing between the body and the

member which is cut off, the person so condemned ceases to be a part of that church.

These things being thus determined, let us inquire in the next place, how far the duty of

Toleration extends, and what is required from every one by it.

And first, I hold, that no church is bound by the duty of Toleration to retain any such person in

her bosom, as after admonition continues obstinately to offend against the laws of the society.

For these being the condition of communion, and the bond of society, if the breach of them were

permitted without any animadversion, the society would immediately be thereby dissolved. But

nevertheless in all such cases care is to be taken that the sentence of excommunication, and the

execution thereof, carry with it no rough usage, of word or action, whereby the ejected person

may any ways be damnified in body or estate. For all force, as has often been said, belongs only

to the magistrate, nor ought any private persons, at any time, to use force; unless it be in self-

defence against unjust violence. Excommunication neither does nor can deprive the

excommunicated person of any of those civil goods that he formerly possessed. All those things

belong to the civil government, and are under the magistrate’s protection. The whole force of

excommunication consists only in this, that the resolution of the society in that respect being

declared, the union that was between the body and some member, comes thereby to be

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dissolved; and that relation ceasing, the participation of some certain things which the society

communicated to its members, and unto which no man has any civil right, comes also to cease.

For there is no civil injury done unto the excommunicated person by the church minister’s

refusing him that bread and wine, in the celebration of the Lord’s supper, which was not bought

with his, but other men’s money.

Secondly: no private person has any right in any manner to prejudice another person in his civil

enjoyments, because he is of another church or religion. All the rights and franchises that belong

to him as a man, or as a denison, are inviolably to be preserved to him. These are not the

business of religion. No violence nor injury is to be offered him, whether he be christian or pagan.

Nay, we must not content ourselves with the narrow measures of bare justice: charity, bounty,

and liberality must be added to it. This the Gospel enjoins, this reason directs, and this that

natural fellowship we are born into requires of us. If any man err from the right way, it is his own

misfortune, no injury to thee: nor therefore art thou to punish him in the things of this life,

because thou supposest he will be miserable in that which is to come.

What I say concerning the mutual toleration of private persons differing from one another in

religion, I understand also of particular churches; which stand as it were in the same relation to

each other as private persons among themselves; nor has any one of them any manner of

jurisdiction over any other, no not even when the civil magistrate, as it sometimes happens,

comes to be of this or the other communion. For the civil government can give no new right to

the church, nor the church to the civil government. So that whether the magistrate join himself to

any church, or separate from it, the church remains always as it was before, a free and voluntary

society. It neither acquires the power of the sword by the magistrate’s coming to it, nor does it

lose the right of instruction and excommunication by his going from it. This is the fundamental

and immutable right of a spontaneous society, that it has to remove any of its members who

transgress the rules of its institution: but it cannot, by the accession of any new members,

acquire any right of jurisdiction over those that are not joined with it. And therefore peace,

equity, and friendship, are always mutually to be observed by particular churches, in the same

manner as by private persons, without any pretence of superiority or jurisdiction over one

another.

That the thing may be made yet clearer by an example; let us suppose two churches, the one of

arminians, the other of calvinists, residing in the city of Constantinople. Will any one say, that

either of these churches has right to deprive the members of the other of their estates and

liberty, as we see practised elsewhere, because of their differing from it in some doctrines or

ceremonies; whilst the Turks in the mean while silently stand by, and laugh to see with what

inhuman cruelty christians thus rage against christians? But if one of these churches hath this

power of treating the other ill, I ask which of them it is to whom that power belongs, and by what

right? It will be answered, undoubtedly, that it is the orthodox church which has the right of

authority over the erroneous or heretical. This is, in great and specious words, to say just nothing

at all. For every church is orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous or heretical. Whatsoever any

church believes, it believes to be true; and the contrary thereunto it pronounces to be errour. So

that the controversy between these churches about the truth of their doctrines, and the purity of

their worship, is on both sides equal; nor is there any judge, either at Constantinople, or

elsewhere upon earth, by whose sentence it can be determined. The decision of that question

belongs only to the Supreme Judge of all men, to whom also alone belongs the punishment of the

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erroneous. In the mean while, let those men consider how heinously they sin, who, adding

injustice, if not their errour, yet certainly to their pride, do rashly and arrogantly take upon them

to misuse the servants of another master, who are not at all accountable to them.

Nay, further: if it could be manifest which of these two dissenting churches were in the right way,

there would not accrue thereby unto the orthodox any right of destroying the other. For churches

have neither any jurisdiction in worldly matters, nor are fire and sword any proper instruments

wherewith to convince men’s minds of errour, and inform them of the truth. Let us suppose,

nevertheless, that the civil magistrate is inclined to favour one of them, and to put his sword into

their hands, that, by his consent, they might chastise the dissenters as they pleased. Will any

man say, that any right can be derived unto a christian church, over its brethren, from a Turkish

emperor? An infidel, who has himself no authority to punish christians for the articles of their

faith, cannot confer such an authority upon any society of christians, nor give unto them a right

which he has not himself. This would be the case at Constantinople. And the reason of the thing is

the same in any christian kingdom. The civil power is the same in every place: nor can that

power, in the hands of a christian prince, confer any greater authority upon the church, than in

the hands of a heathen; which is to say, just none at all.

Nevertheless, it is worthy to be observed, and lamented, that the most violent of these defenders

of the truth, the opposers of errour, the exclaimers against schism, do hardly ever let loose this

their zeal for God, with which they are so warmed and inflamed, unless where they have the civil

magistrate on their side. But so soon as ever court-favour has given them the better end of the

staff, and they begin to feel themselves the stronger; then presently peace and charity are to be

laid aside: otherwise, they are religiously to be observed. Where they have not the power to carry

on persecution, and to become masters, there they desire to live upon fair terms and preach up

toleration. When they are not strengthened with the civil power, then they can bear most

patiently, and unmovedly, the contagion of idolatry, superstition, and heresy in their

neighbourhood; of which, on other occasions, the interest of religion makes them to be extremely

apprehensive. They do not forwardly attack those errours which are in fashion at court, or are

countenanced by the government. Here they can be content to spare their arguments: which yet,

with their leave, is the only right method of propagating truth; which has no such way of

prevailing, as when strong arguments and good reason are joined with the softness of civility and

good usage.

No-body therefore, in fine, neither single persons, nor churches, nay, nor even commonwealths,

have any just title to invade the civil rights and worldly goods of each other, upon pretence of

religion. Those that are of another opinion, would do well to consider with themselves how

pernicious a seed of discord and war, how powerful a provocation to endless hatreds, rapines, and

slaughters, they thereby furnish unto mankind. No peace and security, no not so much as

common friendship, can ever be established or preserved amongst men, so long as this opinion

prevails “that dominion is founded in grace, and that religion is to be propagated by force of

arms.”

In the third place: Let us see what the duty of toleration requires from those who are

distinguished from the rest of mankind, from the laity, as they please to call us, by some

ecclesiastical character and office; whether they be bishops, priests, presbyters, ministers, or

however else dignified or distinguished. It is not my business to enquire here into the original of

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the power or dignity of the clergy. This only I say, that whencesoever their authority be sprung,

since it is ecclesiastical, it ought to be confined within the bounds of the church, nor can it in any

manner be extended to civil affairs; because the church itself is a thing absolutely separate and

distinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immoveable. He

jumbles heaven and earth together, the things most remote and opposite, who mixes these

societies, which are, in their original, end, business, and in every thing, perfectly distinct, and

infinitely different from each other. No man therefore, with whatsoever ecclesiastical office he be

dignified, can deprive another man that is not of his church and faith, either of liberty, or of any

part of his worldly goods, upon the account of that difference which is between them in religion.

For whatsoever is not lawful to the whole church cannot by any ecclesiastical right, become lawful

to any of its members.

But this is not all. It is not enough that ecclesiastical men abstain from violence and rapine, and

all manner of persecution. He that pretends to be a successor of the apostles, and takes upon him

the office of teaching, is obliged also to admonish his hearers of the duties of peace and good-will

towards all men; as well towards the erroneous as the orthodox; towards those that differ from

them in faith and worship, as well as towards those that agree with them therein: and he ought

industriously to exhort all men, whether private persons or magistrates, if any such there be in

his church, to charity, meekness, and toleration; and diligently endeavour to allay and temper all

that heat, and unreasonable averseness of mind, which either any man’s fiery zeal for his own

sect, or the craft of others, has kindled against dissenters. I will not undertake to represent how

happy and how great would be the fruit, both in church and state, if the pulpits every-where

sounded with this doctrine of peace and toleration; lest I should seem to reflect too severely upon

those men whose dignity I desire not to detract from, nor would have it diminished either by

others or themselves. But this I say, that thus it ought to be. And if any one that professes

himself to be a minister of the word of God, a preacher of the gospel of peace, teach otherwise;

he either understands not, or neglects the business of his calling, and shall one day give account

thereof unto the Prince of Peace. If christians are to be admonished that they abstain from all

manner of revenge, even after repeated provocations and multiplied injuries; how much more

ought they who suffer nothing, who have had no harm done them, to forbear violence, and

abstain from all manner of ill usage towards those from whom they have received none? This

caution and temper they ought certainly to use towards those who mind only their own business,

and are solicitous for nothing but that, whatever men think of them, they may worship God in

that manner which they are persuaded is acceptable to him, and in which they have the strongest

hopes of eternal salvation. In private domestic affairs, in the management of estates, in the

conservation of bodily health, every man may consider what suits his own conveniency, and

follow what course he likes best. No man complains of the ill management of his neighbour’s

affairs. No man is angry with another for an errour committed in sowing his land, or in marrying

his daughter. No-body corrects a spendthrift for consuming his substance in taverns. Let any man

pull down, or build, or make whatsoever expences he pleases, no-body murmurs, no-body

controls him; he has his liberty. But if any man do not frequent the church, if he do not there

conform his behaviour exactly to the accustomed ceremonies, or if he brings not his children to

be initiated in the sacred mysteries of this or the other congregation; this immediately causes an

uproar, and the neighbourhood is filled with noise and clamour. Every one is ready to be the

avenger of so great a crime. And the zealots hardly have patience to refrain from violence and

rapine, so long till the cause be heard, and the poor man be, according to form, condemned to

the loss of liberty, goods or life. Oh that our ecclesiastical orators, of every sect, would apply

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themselves, with all the strength of argument that they are able, to the confounding of men’s

errours! But let them spare their persons. Let them not supply their want of reasons with the

instruments of force, which belong to another jurisdiction, and do ill become a churchman’s

hands. Let them not call in the magistrate’s authority to the aid of their eloquence, or learning;

lest perhaps, whilst they pretend only love for the truth, this their intemperate zeal, breathing

nothing but fire and sword, betray their ambition, and show that what they desire is temporal

dominion. For it will be very difficult to persuade men of sense, that he, who with dry eyes, and

satisfaction of mind, can deliver his brother unto the executioner, to be burnt alive, does sincerely

and heartily concern himself to save that brother from the flames of hell in the world to come.

In the last place. Let us now consider what is the magistrate’s duty in the business of toleration:

which is certainly very considerable.

We have already proved that the care of souls does not belong to the magistrate: not a

magisterial care, I mean, if I may so call it, which consists in prescribing by laws, and compelling

by punishments. But a charitable care, which consists in teaching, admonishing, and persuading,

cannot be denied unto any man. The care therefore of every man’s soul belongs unto himself, and

is to be left unto himself. But what if he neglect the care of his soul? I answer, what if he neglect

the care of his health, or of his estate; which things are nearlier related to the government of the

magistrate than the other? Will the magistrate provide by an express law, that such an one shall

not become poor or sick? Laws provide, as much as is possible, that the goods and health of

subjects be not injured by the fraud or violence of others; they do not guard them from the

negligence or ill-husbandry of the possessors themselves. No man can be forced to be rich or

healthful, whether he will or no. Nay God himself will not save men against their wills. Let us

suppose, however, that some prince were desirous to force his subjects to accumulate riches, or

to preserve the health and strength of their bodies. Shall it be provided by law, that they must

consult none but Roman physicians, and shall every one be bound to live according to their

prescriptions? What shall no potion, no broth, be taken, but what is prepared either in the

Vatican, suppose, or in a geneva shop? Or, to make these subjects rich, shall they all be obliged

by law to become merchants, or musicians? Or, shall every one turn victualler, or smith, because

there are some that maintain their families plentifully, and grow rich in those professions? But it

may be said, there are a thousand ways to wealth, but one only way to heaven. It is well said

indeed, especially by those that plead for compelling men into this or the other way; for if there

were several ways that lead thither, there would not be so much as a pretence left for

compulsion. But now, if I be marching on with my utmost vigour, in that way which, according to

the sacred geography, leads straight to Jerusalem; why am I beaten and ill-used by others,

because, perhaps, I wear not buskins; because my hair is not of the right cut; because, perhaps,

I have not been dipt in the right fashion; because I eat flesh upon the road, or some other food

which agrees with my stomach; because I avoid certain by-ways, which seem unto me to lead

into briars or precipices; because, amongst the several paths that are in the same road, I choose

that to walk in which seems to be the straightest and cleanest; because I avoid to keep company

with some travellers that are less grave, and others that are more sour than they ought to be; or

in fine, because I follow a guide that either is, or is not, cloathed in white, and crowned with a

mitre? Certainly, if we consider right, we shall find that for the most part they are such frivolous

things as these, that, without any prejudice to religion to the salvation of souls, if not

accompanied with superstition or hypocrisy, might either be observed or omitted; I say, they are

such like things as these, which breed implacable enmities among christian brethren, who are all

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agreed in the substantial and truly fundamental part of religion.

But let us grant unto these zealots, who condemn all things that are not of their mode, that from

these circumstances arise different ends. What shall we conclude from thence? There is only one

of these which is the true way to eternal happiness. But, in this great variety of ways that men

follow, it is still doubted which is this right one. Now neither the care of the commonwealth, nor

the right of enacting laws, does discover this way that leads to heaven more certainly to the

magistrate than every private man’s search and study discovers it unto himself. I have a weak

body, sunk under a languishing disease, for which, I suppose, there is only one remedy, but that

unknown. Does it therefore belong unto the magistrate to prescribe me a remedy, because there

is but one, and because it is unknown? Because there is but one way for me to escape death, will

it therefore be safe for me to do whatsoever the magistrate ordains? Those things that every man

ought sincerely to inquire into himself, and by meditation, study, search, and his own

endeavours, attain the knowledge of, cannot be looked upon as the peculiar profession of any one

sort of men. Princes indeed are born superiour unto other men in power, but in nature equal.

Neither the right, nor the art of ruling, does necessarily carry along with it the certain knowledge

of other things; and least of all of the true religion; for if it were so, how could it come to pass

that the lords of the earth should differ so vastly as they do in religious matters? But let us grant

that it is probable the way to eternal life may be better known by a prince than by his subjects; or

at least, that in this incertitude of things, the safest and most commodious way for private

persons is to follow his dictates. You will say, what then? If he should bid you follow merchandize

for your livelihood, would you decline that course for fear it should not succeed? I answer, I would

turn merchant upon the prince’s command, because in case I should have ill success in trade, he

is abundantly able to make up my loss some other way. If it be true, as he pretends, that he

desires I should thrive and grow rich, he can set me up again when unsuccessful voyages have

broke me. But this is not the case, in the things that regard the life to come. If there I take a

wrong course, if in that respect I am once undone, it is not in the magistrate’s power to repair my

loss, to ease my suffering, or to restore me in any measure, much less entirely to a good estate.

What security can be given for the kingdom of heaven?

Perhaps some will say, that they do not suppose this infallible judgment that all men are bound to

follow in the affairs of religion, to be in the civil magistrate, but in the church. What the church

has determined, that the civil magistrate orders to be observed; and he provides by his authority,

that nobody shall either act or believe, in the business of religion, otherwise than the church

teaches; so that the judgment of those things is in the church. The magistrate himself yields

obedience thereunto, and requires the like obedience from others. I answer: Who sees not how

frequently the name of the church, which was so venerable in the time of the apostles, has been

made use of to throw dust in people’s eyes, in following ages? But however, in the present case it

helps us not. The one only narrow way which leads to heaven is not better known to the

magistrate than to private persons, and therefore I cannot safely take him for my guide, who may

probably be as ignorant of the way as myself, and who certainly is less concerned for my

salvation than I myself am. Amongst so many kings of the jews, how many of them were there

whom any Israelite, thus blindly following, had not fallen into idolatry, and thereby into

destruction? Yet nevertheless, you bid me be of good courage, and tell me that all is now safe

and secure, because the magistrate does not now enjoin the observance of his own decrees in

matters of religion, but only the decrees of the church. Of what church, I beseech you? Of that

which certainly likes him best. As if he that compels me by laws and penalties to enter into this or

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the other church, did not interpose his own judgment in the matter. What difference is there

whether he lead me himself or deliver me over to be led by others? I depend both ways upon his

will, and it is he that determines both ways of my eternal state. Would an Israelite, that had

worshipped Baal upon the command of his king, have been in any better condition, because

somebody had told him that the king ordered nothing in religion upon his own head, nor

commanded any thing to be done by his subjects in divine worship, but what was approved by

the counsel of priests, and declared to be of divine right by the doctors of the church? If the

religion of any church become therefore true and saving, because the head of that sect, the

prelates and priests, and those of that tribe, do all of them, with all their might, extol and praise

it; what religion can ever be accounted erroneous, false and destructive? I am doubtful

concerning the doctrine of the socinians, I am suspicious of the way of worship practised by the

papists or lutherans; will it be ever a jot the safer for me to join either unto the one or the other

of those churches, upon the magistrate’s command, because he commands nothing in religion but

by the authority and counsel of the doctors of that church?

But to speak the truth, we must acknowledge that the church, if a convention of clergymen,

making canons, must be called by that name, is for the most part more apt to be influenced by

the court, than the court by the church. How the church was under the vicissitude of orthodox

and arian emperors is very well known. Or if those things be too remote, our modern English

history affords us fresher examples, in the reigns of Henry VIII. Edward VI. Mary, and Elizabeth,

how easily and smoothly the clergy changed their decrees, their articles of faith, their form of

worship, every thing, according to the inclination of those kings and queens. Yet were those kings

and queens of such different minds, in points of religion, and enjoined thereupon such different

things, that no man in his wits, I had almost said none but an atheist, will presume to say that

any sincere and upright worshipper of God could, with a safe conscience, obey their several

decrees. To conclude, It is the same thing whether a king that prescribes laws to another man’s

religion pretend to do it by his own judgment, or by the ecclesiastical authority and advice of

others. The decisions of church-men, whose differences and disputes are sufficiently known,

cannot be any sounder, or safer than his: nor can all their suffrages joined together add any new

strength unto the civil power. Though this also must be taken notice of that princes seldom have

any regard to the suffrages of ecclesiastics that are not favourers of their own faith and way of

worship.

But after all, the principal consideration, and which absolutely determines this controversy, is

this: Although the magistrate’s opinion in religion be sound, and the way that he appoints be truly

evangelical, yet if I be not thoroughly persuaded thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety

for me in following it. No way whatsoever that I shall walk in against the dictates of my

conscience, will ever bring me to the mansions of the blessed. I may grow rich by an art that I

take not delight in; I may be cured of some disease by remedies that I have not faith in; but I

cannot be saved by a religion that I distrust, and by a worship that I abhor. It is in vain for an

unbeliever to take up the outward show of another man’s profession. Faith only, and inward

sincerity, are the things that procure acceptance with God. The most likely and most approved

remedy can have no effect upon the patient, if his stomach reject it as soon as taken; and you

will in vain cram a medicine down a sick man’s throat, which his particular constitution will be

sure to turn into poison. In a word; Whatsoever may be doubtful in religion, yet this at least is

certain, that no religion, which I believe not to be true, can be either true or profitable unto me.

In vain therefore do princes compel their subjects to come into their church-communion, under

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pretence of saving their souls. If they believe, they will come of their own accord; if they believe

not, their coming will nothing avail them. How great soever, in fine, may be the pretence of good-

will and charity, and concern for the salvation of men’s souls, men cannot be forced to be saved

whether they will or no; and therefore when all is done, they must be left to their own

consciences.

Having thus at length freed men from all dominion over one another in matters of religion, let us

now consider what they are to do. All men know and acknowledge that God ought to be publicly

worshipped. Why otherwise do they compel one another unto the public assemblies? Men

therefore constituted in this liberty are to enter into some religious society, that they may meet

together, not only for mutual edification, but to own to the world that they worship God, and offer

unto his divine majesty such service as they themselves are not ashamed of, and such as they

think not unworthy of him, nor unacceptable to him; and finally, that by the purity of doctrine,

holiness of life, and decent form of worship, they may draw others unto the love of the true

religion, and perform such other things in religion as cannot be done by each private man apart.

These religious societies I call churches: and these I say the magistrate ought to tolerate. For the

business of these assemblies of the people is nothing but what is lawful for every man in

particular to take care of; I mean the salvation of their souls: nor in this case is there any

difference between the national church, and other separated congregations.

But as in every church there are two things especially to be considered; the outward form and

rites of worship, and the doctrines and articles of faith; these things must be handled each

distinctly, that so the whole matter of toleration may the more clearly be understood.

Concerning outward worship, I say, in the first place, that the magistrate has no power to enforce

by law either in his own church, or much less in another, the use of any rites or ceremonies

whatsoever in the worship of God. And this, not only because these churches are free societies,

but because whatsoever is practised in the worship of God, is only so far justifiable as it is

believed by those that practise it to be acceptable unto him.—Whatsoever is not done with that

assurance of faith, is neither well in itself, nor can it be acceptable to God. To impose such things

therefore upon any people, contrary to their own judgment, is in effect to command them to

offend God; which, considering that the end of all religion is to please him, and that liberty is

essentially necessary to that end, appears to be absurd beyond expression.

But perhaps it may be concluded from hence, that I deny unto the magistrate all manner of

power about indifferent things; which, if it be not granted, the whole subject matter of law-

making is taken away. No, I readily grant that indifferent things, and perhaps none but such, are

subjected to the legislative power. But it does not therefore follow, that the magistrate may

ordain whatsoever hepl eases concerning any thing that is indifferent. The public good is the rule

and measure of all law-making. If a thing be not useful to the commonwealth, though it be ever

so indifferent, it may not presently be established by law.

But further: Things ever so indifferent in their own nature, when they are brought into the church

and worship of God, are removed out of the reach of the magistrate’s jurisdiction, because in that

use they have no connection at all with civil affairs. The only business of the church is the

salvation of souls: and it no ways concerns the commonwealth, or any member of it, that this or

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the other ceremony be there made use of. Neither the use, nor the omission of any ceremonies in

those religious assemblies, does either advantage or prejudice the life, liberty, or estate of any

man. For example: Let it be granted, that the washing of an infant with water is in itself an

indifferent thing. Let it be granted also, that if the magistrate understand such washing to be

profitable to the curing or preventing of any disease that children are subject unto, and esteem

the matter weighty enough to be taken care of by a law, in that case he may order it to be done.

But will any one therefore say, that the magistrate has the same right to ordain by law, that all

children shall be baptised by priests in the sacred font, in order to the purification of their souls?

The extreme difference of these two cases is visible to every one at first sight. Or let us apply the

last case to the child of a jew, and the thing will speak itself. For what hinders but a christian

magistrate may have subjects that are jews? Now if we acknowledge that such an injury may not

be done unto a jew, as to compel him, against his own opinion, to practise in his religion a thing

that is in its nature indifferent, how can we maintain that any thing of this kind may be done to a

christian?

Again: Things in their own nature indifferent, cannot, by any human authority, be made any part

of the worship of God, for this very reason, because they are indifferent. For since indifferent

things are not capable, by any virtue of their own, to propitiate the Deity; no human power or

authority can confer on them so much dignity and excellency as to enable them to do it. In the

common affairs of life, that use of indifferent things which God has not forbidden, is free and

lawful: and therefore in those things human authority has place. But it is not so in matters of

religion. Things indifferent are not otherwise lawful in the worship of God than as they are

instituted by God himself; and as he, by some positive command, has ordained them to be made

a part of that worship which he will vouchsafe to accept of at the hands of poor sinful men. Nor

when an incensed Deity shall ask us, “Who has required these or such like things at your hands?”

will it be enough to answer him, that the magistrate commanded them. If civil jurisdiction

extended thus far, what might not lawfully be introduced into religion? What hodge-podge of

ceremonies, what superstitious inventions, built upon the magistrate’s authority, might not,

against conscience, be imposed upon the worshippers of God? For the greatest part of these

ceremonies and superstitions consists in the religious use of such things as are in their own

nature indifferent: nor are they sinful upon any other account, than because God is not the author

of them. The sprinkling of water, and use of bread and wine, are both in their own nature, and in

the ordinary occasions of life, altogether indifferent. Will any man therefore say that these things

could have been introduced into religion, and made a part of divine worship, if not by divine

institution? If any human authority or civil power could have done this, why might it not also

enjoin the eating of fish, and drinking of ale, in the holy banquet, as a part of divine worship?

Why not the sprinkling of the blood of beasts in churches, and expiations by water or fire, and

abundance more of this kind? But these things, how indifferent soever they be in common uses,

when they come to be annexed unto divine worship, without divine authority, they are as

abominable to God, as the sacrifice of a dog. And why a dog so abominable? What difference is

there between a dog and a goat, in respect of the divine nature, equally and infinitely distant

from all affinity with matter; unless it be that God required the use of the one in his worship, and

not of the other? We see therefore that indifferent things, how much soever they be under the

power of the civil magistrate, yet cannot upon that pretence be introduced into religion, and

imposed upon religious assemblies; because in the worship of God they wholly cease to be

indifferent. He that worships God does it with design to please him and procure his favour. But

that cannot be done by him, who, upon the command of another, offers unto God that which he

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knows will be displeasing to him, because not commanded by himself. This is not to please God,

or appease his wrath, but willingly and knowingly to provoke him, by a manifest contempt; which

is a thing absolutely repugnant to the nature and end of worship.

But it will here be asked: If nothing belonging to divine worship be left to human discretion, how

is it then that churches themselves have the power of ordering any thing about the time and

place of worship, and the like? To this I answer; that in religious worship we must distinguish

between what is part of the worship itself, and what is but a circumstance. That is a part of the

worship which is believed to be appointed by God, and to be well pleasing to him; and therefore

that is necessary. Circumstances are such things which though in general they cannot be

separated from worship, yet the particular instances or modifications of them are not determined;

and therefore they are indifferent. Of this sort are the time and place of worship, the habit and

posture of him that worships. These are circumstances, and perfectly indifferent, where God has

not given any express command about them. For example: Amongst the Jews, the time and place

of their worship, and the habits of those that officiated in it, were not mere circumstances, but a

part of the worship itself; in which if any thing were defective, or different from the institution,

they could not hope that it would be accepted by God. But these, to christians under the liberty of

the gospel, are mere circumstances of worship which the prudence of every church may bring into

such use as shall be judged most subservient to the end of order, decency, and edification.

Though even under the gospel also, those who believe the first, or the seventh day to be set

apart by God, and consecrated still to his worship; to them that portion of time is not a simple

circumstance, but a real part of divine worship, which can neither be changed nor neglected.

In the next place: As the magistrate has no power to impose by his laws the use of any rites and

ceremonies in any church, so neither has he any power to forbid the use of such rites and

ceremonies as are already received, approved, and practised by any church: because if he did so,

he would destroy the church itself; the end of whose institution is only to worship God with

freedom, after its own manner.

You will say, by this rule, if some congregations should have a mind to sacrifice infants, or, as the

primitive christians were falsely accused, lustfully pollute themselves in promiscuous uncleanness,

or practise any other such heinous enormities, is the magistrate obliged to tolerate them, because

they are committed in a religious assembly? I answer, No. These things are not lawful in the

ordinary course of life, nor in any private house; and therefore neither are they so in the worship

of God, or in any religious meeting. But indeed if any people congregated upon account of

religion, should be desirous to sacrifice a calf, I deny that that ought to be prohibited by a law.

Meliboeus, whose calf it is, may lawfully kill his calf at home, and burn any part of it that he

thinks fit. For no injury is thereby done to any one, no prejudice to another man’s goods. And for

the same reason he may kill his calf also in a religious meeting. Whether the doing so be well-

pleasing to God or no, it is their part to consider that do it.—The part of the magistrate is only to

take care that the commonwealth receive no prejudice, and that there be no injury done to any

man either in life or estate. And thus what may be spent on a feast may be spent on a sacrifice.

But if peradventure such were the state of things that the interest of the commonwealth required

all slaughter of beasts should be forborn for some while, in order to the increasing of the stock of

cattle, that had been destroyed by some extraordinary murrain; who sees not that the

magistrate, in such a case, may forbid all his subjects to kill any calves for any use whatsoever?

Only it is to be observed, that in this case the law is not made about a religious, but a political

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matter: nor is the sacrifice, but the slaughter of calves thereby prohibited.

By this we see what difference there is between the church and the commonwealth. Whatsoever

is lawful in the commonwealth, cannot be prohibited by the magistrate in the church. Whatsoever

is permitted unto any of his subjects for their ordinary use, neither can nor ought to be forbidden

by him to any sect of people for their religious uses. If any man may lawfully take bread or wine,

either sitting or kneeling, in his own house, the law ought not to abridge him of the same liberty

in his religious worship; though in the church the use of bread and wine be very different, and be

there applied to the mysteries of faith, and rites of divine worship. But those things that are

prejudicial to the commonwealth of a people in their ordinary use, and are therefore forbidden by

laws, those things ought not to be permitted to churches in their sacred rites. Only the magistrate

ought always to be very careful that he do not misuse his authority, to the oppression of any

church under pretence of public good.

It may be said, what if a church be idolatrous, is that also to be tolerated by the magistrate? In

answer, I ask, what power can be given to the magistrate for the suppression of an idolatrous

church, which may not, in time and place, be made use of to the ruin of an orthodox one? For it

must be remembered, that the civil power is the same every where, and the religion of every

prince is orthodox to himself. If therefore such a power be granted unto the civil magistrate in

spirituals, as that at Geneva, for example; he may extirpate, by violence and blood, the religion

which is there reputed idolatrous; by the same rule, another magistrate, in some neighbouring

country, may oppress the reformed religion; and in India, the christian. The civil power can either

change every thing in religion, according to the prince’s pleasure, or it can change nothing. If it

be once permitted to introduce any thing into religion by the means of laws and penalties, there

can be no bounds put to it; but it will in the same manner be lawful to alter every thing,

according to that rule of truth which the magistrate has framed unto himself. No man whatsoever

ought therefore to be deprived of his terrestrial enjoyments, upon account of his religion. Not

even Americans, subjected unto a christian prince, are to be punished either in body or goods for

not embracing our faith and worship. If they are persuaded that they please God in observing the

rites of their own country, and that they shall obtain happiness by that means, they are to be left

unto God and themselves. Let us trace this matter to the bottom. Thus it is: an inconsiderable

and weak number of christians, destitute of every thing, arrive in a pagan country; these

foreigners beseech the inhabitants, by the bowels of humanity, that they would succour them

with the necessaries of life; those necessaries are given them, habitations are granted, and they

all join together and grow up into one body of people. The christian religion by this means takes

root in that country, and spreads itself; but does not suddenly grow the strongest. While things

are in this condition, peace, friendship, faith, and equal justice, are preserved amongst them. At

length the magistrate becomes a christian, and by that means their party becomes the most

powerful. Then immediately all compacts are to be broken, all civil rights to be violated, that

idolatry may be extirpated: and unless these innocent pagans, strict observers of the rules of

equity and the law of nature, and no ways offending against the laws of the society, I say unless

they will forsake their ancient religion, and embrace a new and strange one, they are to be turned

out of the lands and possessions of their forefathers, and perhaps deprived of life itself. Then at

last it appears what zeal for the church, joined with the desire of dominion, is capable to produce:

and how easily the pretence of religion, and of the care of souls, serves for a cloak to

covetousness, rapine, and ambition.

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Now whosoever maintains that idolatry is to be rooted out of any place by laws, punishments,

fire, and sword, may apply this story to himself. For the reason of the thing is equal, both in

America and Europe. And neither pagans there, nor any dissenting christians here, can with any

right be deprived of their worldly goods, by the predominating faction of a court-church; nor are

any civil rights to be either changed or violated upon account of religion in one place more than

another.

But idolatry, say some, is a sin, and therefore not to be tolerated. If they said it were therefore to

be avoided, the inference were good. But it does not follow, that because it is a sin it ought

therefore to be punished by the magistrate. For it does not belong unto the magistrate to make

use of his sword in punishing every thing, indifferently, that he takes to be a sin against God.

Covetousness, uncharitableness, idleness, and many other things are sins, by the consent of all

men, which yet no man ever said were to be punished by the magistrate. The reason is, because

they are not prejudicial to other men’s rights, nor do they break the public peace of societies.

Nay, even the sins of lying and perjury are no where punishable by laws; unless in certain cases,

in which the real turpitude of the thing and the offence against God, are not considered, but only

the injury done unto men’s neighbours, and to the commonwealth. And what if in another

country, to a mahometan or a pagan prince, the christian religion seem false and offensive to

God; may not the christians for the same reason, and after the same manner, be extirpated

there?

But it may be urged farther, that by the law of Moses, idolaters were to be rooted out. True

indeed, by the law of Moses; but that is not obligatory to us christians. Nobody pretends that

every thing, generally, enjoined by the law of Moses, ought to be practised by christians. But

there is nothing more frivolous than that common distinction of moral, judicial, and ceremonial

law, which men ordinarily make use of. For no positive law whatsoever can oblige any people but

those to whom it is given. “Hear, O Israel,” sufficiently restrains the obligation of the law of Moses

only to that people. And this consideration alone is answer enough unto those that urge the

authority of the law of Moses, for the inflicting of capital punishments upon idolaters. But

however, I will examine this argument a little more particularly.

The case of idolaters in respect of the jewish commonwealth, falls under a double consideration.

The first is of those, who, being initiated into the Mosaical rites, and made citizens of that

commonwealth, did afterwards apostatize from the worship of the God of Israel. These were

proceeded against as traitors and rebels, guilty of no less than high treason; for the

commonwealth of the jews, different in that from all others, was an absolute theocracy: nor was

there, or could there be, any difference between that commonwealth and the church. The laws

established there concerning the worship of one invisible deity, were the civil laws of that people,

and a part of their political government, in which God himself was the legislator. Now if any one

can show me where there is a commonwealth, at this time, constituted upon that foundation, I

will acknowledge that the ecclesiastical laws do there unavoidably become a part of the civil; and

that the subjects of that government both may, and ought to be kept in strict conformity with

that church, by the civil power. But there is absolutely no such thing, under the gospel, as a

christian commonwealth. There are, indeed, many cities and kingdoms that have embraced the

faith of Christ, but they have retained their ancient forms of government; with which the law of

Christ hath not at all meddled. He, indeed, hath taught men how, by faith and good works, they

may attain eternal life. But he instituted no commonwealth. He prescribed unto his followers no

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new and peculiar form of government, nor put he the sword into any magistrate’s hand, with

commission to make use of it in forcing men to forsake their former religion, and receive his.

Secondly, Foreigners, and such as were strangers to the commonwealth of Israel, were not

compelled by force to observe the rites of the Mosaical law. But, on the contrary, in the very

same place where it is ordered “that an Israelite that was an idolater should be put to death,

there it is provided that strangers should not be vexed nor oppressed,” Exod. xxii. 21. I confess

that the seven nations that possessed the land which was promised to the Israelites, were utterly

to be cut off. But this was not singly because they were idolaters; for if that had been the reason,

why were the Moabites and other nations to be spared? No; the reason is this. God being in a

peculiar manner the king of the jews, he could not suffer the adoration of any other deity, which

was properly an act of high treason against himself, in the land of Canaan, which was his

kingdom; for such a manifest revolt could no ways consist with his dominion, which was perfectly

political, in that country. All idolatry was therefore to be rooted out of the bounds of his kingdom;

because it was an acknowledgment of another God, that is to say, another king, against the laws

of empire. The inhabitants were also to be driven out, that the entire possession of the land might

be given to the Israelites. And for the like reason the Emims and the Horims were driven out of

their countries by the children of Esau and Lot; and their lands, upon the same grounds, given by

God to the invaders, Deut. ii. 12. But though all idolatry was thus rooted out of the land of

Canaan, yet every idolater was not brought to execution. The whole family of Rahab, the whole

nation of the Gibeonites, articled with Joshua, and were allowed by treaty: and there were many

captives amongst the jews, who were idolaters. David and Solomon subdued many countries

without the confines of the Land of Promise, and carried their conquests as far as Euphrates.

Amongst so many captives taken of so many nations reduced under their obedience, we find not

one man forced into the jewish religion, and the worship of the true God, and punished for

idolatry, though all of them were certainly guilty of it. If any one indeed, becoming a proselyte,

desired to be made a denison of their commonwealth, he was obliged to submit unto their laws;

that is, to embrace their religion. But this he did willingly, on his own accord, not by constraint.

He did not unwillingly submit to show his obedience; but he sought and solicited for it, as a

privilege; and as soon as he was admitted, he became subject to the laws of the commonwealth,

by which all idolatry was forbidden within the borders of the land of Canaan. But that law, as I

have said, did not reach to any of those regions, however subjected unto the jews that were

situated without those bounds.

Thus far concerning outward worship. Let us now consider articles of faith.

The articles of religion are some of them practical, and some speculative. Now, though both sorts

consist in the knowledge of truth, yet these terminate simply in the understanding, those

influence the will and manners. Speculative opinions, therefore, and articles of faith, as they are

called, which are required only to be believed, cannot be imposed on any church by the law of the

land; for it is absurd that things should be enjoined by laws, which are not in men’s power to

perform; and to believe this or that to be true, does not depend upon our will. But of this enough

has been said already. But, will some say, let men at least profess that they believe. A sweet

religion, indeed, that obliges men to dissemble, and tell lies both to God and man, for the

salvation of their souls! If the magistrate thinks to save men thus, he seems to understand little

of the way of salvation; and if he does it not in order to save them, why is he so solicitous about

the articles of faith, as to enact them by a law?

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Further, The magistrate ought not to forbid the preaching or professing of any speculative

opinions in any church, because they have no manner of relation to the civil rights of the

subjects. If a roman catholic believe that to be really the body of Christ, which another man calls

bread, he does no injury thereby to his neighbour. If a jew does not believe the New Testament

to be the word of God, he does not thereby alter any thing in men’s civil rights. If a heathen

doubt of both Testaments, he is not therefore to be punished as a pernicious citizen. The power of

the magistrate, and the estates of the people, may be equally secure, whether any man believe

these things or no. I readily grant, that these opinions are false and absurd. But the business of

laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the

commonwealth, and of every particular man’s goods and person. And so it ought to be; for truth

certainly would do well enough, if she were once made to shift for herself. She seldom has

received, and I fear never will receive, much assistance from the power of great men, to whom

she is but rarely known, and more rarely welcome. She is not taught by laws, nor has she any

need of force to procure her entrance into the minds of men. Errours indeed prevail by the

assistance of foreign and borrowed succours. But if truth makes not her way into the

understanding by her own light, she will be but the weaker for any borrowed force violence can

add to her. Thus much for speculative opinions. Let us now proceed to the practical ones.

A good life, in which consists not the least part of religion and true piety, concerns also the civil

government: and in it lies the safety both of men’s souls and of the commonwealth. Moral actions

belong therefore to the jurisdiction both of the outward and inward court; both of the civil and

domestic governor; I mean, both of the magistrate and conscience. Here therefore is great

danger, lest one of these jurisdictions intrench upon the other, and discord arise betwen the

keeper of the public peace and the overseers of souls. But if what has been already said

concerning the limits of both these governments be rightly considered, it will easily remove all

difficulty in this matter.

Every man has an immortal soul, capable of eternal happiness or misery; whose happiness

depending upon his believing and doing those things in this life, which are necessary to the

obtaining of God’s favour, and are prescribed by God to that end. It follows from thence, first,

that the observance of these things is the highest obligation that lies upon mankind, and that our

utmost care, application, and diligence, ought to be exercised in the search and performance of

them; because there is nothing in this world that is of any consideration in comparison with

eternity. Secondly, that seeing one man does not violate the right of another, by his erroneous

opinions, and undue manner of worship, nor is his perdition any prejudice to another man’s

affairs; therefore the care of each man’s salvation belongs only to himself. But I would not have

this understood, as if I meant hereby to condemn all charitable admonitions, and affectionate

endeavours to reduce men from errours; which are indeed the greatest duty of a christian. Any

one may employ as many exhortations and arguments as he pleases, towards the promoting of

another man’s salvation. But all force and compulsion are to be forborn. Nothing is to be done

imperiously.—Nobody is obliged in that manner to yield obedience unto the admonitions or

injunctions of another, farther than he himself is persuaded. Every man, in that, has the supreme

and absolute authority of judging for himself; and the reason is, because nobody else is

concerned in it, nor can receive any prejudice from his conduct therein.

But besides their souls, which are immortal, men have also their temporal lives here upon earth;

the state whereof being frail and fleeting, and the duration uncertain, they have need of several

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outward conveniencies to the support thereof, which are to be procured or preserved by pains

and industry; for those things that are necessary to the comfortable support of our lives, are not

the spontaneous products of nature, nor do offer themselves fit and prepared for our use. This

part, therefore, draws on another care, and necessarily gives another employment. But the

pravity of mankind being such, that they had rather injuriously prey upon the fruits of other

men’s labours, than take pains to provide for themselves; the necessity of preserving men in the

possession of what honest industry has already acquired, and also of preserving their liberty and

strength, whereby they may acquire what they farther want, obliges men to enter into society

with one another that by mutual assistance and joint force, they may secure unto each other their

properties, in the things that contribute to the comforts and happiness of this life; leaving in the

mean while to every man the care of his own eternal happiness, the attainment whereof can

neither be facilitated by another man’s industry, nor can the loss of it turn to another man’s

prejudice, nor the hope of it be forced from him by any external violence. But forasmuch as men

thus entering into societies, grounded upon their mutual compacts of assistance, for the defence

of their temporal goods, may nevertheless be deprived of them, either by the rapine and fraud of

their fellow citizens, or by the hostile violence of foreigners: the remedy of all this evil consists in

arms, riches, and multitudes of citizens; the remedy of others in laws: and the care of all things

relating both to the one and the other, is committed by the society to the civil magistrate. This is

the original, this is the use, and these are the bounds of the legislative, which is the supreme

power in every commonwealth. I mean, that provision may be made for the security of each

man’s private possessions; for the peace, riches, and public commodities of the whole people,

and, as much as possible, for the increase of their inward strength against foreign invasions.

These things being thus explained, it is easy to understand to what end the legislative power

ought to be directed, and by what measures regulated; and that is, the temporal good and

outward prosperity of the society; which is the sole reason of men’s entering into society, and the

only thing they seek and aim at in it; and it is also evident what liberty remains to men in

reference to their eternal salvation, and that is, that every one should do what he in his

conscience is persuaded to be acceptable to the Almighty, on whose good pleasure and

acceptance depends his eternal happiness; for obedience is due in the first place to God, and

afterwards to the laws.

But some may ask, “What if the magistrate should enjoin any thing by his authority, that appears

unlawful to the conscience of a private person?” I answer, that if government be faithfully

administered, and the counsels of the magistrate be indeed directed to the public good, this will

seldom happen. But if perhaps it do so fall out, I say, that such a private person is to abstain

from the actions that he judges unlawful; and he is to undergo the punishment, which is not

unlawful for him to bear; for the private judgment of any person concerning a law enacted in

political matters, for the public good, does not take away the obligation of that law, nor deserve a

dispensation. But if the law indeed be concerning things that lie not within the verge of the

magistrate’s authority; as for example, that the people, or any party amongst them, should be

compelled to embrace a strange religion, and join in the worship and ceremonies of another

church; men are not in these cases obliged by that law, against their consciences; for the political

society is instituted for no other end, but only to secure every man’s possession of the things of

this life. The care of each man’s soul, and of the things of heaven, which neither does belong to

the commonwealth, nor can be subjected to it, is left entirely to every man’s self. Thus the

safeguard of men’s lives, and of the things that belong unto this life, is the business of the

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commonwealth; and the preserving of those things unto their owners is the duty of the

magistrate; and therefore the magistrate cannot take away these worldly things from this man,

or party, and give them to that; nor change property amongst fellow-subjects, no not even by a

law, for a cause that has no relation to the end of civil government; I mean for their religion;

which, whether it be true or false, does no prejudice to the worldly concerns of their fellow-

subjects, which are the things that only belong unto the care of the commonwealth.

“But what if the magistrate believe such a law as this to be for the public good?” I answer: as the

private judgment of any particular person, if erroneous, does not exempt him from the obligation

of law, so the private judgment, as I may call it, of the magistrate, does not give him any new

right of imposing laws upon his subjects, which neither was in the constitution of the government

granted him, nor ever was in the power of the people to grant: and least of all, if he make it his

business to enrich and advance his followers and fellow-sectaries with the spoils of others. But

what if the magistrate believe that he has a right to make such laws, and that they are for the

public good; and his subjects believe the contrary? Who shall be judge between them? I answer,

God alone; for there is no judge upon earth between the supreme magistrate and the people.

God, I say, is the only judge in this case, who will retribute unto every one at the last day

according to his deserts; that is, according to his sincerity and uprightness in endeavouring to

promote piety, and the public weal and peace of mankind. But what shall be done in the mean

while? I answer: the principal and chief care of every one ought to be of his own soul first, and, in

the next place, of the public peace: though yet there are few will think it is peace there, where

they see all laid waste. There are two sorts of contests amongst men: the one managed by law,

the other by force; and they are of that nature, that where the one ends the other always begins.

But it is not my business to inquire into the power of the magistrate in the different constitutions

of nations. I only know what usually happens where controversies arise, without a judge to

determine them. You will say, then the magistrate being the stronger will have his will, and carry

his point. Without doubt. But the question is not here concerning the doubtfulness of the event,

but the rule of right.

But to come to particulars. I say, First, No opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral

rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated by the

magistrate. But of those indeed examples in any church are rare. For no sect can easily arrive to

such a degree of madness, as that it should think fit to teach, for doctrines of religion, such things

as manifestly undermine the foundations of society, and are therefore condemned by the

judgment of all mankind: because their own interest, peace, reputation, every thing would be

thereby endangered.

Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is when men arrogate to

themselves, and to those of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative covered over with a

specious show of deceitful words, but in effect opposite to the civil rights of the community. For

example: We cannot find any sect that teaches expressly and openly, that men are not obliged to

keep their promise; that princes may be dethroned by those that differ from them in religion; or

that the dominion of all things belongs only to themselves. For these things, proposed thus

nakedly and plainly, would soon draw on them the eye and hand of the magistrate, and awaken

all the care of the commonwealth to a watchfulness against the spreading of so dangerous an

evil. But nevertheless, we find those that say the same things in other words. What else do they

mean, who teach that, “faith is not to be kept with heretics?” Their meaning, forsooth, is, that the

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privilege of breaking faith belongs unto themselves: for they declare all that are not of their

communion to be heretics, or at least may declare them so whensoever they think fit. What can

be the meaning of their asserting that “kings excommunicated forfeit their crowns and

kingdoms?” It is evident that they thereby arrogate unto themselves the power of deposing kings:

because they challenge the power of excommunication as the peculiar right of their hierarchy.

“That dominion is founded in grace,” is also an assertion by which those that maintain it do

plainly lay claim to the possession of all things. For they are not so wanting to themselves as not

to believe, or at least as not to profess, themselves to be the truly pious and faithful. These

therefore, and the like, who attribute unto the faithful, religious, and orthodox, that is, in plain

terms, unto themselves, any peculiar privilege or power above other mortals, in civil

concernments; or who, upon pretence of religion, do challenge any manner of authority over such

as are not associated with them in their ecclesiastical communion; I say these have no right to be

tolerated by the magistrate; as neither those that will not own and teach the duty of tolerating all

men in matters of mere religion. For what do all these and the like doctrines signify, but that they

may, and are ready upon any occasion to seize the government, and possess themselves of the

estates and fortunes of their fellow-subjects; and that they only ask leave to be tolerated by the

magistrates so long, until they find themselves strong enough to effect it?

Again: That church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate, which is constituted upon

such a bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the

protection and service of another prince. For by this means the magistrate would give way to the

settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country, and suffer his own people to be listed, as it

were, for soldiers against his own government. Nor does the frivolous and fallacious distinction

between the court and the church afford any remedy to this inconvenience; especially when both

the one and the other are equally subject to the absolute authority of the same person; who has

not only power to persuade the members of his church to whatsoever he lists, either as purely

religious, or as in order thereunto; but can also enjoin it them on pain of eternal fire. It is

ridiculous for any one to profess himself to be a mahometan only in religion, but in every thing

else a faithful subject to a christian magistrate, whilst at the same time he acknowledges himself

bound to yield blind obedience to the mufti of Constantinople; who himself is entirely obedient to

the Ottoman emperor, and frames the feigned oracles of that religion according to his pleasure.

But this mahometan living amongst christians, would yet more apparently renounce their

government, if he acknowledged the same person to be head of his church, who is the supreme

magistrate in the state.

Lastly, Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, covenants, and

oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away

of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all. Besides also, those that by their atheism

undermine and destroy all religion, can have no pretence of religion whereupon to challenge the

privilege of a toleration. As for other practical opinions, though not absolutely free from all errour,

yet if they do not tend to establish domination over others, or civil impunity to the church in

which they are taught, there can be no reason why they should not be tolerated.

It remains that I say something concerning those assemblies, which being vulgarly called, and

perhaps having sometimes been conventicles, and nurseries of factions and seditions, are thought

to afford the strongest matter of objection against this doctrine of toleration. But this has not

happened by any thing peculiar unto the genius of such assemblies, but by the unhappy

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circumstances of an oppressed or ill-settled liberty. These accusations would soon cease, if the

law of toleration were once so settled, that all churches were obliged to lay down toleration as the

foundation of their own liberty; and teach that liberty of conscience is every man’s natural right,

equally belonging to dissenters as to themselves; and that nobody ought to be compelled in

matters of religion either by law or force. The establishment of this one thing would take away all

ground of complaints and tumults upon account of conscience. And these causes of discontents

and animosities being once removed, there would remain nothing in these assemblies that were

not more peaceable, and less apt to produce disturbance of state, than in any other meetings

whatsoever. But let us examine particularly the heads of these accusations.

You will say, that “assemblies and meetings endanger the public peace, and threaten the

commonwealth.” I answer: if this be so, why are there daily such numerous meetings in markets,

and courts of judicature? Why are crowds upon the Exchange, and a concourse of people in cities

suffered? You will reply; these are civil assemblies, but those we object against are ecclesiastical.

I answer: it is a likely thing indeed, that such assemblies as are altogether remote from civil

affairs, should be most apt to embroil them. O, but civil assemblies are composed of men that

differ from one another in matters of religion; but these ecclesiastical meetings are of persons

that are all of one opinion. As if an agreement in matters of religion were in effect a conspiracy

against the commonwealth: or as if men would not be so much the more warmly unanimous in

religion the less liberty they had of assembling. But it will be urged still, that civil assemblies are

open and free for any one to enter into; whereas religious conventicles are more private, and

thereby give opportunity to clandestine machinations. I answer, that this is not strictly true: for

many civil assemblies are not open to every one. And if some religious meetings be private, who

are they, I beseech you, that are to be blamed for it? those that desire, or those that forbid their

being public? Again; you will say, that religious communion does exceedingly unite men’s minds

and affections to one another, and is therefore the more dangerous. But if this be so, why is not

the magistrate afraid of his own church; and why does he not forbid their assemblies, as things

dangerous to his govern ment? You will say, because he himself is a part, and even the head of

them. As if he were not also a part of the commonwealth, and the head of the whole people.

Let us therefore deal plainly. The magistrate is afraid of other churches, but not of his own;

because he is kind and favourable to the one, but severe and cruel to the other. These he treats

like children, and indulges them even to wantonness. Those he uses as slaves; and how

blamelessly soever they demean themselves, recompences them no otherwise than by gallies,

prisons, confiscations, and death. These he cherishes and defends: those he continually scourges

and oppresses. Let him turn the tables: or let those dissenters enjoy but the same privileges in

civils as his other subjects, and he will quickly find that these religious meetings will be no longer

dangerous. For if men enter into seditious conspiracies, it is not religion inspires them to it in

their meetings, but their sufferings and oppressions that make them willing to ease themselves.

Just and moderate governments are every-where quiet, every-where safe. But oppression raises

ferments, and makes men struggle to cast off an uneasy and tyrannical yoke. I know that

seditions are very frequently raised upon pretence of religion. But it is as true, that, for reliligion,

subjects are frequently ill treated, and live miserably. Believe me, the stirs that are made,

proceed not from any peculiar temper of this or that church or religious society; but from the

common disposition of all mankind, who, when they groan under any heavy burthen, endeavour

naturally to shake off the yoke that galls their necks. Suppose this business of religion were let

alone, and that there were some other distinction made between men and men, upon account of

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their different complexions, shapes and features, so that those who have black hair, for example,

or grey eyes, should not enjoy the same privileges as other citizens; that they should not be

permitted either to buy or sell, or live by their callings; that parents should not have the

government and education of their own children; that they should either be excluded from the

benefit of the laws, or meet with partial judges: can be it doubted but these persons, thus

distinguished from others by the colour of their hair and eyes, and united together by one

common persecution, would be as dangerous to the magistrate, as any others that had associated

themselves merely upon the account of religion? Some enter into company for trade and profit:

others, for want of business, have their clubs for claret. Neighbourhood joins some, and religion

others. But there is one thing only which gathers people into seditious commotions, and that is

oppression.

You will say; what, will you have people to meet at divine service against the magistrate’s will? I

answer; why, I pray against his will? Is it not both lawful and necessary that they should meet?

Against his will, do you say? That is what I complain of. That is the very root of all the mischief.

Why are assemblies less sufferable in a church than in a theatre or market? Those that meet

there are not either more vicious, or more turbulent, than those that meet elsewhere. The

business in that is, that they are ill used, and therefore they are not to be suffered. Take away

the partiality that is used towards them in matters of common right; change the laws, take away

the penalties unto which they are subjected, and all things will immediately become safe and

peaceable: nay, those that are averse to the religion of the magistrate, will think themselves so

much the more bound to maintain the peace of the commonwealth, as their condition is better in

that place than elsewhere; and all the several separate congregations, like so many guardians of

the public peace, will watch one another, that nothing may be innovated or changed in the form

of the government: because they can hope for nothing better than what they already enjoy; that

is, an equal condition with their fellow-subjects, under a just and moderate government. Now if

that church, which agrees in religion with the prince, be esteemed the chief support of any civil

government, and that for no other reason, as has already been shown, than because the prince is

kind, and the laws are favourable to it; how much greater will be the security of a government,

where all good subjects, of whatsoever they be, without any distinction upon account of religion,

enjoying the same favour of the prince, and the same benefit of the laws, shall become the

common support and guard of it; and where none will have any occasion to fear the severity of

the laws, but those that do injuries to their neighbours, and offend against the civil peace!

That we may draw towards a conclusion. “The sum of all we drive at is, that every man enjoy the

same rights that are granted to others.” Is it permitted to worship God in the Roman manner? Let

it be permitted to do it in the Geneva form also. Is it permitted to speak Latin in the market

place? Let those that have a mind to it, be permitted to do it also in the church. Is it lawful for

any man in his own house to kneel. stand, sit, or use any other posture; and cloath himself in

white or black, in short, or in long garments? Let it not be made unlawful to eat bread, drink

wine, or wash with water in the church. In a word: whatsoever things are left free by law in the

common occasions of life, let them remain free unto every church in divine worship. Let no man’s

life, or body, or house, or estate, suffer any manner of prejudice upon these accounts. Can you

allow of the presbyterian discipline? why should not the episcopal also have what they like?

Ecclesiastical authority, whether it be administered by the hands of a single person, or many, is

every-where the same; and neither has any jurisdiction in things civil, nor any manner of power

of compulsion, nor any thing at all to do with riches and revenues.

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Ecclesiastical assemblies and sermons, are justified by daily experience, and public allowance.

These are allowed to people of some one persuasion: why not to all? If any thing pass in a

religious meeting seditiously, and contrary to the public peace, it is to be punished in the same

manner, and no otherwise than as if it had happened in a fair or market. These meetings ought

not to be sanctuaries of factious and flagitious fellows: nor ought it to be less lawful for men to

meet in churches than in halls: nor are one part of the subjects to be esteemed more blameable

for their meeting together than others. Every one is to be accountable for his own actions; and no

man is to be laid under a suspicion, or odium, for the fault of another. Those that are seditious,

murderers, thieves, robbers, adulterers, slanderers, &c. of whatsoever church, whether national

or not, ought to be punished and suppressed. But those whose doctrine is peaceable, and whose

manners are pure and blameless, ought to be upon equal terms with their fellow-subjects. Thus if

solemn assemblies, observations of festivals, public worship, be permitted to any one sort of

professors; all these things ought to be permitted to the presbyterians, independents,

anabaptists, arminians, quakers, and others, with the same liberty. Nay, if we may openly speak

the truth, and as becomes one man to another, neither pagan, nor mahometan, nor jew, ought to

be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth, because of his religion. The gospel

commands no such thing. The church, “which judgeth not those that are without,” 1 Cor. v. 11.

wants it not. And the commonwealth, which embraces indifferently all men that are honest,

peaceable, and industrious, requires it not. Shall we suffer a pagan to deal and trade with us, and

shall we not suffer him to pray unto and worship God? If we allow the jews to have private

houses and dwellings amongst us, why should we not allow them to have synagogues? Is their

doctrine more false, their worship more abominable, or is the civil peace more endangered, by

their meeting in public, than in their private houses? But if these things may be granted to jews

and pagans, surely the condition of any christians ought not to be worse than theirs, in a christian

commonwealth.

You will say, perhaps, yes, it ought to be: because they are more inclinable to factions, tumults,

and civil wars. I answer: is this the fault of the christian religion? If it be so, truly the christian

religion is the worst of all religions, and ought neither to be embraced by any particular person,

nor tolerated by any commonwealth. For if this be the genius, this the nature of the christian

religion, to be turbulent, and destructive of the civil peace, that church itself which the magistrate

indulges, will not always be innocent. But far be it from us to say any such thing of that religion,

which carries the greatest opposition to covetousness, ambition, discord, contention, and all

manner of inordinate desires; and is the most modest and peaceable religion that ever was. We

must therefore seek another cause of those evils that are charged upon religion. And if we

consider right, we shall find it consist wholly in the subject that I am treating of. It is not the

diversity of opinions, which cannot be avoided; but the refusal of toleration to those that are of

different opinions, which might have been granted, that has produced all the bustles and wars,

that have been in the christian world, upon account of religion. The heads and leaders of the

church, moved by avarice and insatiable desire of dominion, making use of the immoderate

ambition of magistrates, and the credulous superstition of the giddy multitude, have incensed and

animated them against those that dissent from themselves, by preaching unto them, contrary to

the laws of the gospel, and to the precepts of charity, that schismatics and heretics are to be

outed of their possessions, and destroyed. And thus have they mixed together, and confounded

two things, that are in themselves most different, the church and the commonwealth. Now as it is

very difficult for men patiently to suffer themselves to be stript of the goods which they have got

by their honest industry; and contrary to all the laws of equity, both human and divine, to be

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delivered up for a prey to other men’s violence and rapine; especially when they are otherwise

altogether blameless; and that the occasion for which they are thus treated, does not at all

belong to the jurisdiction of the magistrate, but entirely to the conscience of every particular

man; for the conduct of which he is accountable to God only; what else can be expected, but that

these men, growing weary of the evils under which they labour, should in the end think it lawful

for them to resist force with force, and to defend their natural rights, which are not forfeitable

upon account of religion, with arms as well as they can? That this has been hitherto the ordinary

course of things, is abundantly evident in history; and that it will continue to be so hereafter, is

but too apparent in reason. It cannot indeed be otherwise, so long as the principle of persecution

for religion shall prevail, as it has done hitherto, with magistrate and people; and so long as those

that ought to be the preachers of peace and concord, shall continue, with all their art and

strength, to excite men to arms, and sound the trumpet of war. But that magistrates should thus

suffer these incendiaries, and disturbers of the public peace, might justly be wondered at, if it did

not appear that they have been invited by them into a participation of the spoil; and have

therefore thought fit to make use of their covetousness and pride, as means whereby to increase

their own power. For who does not see that these good men are indeed more ministers of the

government, than ministers of the gospel; and that by flattering the ambition, and favouring the

dominion of princes and men in authority, they endeavour with all their might to promote that

tyranny in the commonwealth, which otherwise they should not be able to establish in the

church? This is the unhappy agreement that we see between the church and the state. Whereas if

each of them would contain itself within its own bounds, the one attending to the worldly welfare

of the commonwealth, the other to the salvation of souls, it is impossible that any discord should

ever have happened between them. “Sed pudet hæc opprobria, &c.” God Almighty grant, I

beseech him, that the gospel of peace may at length be preached, and that civil magistrates,

growing more careful to conform their own consciences to the law of God, and less solicitous

about the binding of other men’s consciences by human laws, may, like fathers of their country,

direct all their counsels and endeavours to promote universally the civil welfare of all their

children; except only of such as are arrogant, ungovernable, and injurious to their brethren; and

that all ecclesiastical men, who boast themselves to be the successors of the apostles, walking

peaceably and modestly in the apostles’ steps, without intermeddling with state-affairs, may

apply themselves wholly to promote the salvation of souls. Farewell.

Perhaps it may not be amiss to add a few things concerning heresy and schism. A turk is not, nor

can be either heretic or schismatic, to a christian: and if any man fall off from the christian faith

to mahometism, he does not thereby become a heretic or a schismatic, but an apostate and an

infidel. This no-body doubts of. And by this it appears that men of different religions cannot be

heretics or schismatics to one another.

We are to enquire therefore, what men are of the same religion. Concerning which, it is manifest

that those who have one and the same rule of faith and worship, are of the same religion, and

those who have not the same rule of faith and worship, are of different religions. For since all

things that belong unto that religion are contained in that rule, it follows necessarily, that those

who agree in one rule are of one and the same religion: and vice versâ. Thus turks and christians

are of different religions: because these take the Holy Scriptures to be the rule of their religion,

and those the Koran. And for the same reason, there may be different religions also even

amongst christians. The papists and the lutherans, though both of them profess faith in Christ,

and are therefore called christians, yet are not both of the same religion: because these

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acknowledge nothing but the Holy Scriptures to be the rule and foundation of their religion; those

take in also traditions and decrees of popes, and of all these together make the rule of their

religion. And thus the christians of St. John, as they are called, and the christians of Geneva, are

of different religions: because these also take only the scriptures; and those, I know not what

traditions; for the rule of their religion.

This being settled, it follows, First, That heresy is a separation made in ecclesiastical communion

between men of the same religion, for some opinions no way contained in the rule itself. And

secondly, That amongst those who acknowledge nothing but the Holy Scriptures to be their rule

of faith, heresy is a separation made in their christian communion, for opinions not contained in

the express words of scripture.

Now this separation may be made in a twofold manner.

First, When the greater part, or, by the magistrate’s patronage, the stronger part of the church

separates itself from others, by excluding them out of her communion, because they will not

profess their belief of certain opinions which are not to be found in the express words of scripture.

For it is not the paucity of those that are separated, nor the authority of the magistrate, that can

make any man guilty of heresy. But he only is an heretic who divides the church into parts,

introduces names and marks of distinction, and voluntarily makes a separation because of such

opinions.

Secondly, When any one separates himself from the communion of a church, because that church

does not publicly profess some certain opinions which the Holy Scriptures do not expressly teach.

Both these are “heretics, because they err in fundamentals, and they err obstinately against

knowledge.” For when they have determined the Holy Scriptures to be the only foundation of

faith, they nevertheless lay down certain propositions as fundamental, which are not in the

scripture; and because others will not acknowledge these additional opinions of theirs, nor build

upon them as if they were necessary and fundamental, they therefore make a separation in the

church, either by withdrawing themselves from the others, or expelling the others from them. Nor

does it signify any thing for them to say that their confessions and symbols are agreeable to

scripture, and to the analogy of faith. For if they be conceived in the express words of scripture,

there can be no question about them; because those are acknowledged by all christians to be of

divine inspiration, and therefore fundamental. But if they say that the articles which they require

to be professed, are consequences deduced from the scripture; it is undoubtedly well done of

them to believe and profess such things as seem unto them so agreeable to the rule of faith: but

it would be very ill done to obtrude those things upon others, unto whom they do not seem to be

the indubitable doctrines of the scripture. And to make a separation for such things as these,

which neither are nor can be fundamental, is to become heretics. For I do not think there is any

man arrived to that degree of madness, as that he dare give out his consequences and

interpretations of scripture as divine inspirations, and compare the articles of faith that he has

framed according to his own fancy, with the authority of the scripture. I know there are some

propositions so evidently agreeable to scripture, that no-body can deny them to be drawn from

thence: but about those therefore than can be no difference. This only I say, that however clearly

we may think this or the other doctrine to be deduced from scripture, we ought not therefore to

impose it upon others, as a necessary article of faith, because we believe it to be agreeable to the

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rule of faith; unless we would be content also that other doctrines should be imposed upon us in

the same manner; and that we should be compelled to receive and profess all the different and

contradictory opinions of lutherans, calvinists, remonstrants, anabaptists, and other sects which

the contrivers of symbols, systems, and confessions, are accustomed to deliver unto their

followers as genuine and necessary deductions from the Holy Scripture. I cannot but wonder at

the extravagant arrogance of those men who think that they themselves can explain things

necessary to salvation more clearly than the Holy Ghost, the eternal and infinite wisdom of God.

Thus much concerning heresy; which word in common use is applied only to the doctrinal part of

religion. Let us now consider schism, which is a crime near a-kin to it. For both these words seem

unto me to signify an “ill-grounded separation in ecclesiastical communion, made about things not

necessary.” But since use, which is the supreme law in matter of language, has determined that

heresy relates to errours in faith, and schism to those in worship or discipline, we must consider

them under that distinction.

Schism then, for the same reasons that have already been alleged, is nothing else but a

separation made in the communion of the church, upon account of something in divine worship,

or ecclesiastical discipline, that is not any necessary part of it. Now nothing in worship or

discipline can be necessary to christian communion, but what Christ our legislator, or the

apostles, by inspiration of the Holy Spirit, have commanded in express words.

In a word: he that denies not any thing that the Holy Scriptures teach in express words, nor

makes a separation upon occasion of any thing that is not manifestly contained in the sacred

text; however he may be nick-named by any sect of christians, and declared by some or all of

them, to be utterly void of true christianity; yet indeed and in truth this man cannot be either a

heretic or schismatic.

These things might have been explained more largely, and more advantageously; but it is enough

to have hinted at them, thus briefly, to a person of your parts.

A SECOND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION.

To the A

UTHOR

of the Argument of the L

ETTER

, concerning T

OLERATION

, briefly

considered and answered.

SIR,

will pardon me if I take the same liberty with you, that you have done with the author of the

Letter concerning Toleration; to consider your arguments, and endeavour to shew you the

mistakes of them; for since you have so plainly yielded up the question to him, and do own that

“the severities he would dissuade christians from, are utterly unapt and improper to bring men to

embrace that truth which must save them:” I am not without some hopes to prevail with you to

do that yourself, which you say is the only justifiable aim of men differing about religion, even in

the use of the severest methods, viz. carefully and impartially to weigh the whole matter, and

thereby to remove that prejudice which makes you yet favour some remains of persecution:

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promising myself that so ingenious a person will either be convinced by the truth which appears

so very clear and evident to me: or else confess, that, were either you or I in authority, we

should very unreasonably and very unjustly use any force upon the other, which differed from

him, upon any pretence of want of examination. And if force be not to be used in your case or

mine, because unreasonable, or unjust; you will, I hope, think fit that it should be forborn in all

others where it will be equally unjust and unreasonable; as I doubt not but to make it appear it

will unavoidably be, wherever you will go about to punish men for want of consideration; for the

true way to try such speculations as these, is to see how they will prove when they are reduced

into practice.

The first thing you seem startled at in the author’s letter, is the largeness of the toleration he

proposes; and you think it strange that he would not have so much as a “pagan, mahometan, or

jew, excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth, because of his religion,” p. 1. We pray

every day for their conversion, and I think it our duty so to do: but it will, I fear, hardly be

believed that we pray in earnest, if we exclude them from the other ordinary and probable means

of conversion; either by driving them from, or persecuting them when they are amongst us.

Force, you allow, is improper to convert men to any religion. Toleration is but the removing that

force; so that why those should not be tolerated as well as others, if you wish their conversion, I

do not see. But you say, “it seems hard to conceive how the author of that letter should think to

do any service to religion in general, or to the christian religion, by recommending and

persuading such a toleration; for how much soever it may tend to the advancement of trade and

commerce (which some seem to place above all other considerations), I see no reason, from any

experiment that has been made, to expect that true religion would be a gainer by it; that it would

be either the better preserved, the more widely propagated, or rendered any whit the more

fruitful in the lives of its professors by it.” Before I come to your doubt itself, “Whether true

religion would be a gainer by such a toleration;” give me leave to take notice, that if, by other

considerations, you mean any thing but religion, your parenthesis is wholly beside the matter;

and that if you do not know that the author of the letter places the advancement of trade above

religion, your insinuation is very uncharitable. But I go on.

“You see no reason, you say, from any experiment that has been made, to expect that true

religion would be a gainer by it.” True religion and christian religion are, I suppose, to you and

me, the same thing. But of this you have an experiment in its first appearance in the world, and

several hundreds of years after. It was then “better preserved, more widely propagated, in

proportion, and rendered more fruitful in the lives of its professors,” than ever since; though then

jews and pagans were tolerated, and more than tolerated by the governments of those places

where it grew up. I hope you do not imagine the christian religion has lost any of its first beauty,

force, or reasonableness, by having been almost two thousand years in the world; that you

should fear it should be less able now to shift for itself, without the help of force. I doubt not but

you look upon it still to be “the power and wisdom of God for our salvation;” and therefore cannot

suspect it less capable to prevail now, by its own truth and light, than it did in the first ages of the

church, when poor contemptible men, without authority, or the countenance of authority, had

alone the care of it. This, as I take it, has been made use of by christians generally, and by some

of our church in particular, as an argument for the truth of the christian religion; that it grew, and

spread, and prevailed, without any aid from force, or the assistance of the powers in being; and if

it be a mark of the true religion, that it will prevail by its own light and strength, but that false

religions will not, but have need of force and foreign helps to support them, nothing certainly can

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be more for the advantage of true religion, than to take away compulsion every-where; and

therefore it is no more “hard to conceive how the author of the letter should think to do service to

religion in general, or to the christian religion,” than it is hard to conceive that he should think

there is a true religion, and that the christian religion is it; which its professors have always

owned not to need force, and have urged that as a good argument to prove the truth of it. The

inventions of men in religion need the force and helps of men to support them. A religion that is

of God wants not the assistance of human authority to make it prevail. I guess, when this

dropped from you, you had narrowed your thoughts to your own age and country: but if you will

enlarge them a little beyond the confines of England, I do not doubt but you will easily imagine

that if in Italy, Spain, Portugal, &c. the inquisition; and in France their dragooning; and in other

parts those severities that are used to keep or force men to the national religion; were taken

away; and instead thereof the toleration proposed by the author were set up, the true religion

would be a gainer by it.

The author of the letter says, “Truth would do well enough, if she were once left to shift for

herself. She seldom hath received, and he fears never will receive much assistance from the

power of great men, to whom she is but rarely known, and more rarely welcome. Errors indeed

prevail, by the assistance of foreign and borrowed succours. Truth makes way into our

understanding, by her own light, and is but the weaker for any borrowed force that violence can

add to her.” These words of his, how hard soever they may seem to you, may help you to

conceive how he should think to do service to true religion, by recommending and persuading

such a toleration as he proposed. And now pray tell me yourself, whether you do not think true

religion would be a gainer by it, if such a toleration, established there, would permit the doctrine

of the church of England to be freely preached, and its worship set up, in any popish,

mahometan, or pagan country? if you do not, you have a very ill opinion of the religion of the

church of England, and must own that it can only be propagated and supported by force. If you

think it would gain in those countries, by such a toleration, you are then of the author’s mind, and

do not find it so hard to conceive how the recommending such a toleration might do service to

that which you think true religion. But if you allow such a toleration useful to truth in other

countries, you must find something very peculiar in the air, that must make it less useful to truth

in England; and it will savour of much partiality, and be too absurd, I fear, for you to own, that

toleration will be advantageous to true religion all the world over, except only in this island:

though, I much suspect, this, as absurd as it is, lies at the bottom; and you build all you say upon

this lurking supposition, that the national religion now in England, backed by the public authority

of the law, is the only true religion, and therefore no other is to be tolerated; which being a

supposition equally unavoidable, and equally just in other countries, unless we can imagine that

every-where but in England men believe what at the same time they think to be a lie; will in

other places exclude toleration, and thereby hinder truth from the means of propagating itself.

What the fruits of toleration are, which in the next words you complain do “remain still among

us,” and which you say, “give no encouragement to hope for any advantages from it;” what fruits,

I say, these are, or whether they are owing to the want or wideness of toleration among us, we

shall then be able to judge when you tell us what they are. In the mean time I will boldly say,

that if the magistrates will severally and impartially set themselves against vice, in whomsoever it

is found, and leave men to their own consciences; in their articles of faith, and ways of worship,

“true religion will be spread wider, and be more fruitful in the lives of its professors,” than ever

hitherto it has been, by the imposition of creeds and ceremonies.

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You tell us, “that no man can fail of finding the way of salvation, who seeks it as he ought.” I

wonder you had not taken notice, in the places you quote for this, how we are directed there to

the right way of seeking. The words, John vii. 17, are, “If any man will do his will, he shall know

of the doctrine whether it be of God.” And Psalm xxv. 9, 12, 14, which are also quoted by you,

tell us, “The meek will he guide in judgment, and the meek will he teach his way. What man is he

that feareth the Lord, him shall he teach in the way that he shall choose. The secret of the Lord is

with them that fear him, and he will show them his covenant.” So that these places, if they prove

what you cite them for, “that no man can fail of finding the way of salvation, who seeks it as he

ought;” they do also prove, that a good life is the only way to seek as we ought; and that

therefore the magistrates, if they would put men upon seeking the way of salvation as they

ought, should, by their laws and penalties, force them to a good life; a good conversation being

the readiest and surest way to a right understanding. Punishments and severities thus applied,

we are sure, are both practicable, just, and useful. How punishments will prove in the way you

contend for, we shall see when we come to consider it.

Having given us these broad marks of your goodwill to toleration, you tell us, “It is not your

design to argue against it, but only to inquire what our author offers for the proof of his

assertion.” And then you give us this scheme of his argument.

1. “There is but one way of salvation, or but one true religion.

2. “No man can be saved by this religion, who does not believe it to be the true religion.

3. “This belief is to be wrought in men by reason and argument, not by outward force and

compulsion.

4. “Therefore all such force is utterly of no use for the promoting true religion, and the salvation

of souls.

5. “And therefore nobody can have any right to use any force or compulsion, for the bringing men

to the true religion.”

And you tell us, “the whole strength of what that letter urged for the purpose of it, lies in this

argument,” which I think you have no more reason to say, than if you should tell us, that only

one beam of a house had any strength in it, when there are several others that would support the

building, were that gone.

The purpose of the letter is plainly to defend toleration, exempt from all force; especially civil

force, or the force of the magistrate. Now, if it be a true consequence “that men must be

tolerated, if magistrates have no commission or authority to punish them for matters of religion;”

then the only strength of that letter lies not in the unfitness of force to convince men’s

understanding. See letter, p. 381.

Again; if it be true that “magistrates being as liable to errour as the rest of mankind, their using

of force in matters of religion, would not at all advance the salvation of mankind,” allowing that

even force could work upon them, and magistrates had authority to use it in religion, then the

argument you mention is not “the only one in that letter of strength to prove the necessity of

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toleration.” See letter, p. 319. For the argument of the unfitness of force to convince men’s minds

being quite taken away, either of the other would be a strong proof for toleration. But let us

consider the argument as you have put it.

“The two first propositions, you say, you agree to.” As to the third, you grant, that “force is very

improper to be used to induce the mind to assent to any truth.” But yet you deny, “that force is

utterly useless for the promoting true religion, and the salvation of men’s souls:” which you call

the author’s fourth proposition; but indeed that is not the author’s fourth proposition, or any

proposition of his, to be found in the pages you quote, or any-where else in the whole letter,

either in those terms, or in the sense you take it. In page 319, which you quote, the author is

showing that the magistrate has no power, that is, no right, to make use of force in matters of

religion, for the salvation of men’s souls. And the reason he gives for it there, is, because force

has no efficacy to convince men’s minds; and that without a full persuasion of the mind, the

profession of the true religion itself is not acceptable to God. “Upon this ground, says he, I affirm

that the magistrate’s power extends not to the establishing any articles of faith, or forms of

worship, by the force of his laws. For laws are of no force at all without penalties; and penalties in

this case are absolutely impertinent, because they are not proper to convince the mind.” And so

again, p. 331, which is the other place you quote, the author says: “Whatsoever may be doubted

in religion, yet this at least is certain, that no religion which I believe not to be true, can be either

true, or profitable unto me. In vain therefore do princes compel their subjects to come into their

church-communion, under the pretence of saving their souls.” And more to this purpose. But in

neither of those passages, nor any-where else, that I remember, does the author say that it is

impossible that force should any way, at any time, upon any person, by any accident, be useful

towards the promoting of true religion, and the salvation of souls; for that is it which you mean

by “utterly of no use.” He does not deny that there is any thing which God in his goodness does

not, or may not, sometimes graciously make use of towards the salvation of men’s souls; as our

Saviour did of clay and spittle to cure blindness; and that so force also may be sometimes useful.

But that which he denies, and you grant, is, that force has any proper efficacy to enlighten the

understanding, or produce belief. And from thence he infers, that therefore the magistrate cannot

lawfully compel men in matters of religion. This is what the author says, and what I imagine will

always hold true, whatever you or any one can say or think to the contrary.

That which you say is, “Force indirectly and at a distance may do some service.” What you mean

by doing service at a distance, towards the bringing men to salvation, or to embrace the truth, I

confess I do not understand; unless perhaps it be what others, in propriety of speech, call by

accident. But be it what it will, it is such a service as cannot be ascribed to the direct and proper

efficacy of force. And so, say you, “Force, indirectly, and at a distance, may do some service.” I

grant it: make your best of it. What do you conclude from thence, to your purpose? That

therefore the magistrate may make use of it? That I deny, that such an indirect, and at a distance

usefulness, will authorise the civil power in the use of it, that will never be proved. Loss of estate

and dignities may make a proud man humble: sufferings and imprisonment may make a wild and

debauched man sober: and so these things may “indirectly, and at a distance, be serviceable

towards the salvation of men’s souls.” I doubt not but God has made some, or all of these, the

occasions of good to many men. But will you therefore infer, that the magistrate may take away a

man’s honour, or estate, or liberty for the salvation of his soul; or torment him in this, that he

may be happy in the other world? What is otherwise unlawful in itself, as it certainly is to punish a

man without a fault; can never be made lawful by some good that, indirectly and at a distance,

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or, if you please, indirectly and by accident, may follow from it. Running a man through, may

save his life, as it has done by chance, opening a lurking imposthume. But will you say therefore,

that this is lawful, justifiable chirurgery? The gallies, it is like, might reduce many a vain, loose

protestant to repentance, sobriety of thought, and a true sense of religion: and the torments they

suffered in the late persecution might make several consider the pains of hell, and put a due

estimate of vanity and contempt on all things of this world. But will you say, because those

punishments might, indirectly and at a distance, serve to the salvation of men’s souls, that

therefore the king of France had right authority to make use of them? If your indirect and at a

distance serviceableness may authorize the magistrate to use force in religion, all the cruelties

used by the heathens against christians, by papists against protestants, and all the persecuting of

christians one among another are all justifiable.

But what if I should tell you now of other effects, contrary effects, that punishments in matters of

religion may produce; and so may serve to keep men from the truth and from salvation? What

then will become of your indirect and at a distance usefulness? For in all pleas for any thing

because of its usefulness, it is not enough to say as you do, and is the utmost that can be said for

it, that it may be serviceable: but it must be considered not only what it may, but what it is likely

to produce: and the greater good or harm like to come from it ought to determine the use of it.

To show you what effects one may expect from force, of what usefulness it is to bring men to

embrace the truth, be pleased to read what you yourself have writ: “I cannot but remark, say

you, that these methods (viz. depriving men of estates, corporal punishment, starving and

tormenting them in prisons, and in the end even taking away their lives, to make them christians)

are so very improper in respect to the design of them, that they usually produce the quite

contrary effect. For whereas all the use which force can have for the advancing true religion, and

the salvation of souls, is (as has already been showed) by disposing men to submit to instruction,

and to give a fair hearing to the reasons which are offered for the enlightening their minds, and

discovering the truth to them; these cruelties have the misfortune to be commonly looked upon

as so just a prejudice against any religion that uses them, as makes it needless to look any

farther into it: and to tempt men to reject it, as both false and detestable, without ever

vouchsafing to consider the rational grounds and motives of it. This effect they seldom fail to

work upon the sufferers of them. And as to the spectators, if they be not beforehand well

instructed in those grounds and motives, they will be much tempted likewise not only to entertain

the same opinion of such a religion, but withal to judge much more favourably of that of the

sufferers; who, they will be apt to think, would not expose themselves to such extremities, which

they might avoid by compliance, if they were not thoroughly satisfied of the justice of their

cause.” Here then you allow that taking away men’s estates, or liberty, and corporal

punishments, are apt to drive away both sufferers and spectators from the religion that makes

use of them, rather than to it. And so these you renounce. Now if you give up punishments of a

man, in his person, liberty, and estate, I think we need not stand with you, for any other

punishments that may be made use of. But, by what follows, it seems you shelter yourself under

the name of severities. For moderate punishments, as you call them in another place, you think

may be serviceable; indirectly, and at a distance serviceable, to bring men to the truth. And I

say, any sort of punishments disproportioned to the offence, or where there is no fault at all, will

always be severity, unjustifiable severity, and will be thought so by the sufferers and by-

standers; and so will usually produce the effects you have mentioned, contrary to the design they

are used for. Not to profess the national faith, whilst one believes it not to be true; not to enter

into church-communion with the magistrate as long as one judges the doctrine there professed to

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be erroneous, or the worship not such as God has either prescribed, or will accept; this you allow,

and all the world with you must allow, not to be a fault. But yet you would have men punished for

not being of the national religion; that is, as you yourself confess, for no fault at all. Whether this

be not severity, nay so open and avowed injustice, that it will give men a just prejudice against

the religion that uses it, and produce all those ill effects you there mention, I leave you to

consider. So that the name of severities, in opposition to the moderate punishments you speak

for, can do you no service at all. For where there is no fault, there can be no moderate

punishment: all punishment is immoderate, where there is no fault to be punished. But of your

moderate punishment we shall have occasion to speak more in another place. It suffices here to

have shown, that, whatever punishments you use, they are as likely to drive men from the

religion that uses them, as to bring them to the truth; and much more likely, as well shall see

before we have done: and so by your own confession they are not to be used.

One thing in this passage of the author, it seems, appears absurd to you; that he should say,

“That to take away men’s lives, to make them christians, was but an ill way of expressing a

design of their salvation.” I grant there is great absurdity somewhere in the case. But it is in the

practice of those who, persecuting men under a pretence of bringing them to salvation, suffer the

temper of their good-will to betray itself, in taking away their lives. And whatever absurdities

there be in this way of proceeding, there is none in the author’s way of expressing it; as you

would more plainly have seen, if you had looked into the Latin original, where the words are,

“Vitâ denique ipsâ privant, ut fideles, ut salvi fiant;” which, though more literally, might be thus

rendered, “to bring them to the faith and to salvation;” yet the translator is not to be blamed, if

he chose to express the sense of the author, in words that very livelily represented the extreme

absurdity they are guilty of, who under pretence of zeal for the salvation of souls, proceed to the

taking away their lives. An example whereof we have in a neighbouring country, where the prince

declares he will have all his dissenting subjects saved, and pursuant thereunto has taken away

the lives of many of them. For thither at last persecution must come: as I fear, notwithstanding

your talk of moderate punishments, you yourself intimate in these words: “Not that I think the

sword is to be used in this business (as I have sufficiently declared already), but because all

coactive power resolves at last into the sword; since all (I do not say that will not be reformed in

this matter by lesser penalties, but) that refuse to submit to lesser penalties must at last fall

under the stroke of it.” In which words, if you mean any thing to the business in hand, you seem

to have a reserve for greater punishments, when lesser are not sufficient to bring men to be

convinced. But let that pass.

You say, “if force be used, not instead of reason and arguments, that is, not to convince by its

own proper efficacy, which it cannot do,” &c. I think those who make laws, and use force, to bring

men to church-conformity in religion, seek only the compliance, but concern themselves not for

the conviction of those they punish; and so never use force to convince. For, pray tell me, when

any dissenter conforms, and enters into the church-communion, is he ever examined to see

whether he does it upon reason, and conviction, and such grounds as would become a christian

concerned for religion? If persecution, as is pretended, were for the salvation of men’s souls, this

would be done; and men not driven to take the sacrament to keep their places, or to obtain

licences to sell ale, for so low have these holy things been prostituted; who perhaps knew nothing

of its institution, and considered no other use of it but the securing some poor secular advantage,

which without taking of it they should have lost. So that this exception of yours, of the “use of

force, instead of arguments, to convince men,” I think is needless; those who use it, not being,

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that ever I heard, concerned that men should be convinced.

But you go on in telling us your way of using force, “only to bring men to consider those reasons

and arguments, which are proper and sufficient to convince them; but which, without being

forced, they would not consider.” And, say you, “who can deny but that, indirectly and at a

distance, it does some service, towards bringing men to embrace that truth, which either through

negligence they would never acquaint themselves with, or through prejudice, they would reject

and condemn unheard?” Whether this way of punishment is like to increase, or remove prejudice,

we have already seen. And what that truth is, which you can positively say any man, “without

being forced by punishment, would through carelessness never acquaint himself with,” I desire

you to name. Some are called at the third, some at the ninth, and some at the eleventh hour.

And whenever they are called, they embrace all the truth necessary to salvation. But these slips

may be forgiven, amongst so many gross and palpable mistakes, as appear to me all through

your discourse. For example: you tell us that “force used to bring men to consider, does,

indirectly, and at a distance, some service.” Here now you walk in the dark, and endeavour to

cover yourself with obscurity, by omitting two necessary parts. As first, who must use this force:

which, though you tell us not here, yet by other parts of your treatise it is plain you mean the

magistrate. And, secondly, you omit to say upon whom it must be used, who it is must be

punished: and those, if you say any thing to your purpose, must be dissenters from the national

religion, those who come not into church-communion with the magistrate. And then your

proposition, in fair plain terms, will stand thus: “If the magistrate punish dissenters, only to bring

them to consider those reasons and arguments which are proper to convince them; who can deny

but that, indirectly and at a distance, it may do service, &c. towards bringing men to embrace

that truth which otherwise they would never be acquainted with?” &c. In which proposition, 1.

There is something impracticable. 2. Something unjust. And, 3. Whatever efficacy there is in

force, your way applied, to bring men to consider and be convinced, it makes against you.

1. It is impracticable to punish dissenters, as dissenters, only to make them consider. For if you

punish them as dissenters, as certainly you do, if you punish them alone, and them all without

exception, you punish them for not being of the national religion. And to punish a man for not

being of the national religion, is not to punish him only to make him consider; unless not to be of

the national religion, and not to consider, be the same thing. But you will say, the design is only

to make dissenters consider; and therefore they may be punished only to make them consider. To

this I reply; it is impossible you should punish one with a design only to make him consider,

whom you punish for something else besides want of consideration; or if you punish him whether

he consider or no; as you do, if you lay penalties on dissenters in general. If you should make a

law to punish all stammerers; could any one believe you, if you said it was designed only to make

them leave swearing? Would not every one see it was impossible that punishment should be only

against swearing, when all stammerers were under the penalty? Such a proposal as this is, in

itself, at first sight monstrously absurd. But you must thank yourself for it. For to lay penalties

upon stammerers, only to make them not swear, is not more absurd and impossible than it is to

lay penalties upon dissenters only to make them consider.

2. To punish men out of the communion of the national church, to make them consider, is unjust.

They are punished, because out of the national church: and they are out of the national church,

because they are not yet convinced. Their standing out therefore in this state, whilst they are not

convinced, not satisfied in their minds, is no fault; and therefore cannot justly be punished. But

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your method is, “Punish them, to make them consider such reasons and arguments as are proper

to convince them.” Which is just such justice, as it would be for the magistrate to punish you for

not being a cartesian, “only to bring you to consider such reasons and arguments as are proper

and sufficient to convince you:” when it is possible, 1. That you being satisfied of the truth of your

own opinion in philosophy, did not judge it worth while to consider that of Des Cartes. 2. It is

possible you are not able to consider and examine all the proofs and grounds upon which he

endeavours to establish his philosophy. 3. Possibly you have examined, and can find no reasons

and arguments proper and sufficient to convince you.

3. Whatever indirect efficacy there be in force, applied by the magistrate your way, it makes

against you. “Force used by the magistrate to bring men to consider those reasons and

arguments, which are proper and sufficient to convince them, but which without being forced they

would not consider; may, say you, be serviceable, indirectly and at a distance, to make men

embrace the truth which must save them.” And thus, say I, it must be serviceable to bring men

to receive and embrace falsehood, which will destroy them. So that force and punishment, by

your own confession, not being able directly, by its proper efficacy, to do men any good, in

reference to their future estate; though it be sure directly to do them harm, in reference to their

present condition here; and indirectly, and in your way of applying it, being proper to do at least

as much harm as good, I desire to know what the usefulness is which so much reccommends it,

even to a degree that you pretend it needful and necessary. Had you some new untried chymical

preparation, that was as proper to kill as to save an infirm man, of whose life I hope you would

not be more tender than of a weak brother’s soul; would you give it your child, or try it upon your

friend, or recommend it to the world for its rare usefulness? I deal very favourably with you,

when I say as proper to kill as to save. For force, in your indirect way, of the magistrate’s

“applying to make men consider those arguments that otherwise they would not; to make them

lend an ear to those who tell them they have mistaken their way, and offer to show them the

right;” I say, in this way, force is much more proper, and likely, to make men receive and

embrace errour than the truth.

1. Because men out of the right way are as apt, I think I may say, apter to use force, than

others. For truth, I mean the truth of the Gospel, which is that of the true religion, is mild, and

gentle, and meek, and apter to use prayers and intreaties, than force, to gain a hearing.

2. Because the magistrates of the world, or the civil sovereigns, as you think it more proper to

call them, being few of them in the right way; not one of ten, take which side you will, perhaps

you will grant not one of an hundred, being of the true religion; it is likely your indirect way of

using of force would do an hundred, or at least ten times as much harm as good; especially if you

consider, that as the magistrate will certainly use it to force men to hearken to the proper

ministers of his religion, let it be what it will: so you having set no time, nor bounds, to this

consideration of arguments and reasons, short of being convinced; you, under another pretence,

put into the magistrate’s hands as much power to force men to his religion, as any the openest

persecutors can pretend to. For what difference, I beseech you, between punishing you to bring

you to mass, and punishing you to consider those reasons and arguments which are proper and

sufficient to convince you that you ought to go to mass? For till you are brought to consider

reasons and arguments proper and sufficient to convince you; that is, till you are convinced, you

are punished on. If you reply, you meant reasons and arguments proper and sufficient to

convince them of the truth: I answer, if you meant so, why did you not say so? But if you had, it

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would in this case do you little service. For the mass, in France is as much supposed the truth, as

the liturgy here. And your way of applying force will as much promote popery in France, as

protestantism in England. And so you see how serviceable it is to make men receive and embrace

the truth that must save them.

However you tell us, in the same page, that “if force so applied, as is above-mentioned, may in

such sort as has been said, i. e. indirectly and at a distance, be serviceable to bring men to

receive and embrace truth, you think it sufficient to show the usefulness of it in religion:” where I

shall observe, I, that this usefulness amounts to no more but this, that it is not impossible but

that it may be useful. And such an usefulness one cannot deny to auricular confession, doing of

penance, going of a pilgrimage to some saint, and what not. Yet our church does not think fit to

use them: though it cannot be denied, but they may have some of your indirect and at a distance

usefulness; that is, perhaps may do some service indirectly and by accident.

2. Force, your way applied, as it may be useful, so also it may be useless. For, 1. Where the law

punishes dissenters, without telling them it is to make them consider, they may through

ignorance and oversight neglect to do it, and so your force proves useless. 2. Some dissenters

may have considered already, and then force employed upon them must needs be useless; unless

you can think it useful to punish a man to make him do that which he has done already. 3. God

has not directed it: and therefore we have no reason to expect he should make it successful.

3. It may be hurtful: nay, it is likely to prove more hurtful than useful. 1. Because to punish men

for that, which it is visible cannot be known whether they have performed or no, is so palpable an

injustice, that it is likelier to give them an aversion to the persons, and religion that uses it, than

to bring them to it. 2. Because the greatest part of mankind, being not able to discern betwixt

truth and falsehood, that depend upon long and many proofs, and remote consequences; nor

having ability enough to discover the false grounds, and resist the captious and fallacious

arguments of learned men versed in controversies; are so much more exposed to it by the force

which is used to make them hearken to the information and instruction of men appointed to it by

the magistrate, or those of his religion, to be led into falsehood and errour, than they are likely

this way to be brought to embrace the truth that must save them; by how much the national

religions of the world are, beyond comparison, more of them false or erroneous, than such as

have God for their author, and truth for their standard. And that seeking and examining, without

the special grace of God, will not secure even knowing and learned men from errour; we have a

famous instance in the two Reynolds’s, both scholars and brothors, but one a protestant, the

other a papist, who, upon the exchange of papers between them, were both turned; but so that

neither of them, with all the arguments he could use, could bring his brother back to the religion

which he himself had found reason to embrace. Here was ability to examine and judge, beyond

the ordinary rate of most men. Yet one of these brothers was so caught by the sophistry and skill

of the other, that he was brought into errour, from which he could never again be extricated. This

we must unavoidably conclude; unless we can think, that wherein they differed, they were both in

the right; or that truth can be an argument to support a falsehood; both which are impossible.

And now, I pray, which of these two brothers would you have punished, to make him bethink

himself and bring him back to the truth? For it is certain some ill-grounded cause of assent

alienated one of them from it. If you will examine your principles, you will find that, according to

your rule, the papist must be punished in England, and the protestant in Italy. So that, in effect,

by your rule passion, humour, prejudice, lust, impressions of education, admiration of persons,

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worldly respect, and the like incompetent motives, must always be supposed on that side on

which the magistrate is not.

I have taken the pains here, in a short recapitulation, to give you the view of the usefulness of

force, your way applied, which you make such a noise with, and lay so much stress on. Whereby I

doubt not but it is visible, that its usefulness and uselessness laid in the balance against each

other, the pretended usefulness is so far from outweighing, that it can neither encourage nor

excuse the using of punishments; which are not lawful to be used in our case without strong

probability of success. But when to its uselessness mischief is added, and it is evident that more,

much more, harm may be expected from it than good; your own argument returns upon you. For

if it be reasonable to use it, because it may be serviceable to promote true religion, and the

salvation of souls: it is much more reasonable to let it alone, if it may be more serviceable to the

promoting falsehood and the perdition of souls. And therefore you will do well hereafter not to

build so much on the usefulness of force, applied your way, your indirect and at a distance

usefulness, which amounts but to the shadow and possibility of usefulness, but with an

overbalancing weight of mischief and harm annexed to it. For upon a just estimate, this indirect,

and at a distance, usefulness, can directly go for nothing; or rather less than nothing.

But suppose force, applied your way, were as useful for the promoting true religion, as I suppose

I have showed it to be the contrary; it does not from hence follow that it is lawful and may be

used. It may be very useful in a parish that has no teacher, or as bad as none, that a lay-man

who wanted not abilities for it, for such we may suppose to be, should sometimes preach to them

the doctrine of the gospel, and stir them up to the duties of a good life. And yet this (which

cannot be denied, may be at least “indirectly, and, at a distance, serviceable towards the

promoting true religion, and the salvation of souls,”) you will not, I imagine, allow, for this

usefulness to be lawful: and that because he has not commission and authority to do it. The same

might be said of the administration of the sacraments, and any other function of the priestly

office. This is just our case. Granting force, as you say, indirectly and at a distance, useful to the

salvation of men’s souls; yet it does not therefore follow that it is lawful for the magistrate to use

it: because as the author says, the magistrate has no commission or authority to do so. For

however you have put it thus, as you have framed the author’s argument, “force is utterly of no

use for the promoting of true religion, and the salvation of souls; and therefore no-body can have

any right to use any force or compulsion for the bringing men to the true religion;” yet the author

does not, in those pages you quote, make the latter of these propositions an inference barely

from the former; but makes use of it as a truth proved by several arguments he had before

brought to that purpose. For though it be a good argument; it is not useful, therefore not fit to be

used: yet this will not be good logic; it is useful, therefore any one has a right to use it. For if the

usefulness makes it lawful, it makes it lawful in any hands that can so apply it; and so private

men may use it.

“Who can deny, say you, but that force, indirectly and at a distance, may do some service

towards the bringing men to embrace that truth, which otherwise they would never acquaint

themselves with?” If this be good arguing in you, for the usefulness of force towards the saving of

men’s souls; give me leave to argue after the same fashion. 1. I will suppose, which you will not

deny me, that as there are many who take up their religion upon wrong grounds, to the

endangering of their souls; so there are many that abandon themselves to the heat of their lusts,

to the endangering of their souls. 2. I will suppose, that as force applied your way is apt to make

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the inconsiderate consider, so force applied another way is apt to make the lascivious chaste. The

argument then, in your form, will stand thus; “Who can deny but that force, indirectly and at a

distance, may, by castration, do some service towards bringing men to embrace that chastity,

which otherwise they would never acquit themselves with?” Thus, you see, “castration may,

indirectly and at a distance, be serviceable towards the salvation of men’s souls.” But will you

say, from such an usefulness as this, because it may, indirectly and at a distance, conduce to the

saving of any of his subjects souls, that therefore the magistrate has a right to do it, and may by

force make his subjects eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven? It is not for the magistrate or any-

body else, upon an imagination of its usefulness, to make use of any other means for the

salvation of men’s souls, than what the author and finisher of our faith hath directed You may be

mistaken in what you think useful. Dives thought, and so perhaps should you and I too, if not

better informed by the scriptures, that it would be useful to rouze and awaken men if one should

come to them from the dead. But he was mistaken. And we are told, that if men will not hearken

to Moses and the prophets, the means appointed; neither will the strangeness nor terrour of one

coming from the dead, persuade them. If what we are apt to think useful were thence to be

concluded so, we should, I fear, be obliged to believe the miracles pretended to by the church of

Rome. For miracles, we know, were once useful for the promoting true religion, and the salvation

of souls; which is more than you say for your political punishments: but yet we must conclude

that God thinks them not useful now; unless we will say, that which without impiety cannot be

said, that the wise and benign disposer and governor of all things does not now use all useful

means for promoting his own honour in the world, and the good of souls. I think this consequence

will hold as well as what you draw in near the same words.

Let us not therefore be more wise than our Maker, in that stupendous and supernatural work of

our salvation. The scripture, that reveals it to us, contains all that we can know, or do, in order to

it; and where that is silent, it is in us presumption to direct. When you can show any commission

in scripture, for the use of force to compel men to hear, any more than to embrace the doctrine

of others that differ from them, we shall have reason to submit to it, and the magistrate have

some ground to set up this new way of persecution. But till then, it will be fit for us to obey that

precept of the gospel, which bids us “take heed what we hear,” Mark iv. 24. So that hearing is not

always so useful as you suppose. If it had, we should never have had so direct a caution against

it. It is not any imaginary usefulness, you can suppose, which can make that a punishable crime,

which the magistrate was never authorized to meddle with. “Go and teach all nations,” was a

commission of our Saviour’s; but there was not added to it, punish those that will nor hear and

consider what you say. No, but “if they will not receive you, shake off the dust of your feet;”

leave them, and apply yourselves to some others. And St. Paul knew no other means to make

men hear, but the preaching of the gospel; as will appear to any one who will read Romans x. 14,

&c. “Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God.”

You go on, and in favour of your beloved force you tell us that it is not only useful but needful.

And here after having at large, in the four following pages, set out the negligence or aversion, or

other hinderances that keep men from examining, with that application and freedom of judgment

they should, the grounds upon which they take up and persist in their religion; you come to

conclude force necessary. Your words are; “If men are generally averse to a due consideration of

things, where they are most concerned to use it; if they usually take up their religion without

examining it as they ought, and then grow so opinionative and so stiff in their prejudice, that

neither the gentlest admonitions, nor the most earnest entreaties, shall ever prevail with them

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afterwards to do it: what means is there left, besides the grace of God, to reduce those of them

that are gone into a wrong way, but to lay thorns and briars in it? That since they are deaf to all

persuasions, the uneasiness they meet with may at least put them to a stand, and incline them to

lend an ear to those who tell them they have mistaken their way, and offer to show them the

right.” What means is there left, say you, but force? What to do? “To reduce men, who are out of

it, into the right way.” So you tell us here. And to that, I say, there is other means besides force;

that which was appointed and made use of from the beginning, the preaching of the gospel.

“But, say you, to make them hear, to make them consider, to make them examine, there is no

other means but punishment; and therefore it is necessary.”

I answer, 1. What if God, for reasons best known to himself, would not have men compelied to

hear; but thought the good tidings of salvation, and the proposals of life and death, means and

inducements enough to make them hear, and consider, now as well as heretofore? Then your

means, your punishments, are not necessary. What if God would have men left to their freedom

in this point, if they will hear, or if they will forbear, will you constrain them? thus we are sure he

did with his own people: and this when they were in captivity, Ezek. xi. 5, 7. And it is very like

were illtreated for being of a different religion from the national, and so were punished as

dissenters. Yet then God expected not that those punishments should force them to hearken

more than at other times: as appears by Ezek. iii. 11. And this also is the method of the gospel.

“We are ambassadors for Christ; as if God did beseech you in Christ’s stead,” says St. Paul, 2 Cor.

v. 20. If God thought it necessary to have men punished to make them give ear, he could have

called magistrates to be spreaders and ministers of the gospel, as well as poor fishermen, or Paul

a persecutor; who yet wanted not power to punish where punishment was necessary, as is

evident in Ananias and Sapphira, and the incestuous Corinthian.

2. What if God, foreseeing this force would be in the hands of men, as passionate, humorsome,

as liable to prejudice and errour as the rest of their brethren, did not think it a proper means to

bring men into the right way?

3. What if there be other means? Then yours ceases to be necessary, upon the account that there

is no means left. For you yourself allow, “that the grace of God is another means.” And I suppose

you will not deny it to be both a proper and sufficient means; and, which is more, the only

means; such means as can work by itself, and without which all the force in the world can do

nothing. God alone can open the ear that it may hear, and open the heart that it may

understand: and this he does in his own good time, and to whom he is graciously pleased; but

not according to the will and fancy of man, when he thinks fit, by punishments, to compel his

brethren. If God has pronounced against any person or people, what he did against the jews,

(Isa. vi. 10.) “Make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy and shut their eyes;

lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and

convert, and be healed;” will all the force you can use be a means to make them hear and

understand, and be converted?

But, sir, to return to your argument; you see “no other means left (taking the world as we now

find it) to make men thoroughly and impartially examine a religion, which they embraced upon

such inducements as ought to have no sway at all in the matter, and with little or no examination

of the proper grounds of it.” And thence you conclude the use of force, by the magistrates upon

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dissenters, necessary. And, I say, I see no other means left (taking the world as we now find it,

wherein the magistrates never lay penalties, for matters of religion, upon those of their own

church, nor is it to be expected they ever should;) “to make men of the national church, any-

where, thoroughly and impartially examine a religion, which they embrace upon such

inducements, as ought to have no sway at all in the matter, and therefore with little or no

examination of the proper grounds of it.” And therefore I conclude the use of force by dissenters

upon conformists necessary. I appeal to the world, whether this be not as just and natural a

conclusion as yours. Though if you will have my opinion, I think the more genuine consequence

is, that force, to make men examine matters of religion, is not necessary at all. But you may take

which of these consequences you please. Both of them, I am sure, you cannot avoid. It is not for

you and me, out of an imagination that they may be useful, or are necessary to prescribe means

in the great and mysterious work of salvation, other than what God himself has directed. God has

appointed force as useful or necessary, and therefore it is to be used; is a way of arguing,

becoming the ignorance and humility of poor creatures. But I think force useful or necessary, and

therefore it is to be used; has, methinks, a little too much presumption in it. You ask, “What

means else is there left?” None, say I, to be used by man, but what God himself has directed in

the scriptures, wherein are contained all the means and methods of salvation. “Faith is the gift of

God.” And we are not to use any other means to procure this gift to any one, but what God

himself has prescribed. If he has there appointed that any should be forced “to hear those who

tell them they have mistaken their way, and offer to show them the right;” and that they should

be punished by the magistrate if they did not; it will be past doubt, it is to be made use of. But till

that can be done, it will be in vain to say what other means is there left. If all the means God has

appointed, to make men hear and consider, be “exhortation in season and out of season,” &c.

together with prayer for them, and the example of meekness and a good life; this is all ought to

be done, “Whether they will hear or whether they will forbear.”

By these means the gospel at first made itself to be heard through a great part of the world, and

in a crooked and perverse generation, led away by lusts, humours, and prejudice, as well as this

you complain of, prevailed with men to hear and embrace the truth, and take care of their own

souls; without the assistance of any such force of the magistrate, which you now think needful.

But whatever neglect or aversion there is in some men, impartially and thoroughly to be

instructed; there will upon a due examination, I fear, be found no less a neglect and aversion in

others, impartially and thoroughly to instruct them. It is not the talking even general truths in

plain and clear language; much less a man’s own fancies in scholastic or uncommon ways of

speaking, an hour or two, once a week in public; that is enough to instruct even willing hearers in

the way of salvation, and the grounds of their religion. They are not politic discourses which are

the means of right information in the foundations of religion. For with such, sometimes venting

antimonarchical principles, sometimes again preaching up nothing but absolute monarchy and

passive obedience, as the one or other have been in vogue, and the way to preferment; have our

churches rung in their turns, so loudly, that reasons and arguments proper and sufficient to

convince men of the truth in the controverted points of religion, and to direct them in the right

way to salvation, were scarce any-where to be heard. But how many, do you think, by friendly

and christian debates with them at their houses, and by the gentle methods of the gospel made

use of in private conversation, might have been brought into the church; who, by railing from the

pulpit, ill and unfriendly treatment out of it, and other neglects and miscarriages of those who

claimed to be their teachers, have been driven from hearing them? Paint the defects and

miscarriages frequent on this side, as well as you have done those on the other, and then do you,

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with all the world, consider whether those whom you so handsomely declaim against, for being

misled by “education, passion, humour, prejudice, obstinacy,” &c. do deserve all the punishment.

Perhaps it will be answered: if there be so much toil in it, that particular persons must be applied

to, who then will be a minister? And what if a layman should reply: if there be so much toil in it,

that doubts must be cleared, prejudices removed, foundations examined, &c. who then will be a

protestant? the excuse will be as good hereafter for the one as for the other.

This new method of yours, which you say “no-body can deny but that indirectly, and at a

distance, it does some service towards bringing men to embrace the truth;” was never yet

thought on by the most refined persecutors. Though indeed it is not altogether unlike the plea

made use of to excuse the late barbarous usage of the protestants in France, designed to

extirpate the reformed religion there; from being a persecution for religion. The French king

requires all his subjects to come to mass: those who do not, are punished with a witness. For

what? Not for their religion, say the pleaders for that discipline, but for disobeying the king’s laws.

So by your rule, the dissenters, for thither you would, and thither you must come, if you mean

any thing, must be punished. For what? Not for their religion, say you; not for “following the light

of their own reason; nor for obeying the dictates of their own consciences.” That you think not fit.

For what then are they to be punished? “To make them, say you, examine the religion they have

embraced, and the religion they have rejected.” So that they are punished, not for having

offended against a law: for there is no law of the land that requires them to examine. And which

now is the fairer plea, pray judge. You ought, indeed, to have the credit of this new invention. All

other law-makers have constantly taken this method, that where any thing was to be amended,

the fault was first declared, and then penalties denounced against all those, who, after a set time,

should be found guilty of it. This the common sense of mankind, and the very reason of laws,

which are intended not for punishment, but correction, has made so plain, that the subtilest and

most refined law-makers have not got out of this course; nor have the most ignorant and

barbarous nations missed it. But you have outdone Solon and Lycurgus, Moses, and our Saviour,

and are resolved to be a law-maker of a way by yourself. It is an old and obsolete way, and will

not serve your turn, to begin with warnings and threats of penalties to be inflicted on those who

do not reform, but continue to do that which you think they fail in. To allow of impunity to the

innocent, or the opportunity of amendment to those who would avoid the penalties, are

formalities not worth your notice. You are for a shorter and surer way. Take a whole tribe, and

punish them at all adventures; whether guilty or no of the miscarriage which you would have

amended; or without so much as telling them what it is you would have them do, but leaving

them to find it out if they can. All these absurdities are contained in your way of proceeding; and

are impossible to be avoided by any one who will punish dissenters, and only dissenters, to make

them “consider and weigh the grounds of their religion, and impartially examine whether it be

true or no; and upon what grounds they took it up, that so they may find and embrace the truth

that must save them.” But that this new sort of discipline may have all fair play, let us inquire

first, who it is you would have be punished. In the place above cited, they are “those who are got

into a wrong way, and are deaf to all persuasions.” If these are the men to be punished, let a law

be made against them; you have my consent; and that is the proper course to have offenders

punished. For you do not, I hope, intend to punish any fault by a law, which you do not name in

the law; nor make a law against any fault you would not have punished. And now, if you are

sincere, and in earnest, and are, as a fair man should be, for what your words plainly signify, and

nothing else; what will such a law serve for? Men in the wrong way are to be punished: but who

are in the wrong way is the question. You have no more reason to determine it against one who

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differs from you; than he has to conclude against you, who differ from him. No, not though you

have the magistrate and the national church on your side. For if to differ from them be to be in

the wrong way, you, who are in the right way in England, will be in the wrong way in France.

Every one here must be judge for himself: and your law will reach no-body, till you have

convinced him he is in the wrong way. And then there will be no need of punishment to make him

consider; unless you will affirm again, what you have denied, and have men punished for

embracing the religion they believe to be true, when it differs from yours or the public.

Besides being in the wrong way, those whom you would have punished must be such as are deaf

to all persuasions. But any such, I suppose, you will hardly find who hearken to no-body, not to

those of their own way. If you mean by deaf to all persuasions, all persuasions of a contrary

party, or of a different church; such, I suppose, you may abundantly find in your own church, as

well as elsewhere; and I presume to them you are so charitable, that you would not have them

punished for not lending an ear to seducers. For constancy in the truth, and perseverance in the

faith, is, I hope, rather to be encouraged, than by any penalties checked in the orthodox. And

your church, doubtless, as well as all others, is orthodox to itself in all its tenets. If you mean by

all persuasion, all your persuasion, or all persuasion of those of your communion; you do but beg

the question, and suppose you have a right to punish those who differ from, and will not comply

with you.

Your next words are, “When men fly from the means of a right information, and will not so much

as consider how reasonable it is thoroughly and impartially to examine a religion, which they

embraced upon such inducements as ought to have no sway at all in the matter; and therefore

with little or no examination of the proper grounds of it; what human method can be used to

bring them to act like men, in an affair of such consequence, and to make a wiser and more

rational choice, but that of laying such penalties upon them, as may balance the weight of those

prejudices which inclined them to prefer a false way before the true; and recover them to so

much sobriety and reflection, as seriously to put the question to themselves, whether it be really

worth the while to undergo such inconveniencies, for adhering to a religion, which, for any thing

they know, may be false, or for rejecting another (if that be the case) which for any thing they

know may be true, till they have brought it to the bar of reason, and given it a fair trial there?”

Here you again bring in such as prefer a false way before a true: to which having answered

already, I shall here say no more, but that, since our church will not allow those to be in a false

way who are out of the church of Rome, because the church of Rome, which pretends infallibility,

declares hers to be the only true way; certainly no one of our church, nor any other, which claims

not infallibility, can require any one to take the testimony of any church, as a sufficient proof of

the truth of her own doctrine. So that true and false, as it commonly happens, when we suppose

them for ourselves, or our party, in effect signify just nothing, or nothing to the purpose: unless

we can think that true or false in England, which will not be so at Rome, or Geneva: and vice

versâ. As for the rest of the description of those on whom you are here laying penalties; I

beseech you consider whether it will not belong to any of your church, let it be what it will.

Consider, I say, if there be none in your church “who have embraced her religion, upon such

inducements as ought to have no sway at all in the matter, and therefore with little or no

examination of the proper grounds of it; who have not been inclined by prejudices; who do not

adhere to a religion, which for any thing they know may be false, and who have rejected another

which for any thing they know may be true.” If you have any such in your communion, and it will

be an admirable, though I fear but a little, flock that has none such in it; consider well what you

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have done. You have prepared rods for them, for which I imagine they will con you no thanks. For

to make any tolerable sense of what you here propose, it must be understood that you would

have men of all religions punished, to make them consider “whether it be really worth the while

to undergo such inconveniencies for adhering to a religion which for any thing they know may be

false.” If you hope to avoid that, by what you have said of true and false; and pretend that the

supposed preference of the true way in your church ought to preserve its members from your

punishment; you manifestly trifle. For every church’s testimony, that it has chosen the true way,

must be taken for itself; and then none will be liable; and your new invention of punishment is

come to nothing: or else the differing churches testimonies must be taken one for another; and

then they will be all out of the true way, and your church need penalties as well as the rest. So

that, upon your principles, they must all or none be punished. Choose which you please: one of

them, I think, you cannot escape.

What you say in the next words: “Where instruction is stiffly refused, and all admonitions and

persuasions prove vain and ineffectual;” differs nothing, but in the way of expressing, from deaf

to all persuasions: and so that is answered already.

In another place, you give us another description of those you think ought to be punished, in

these words: “Those who refuse to embrace the doctrine, and submit to the spiritual government

of the proper ministers of religion, who by special designation are appointed to exhort, admonish,

reprove,” &c. Here then, those to be punished, “are such who refuse to embrace the doctrine, and

submit to the government of the proper ministers of religion.” Whereby we are as much still at

uncertainty, as we were before, who those are, who by your scheme and laws suitable to it are to

be punished. Since every church has, as it thinks, its proper ministers of religion. And if you mean

those that refuse to embrace the doctrine, and submit to the government of the ministers of

another church; then all men will be guilty, and must be punished; even those of your church, as

well as others. If you mean those who refuse, &c. the ministers of their own church; very few will

incur your penalties. But if, by these proper ministers of religion, the ministers of some particular

church are intended, who do you not name it? Why are you so reserved in a matter wherein, if

you speak not out, all the rest that you say will be to no purpose? Are men to be punished for

refusing to embrace the doctrine, and submit to the government, of the proper ministers of the

church of Geneva? For this time, since you have declared nothing to the contrary, let me suppose

you of that church; and then, I am sure that is it that you would name. For of whatever church

you are, if you think the ministers of any one church ought to be hearkened to, and obeyed, it

must be those of your own. There are persons to be punished, you say. This you contend for all

through your book; and lay so much stress on it, that you make the preservation and propagation

of religion, and the salvation of souls, to depend on it; and yet you describe them by so general

and equivocal marks; that, unless it be upon suppositions which no-body will grant you, I dare

say, neither you, nor any body else, will be able to find one guilty. Pray find me, if you can, a

man whom you can judicially prove (for he that is to be punished by law must be fairly tried), is

in a wrong way, in respect of his faith; I mean, “who is deaf to all persuasions, who flies from all

means of a right information, who refuses to embrace the doctrine, and submit to the

government of the spiritual pastors.” And when you have done that, I think, I may allow you what

power you please to punish him, without any prejudice to the toleration the author of the letter

proposes.

But why, I pray, all this boggling, all this loose talking as if you knew not what you meant, or

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durst not speak it out? Would you be for punishing some body, you know not whom? I do not

think so ill of you. Let me then speak out for you. The evidence of the argument has convinced

you that men ought not to be persecuted for their religion; that the severities in use amongst

christians cannot be defended; that the magistrate has not authority to compel any one to his

religion. This you are forced to yield. But you would fain retain some power in the magistrate’s

hands to punish dissenters, upon a new pretence; viz. not for having embraced the doctrine and

worship they believe to be true and right, but for not having well considered their own and the

magistrate’s religion. To show you that I do not speak wholly without-book; give me leave to

mind you of one passage of yours. The words are, “Penalties to put them upon a serious and

impartial examination of the controversy between the magistrates and them.” Though these

words be not intended to tell us who you would have punished, yet it may be plainly inferred from

them. And they more clearly point out whom you aim at, than all the foregoing places, where you

seem to (and should) describe them. For they are such as between whom and the magistrate

there is a controversy; that is, in short, who differ from the magistrate in religion. And now

indeed you have given us a note by which these you would have punished may be made known.

We have, with much ado, found out at last whom it is we may presume you would have punished.

Which in other cases is usually not very difficult: because there the faults to be mended easily

design the persons to be corrected. But yours is a new method, and unlike all that ever went

before it.

In the next place: let us see for what you would have them punished. You tell us, and it will easily

be granted you, that not to examine and weigh impartially, and without prejudice or passion, all

which, for shortness-sake, we will express by this one word consider, the religion one embraces

or refuses, is a fault very common, and very prejudicial to true religion, and the salvation of

men’s souls. But penalties and punishments are very necessary, say you, to remedy this evil.

Let us see now how you apply this remedy. Therefore, say you, let all dissenters be punished.

Why? Have no dissenters considered of religion? Or have all conformists considered? That you

yourself will not say. Your project therefore is just as reasonable, as if a lethargy growing

epidemical in England, you should propose to have a law made to blister and scarify and shave

the heads of all who wear gowns: though it be certain that neither all who wear gowns are

lethargic, nor all who are lethargic wear gowns:

— Dii te Damasippe deæque Verum ob consilium donent tonsore.

For there could not be certainly a more learned advice, than that one man should be pulled by the

ears, because another is asleep. This, when you have considered of it again, for I find, according

to your principle, all men have now and then need to be jogged, you will, I guess, be convinced it

is not like a fair physician, to apply a remedy to a disease; but, like an enraged enemy, to vent

one’s spleen upon a party. Common sense, as well as common justice, requires, that the

remedies of laws and penalties should be directed against the evil that is to be removed,

wherever it be found. And if the punishment you think so necessary be, as you pretend, to cure

the mischief you complain of, you must let it pursue and fall on the guilty, and those only, in what

company soever they are; and not, as you here propose, and is the highest injustice, punish the

innocent considering dissenter with the guilty; and, on the other side, let the inconsiderate guilty

conformist escape with the innocent. For one may rationally presume that the national church has

some, nay more in proportion, of those who little consider or concern themselves about religion,

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than any congregation of dissenters. For conscience, or the care of their souls, being once laid

aside; interest of course leads men into that society, where the protection and countenence of the

government, and hopes of preferment, bid fairest to their remaining desires. So that if careless,

negligent, inconsiderate men in matters of religion, who without being forced would not consider,

are to be rouzed into a care of their souls, and a search after truth, by punishments; the national

religion, in all countries, will certainly have a right to the greatest share of those punishments; at

least not to be wholly exempt from them.

This is that which the author of the letter, as I remember, complains of; and that justly, viz. “That

the pretended care of men’s souls always expresses itself, in those who would have force any way

made use of to that end, in very unequal methods; some persons being to be treated with

severity, whilst others guilty of the same faults, are not to be so much as touched.” Though you

are got pretty well out of the deep mud, and renounce punishments directly for religion; yet you

stick still in this part of the mire; whilst you would have dissenters punished to make them

consider, but would not have any thing done to conformists, though ever so negligent in this point

of considering. The author’s letter pleased me, because it is equal to all mankind, is direct, and

will, I think, hold every-where; which I take to be a good mark of truth. For I shall always suspect

that neither to comport with the truth of religion, or the design of the gospel, which is suited to

only some one country, or party. What is true and good in England, will be true and good at

Rome too, in China, or Geneva. But whether your great and only method for the propagating of

truth, by bringing the inconsiderate by punishments to consider, would, according to your way of

applying your punishments only to dissenters from the national religion, be of use in those

countries, or any-where but where you suppose the magistrate to be in the right, judge you.

Pray, sir, consider a little, whether prejudice has not some share in your way of arguing. For this

is your position: “Men are generally negligent in examining the grounds of their religion.” This I

grant. But could there be a more wild and incoherent consequence drawn from it, than this:

“therefore dissenters must be punished?”

But that being laid aside, let us now see to what end they must be punished. Sometimes it is, “To

bring them to consider those reasons and arguments which are proper and sufficient to convince

them.” Of what? That it is not easy to set Grantham steeple upon Paul’s church? Whatever it be

you would have them convinced of, you are not willing to tell us. And so it may be any thing.

Sometimes it is, “To incline them to lend an ear to those who tell them they have mistaken their

way, and offer to show them the right.” Which is, to lend an ear to all who differ from them in

religion; as well crafty seducers, as others. Whether this be for the procuring the salvation of

their souls, the end for which you say this force is to be used, judge you. But this I am sure;

whoever will lend an ear to all who will tell them they are out of the way, will not have much time

for any other business.

Sometimes it is, “To recover men to so much sobriety and reflection, as seriously to put the

question to themselves, whether it be really worth their while to undergo such inconveniencies,

for adhering to a religion which, for any thing they know, may be false; or for rejecting another (if

that be the case) which, for aught they know, may be true, till they have brought it to the bar of

reason, and given it a fair trial there.” Which, in short, amounts to thus much, viz. “to make them

examine whether their religion be true, and so worth the holding, under those penalties that are

annexed to it.” Dissenters are indebted to you for your great care of their souls. But what, I

beseech you, shall become of those of the national church, every-where, which make far the

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greater part of mankind, who have no such punishments to make them consider; who have not

this only remedy provided for them, but are left in that deplorable condition you mention, “of

being suffered quietly, and without molestation, to take no care at all of their souls, or in doing of

it to follow their own prejudices, humours, or some crafty seducers?” Need not those of the

national church, as well as others, “bring their religion to the bar of reason, and give it a fair trial

there?” And if they need to do so, as they must, if all national religions cannot be supposed true;

they will always need that which, you say, is the only means to make them do so. So that if you

are sure, as you tell us, that there is need of your method; I am sure there is as much need of it

in national churches, as any other. And so, for aught I can see, you must either punish them, or

let others alone; unless you think it reasonable that the far greater part of mankind should

constantly be without that sovereign and only remedy, which they stand in need of equally with

other people.

Sometimes the end for which men must be punished is “to dispose them to submit to instruction,

and to give a fair hearing to the reasons offered for the enlightening their minds, and discovering

the truth to them.” If their own words may be taken for it, there are as few dissenters as

conformists, in any country, who will not profess they have done, and do this. And if their own

words may not be taken; who, I pray, must be judge? You and your magistrates? If so, then it is

plain you punish them not to dispose them to submit to instruction, but to your instruction; not to

dispose them to give a fair hearing to reasons offered for the enlightening their minds, but to give

an obedient hearing to your reasons. If you mean this; it had been fairer and shorter to have

spoken out plainly, than thus in fair words, or indefinite signification, to say that which amounts

to nothing. For what sense is it, to punish a man “to dispose him to submit to instruction, and

give a fair hearing to reasons offered for enlightening his mind, and discovering truth to him,”

who goes two or three times a week several miles on purpose to do it, and that with the hazard of

his liberty or purse? Unless you mean your instructions, your reasons, your truth: which brings us

but back to what you have disclaimed, plain persecution for differing in religion.

Sometimes this is to be done, “to prevail with men to weigh matters of religion carefully, and

impartially.” Discountenance and punishment put into one scale, with impunity and hopes of

preferment put into the other, is as sure a way to make a man weigh impartially, as it would be

for a prince to bribe and threaten a judge to make him judge uprightly.

Sometimes it is, “To make men bethink themselves, and put it out of the power of any foolish

humour, or unreasonable prejudice, to alienate them from truth and their own happiness.” Add

but this, to put it out of the power of any humour or prejudice of their own, or other men’s; and I

grant the end is good, if you can find the means to procure it. But why it should not be put out of

the power of other men’s humour or prejudice, as well as their own, wants, and will always want,

a reason to prove. Would it not, I beseech you, to an indifferent by-stander, appear humour or

prejudice, or something as bad; to see men, who profess a religion revealed from heaven, and

which they own contains all in it necessary to salvation, exclude men from their communion, and

persecute them with the penalties of the civil law, for not joining in the use of ceremonies which

are no-where to be found in that revealed religion? Would it not appear humour or prejudice, or

some such thing, to a sober impartial heathen; to see christians exclude and persecute one of the

same faith, for things which they themselves confess to be indifferent, and not worth the

contending for? “Prejudice, humour, passion, lusts, impressions of education, reverence and

admiration of persons, worldly respects, love of their own choice, and the like,” to which you

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justly impute many men’s taking up, and persisting in their religion, are indeed good words; and

so, on the other side, are these following; “truth, the right way, enlightening reason, sound

judgment;” but they signify nothing at all to your purpose, till you can evidently and

unquestionably show the world that the latter, viz. “truth and the right way,” &c. are always, and

in all countries, to be found only in the national church; and the former, viz. “passion and

prejudice,” &c. only amongst the dissenters. But to go on:

Sometimes it is, “to bring men to take such care as they ought of their salvation.” What care is

such as men ought to take, whilst they are out of your church, will be hard for you to tell me. But

you endeavour to explain yourself, in the following words: “that they may not blindly leave it to

the choice neither of any other person, nor yet of their own lusts and passions, to prescribe to

them what faith or what worship they shall embrace.” You do well to make use of punishment to

shut passion out of the choice: because you know fear of suffering is no passion. But let that

pass. You would have men punished, “to bring them to take such care of their salvation that they

may not blindly leave it to the choice of any other person to prescribe to them.” Are you sincere?

Are you in earnest? Tell me then truly: did the magistrate or national church any-where, or yours

in particular, ever punish any man, to bring him to have this care, which, you say, he ought to

take of his salvation! Did you ever punish any man, that he might not blindly leave it to the

choice of his parish-priest, or bishop, or the convocation, what faith or worship he should

embrace? It will be suspected care of a party, or any thing else rather than care of the salvation

of men’s souls; if having found out so useful, so necessary a remedy, the only method there is

room left for, you will apply it but partially, and make trial of it only on those whom you have

truly least kindness for. This will, unavoidably, give one reason to imagine, you do not think so

well of your remedy as you pretend, who are so sparing of it to your friends; but are very free of

it to strangers, who in other things are used very much like enemies.—But your remedy is like the

helleboraster, that grew in the woman’s garden for the cure of worms in her neighbour’s children;

for truly it wrought too roughly to give it to any of her own. Methinks your charity, in your

present persecution, is much what as prudent, as justifiable, as that good woman’s. I hope I have

done you no injury, that I here suppose you of the church of England. If I have, I beg your

pardon.—It is no offence of malice, I assure you: for I suppose no worse of you than I confess of

myself.

Sometimes this punishment that you contend for, is “to bring men to act according to reason and

sound judgment.”

“Tertius è cœlo cecidit Cato.”

This is reformation indeed. If you can help us to it, you will deserve statues to be erected to you,

as to the restorer of decayed religion. But if all men have not reason and sound judgment, will

punishment put it into them? Besides, concerning this matter, mankind is so divided, that he acts

according to reason and sound judgment at Augsburg, who would be judged to do the quite

contrary at Edinburgh. Will punishment make men know what is reason and sound judgment? If it

will not, it is impossible it should make them act according to it. Reason and sound judgment are

the elixir itself, the universal remedy: and you may as reasonably punish men to bring them to

have the philosopher’s stone, as to bring them to act according to reason and sound judgment.

Sometimes it is, “To put men upon a serious and impartial examination of the controversy

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between the magistrate and them, which is the way for them to come to the knowledge of the

truth.” But what if the truth be on neither side, as I am apt to imagine you will think it is not,

where neither the magistrate nor the dissenter is either of them of your church; how will the

“examining the controversy between the magistrate and him be the way to come to the

knowledge of the truth?” Suppose the controversy between a lutheran and a papist; or, if you

please, between a presbyterian magistrate and a quaker subject.—Will the examining the

controversy between the magistrate and the dissenting subject, in this case, bring him to the

knowledge of the truth? If you say yes, then you grant one of these to have the truth on his side:

for the examining the controversy between a presbyterian and a quaker, leaves the controversy

either of them has with the church of England, or any other church, untouched. And so one, at

least, of those being already come to the knowledge of the truth, ought not to be put under your

discipline of punishment, which is only to bring him to the truth. If you say no, and that the

examining the controversy between the magistrate and the dissenter, in this case will not bring

him to the knowledge of the truth; you confess your rule to be false, and your method to no

purpose.

To conclude, your system is, in short, this: You would have all men, laying aside prejudice,

humour, passion, &c. examine the grounds of their religion, and search for the truth. This, I

confess, is heartily to be wished. The means that you propose to make men do this, is that

dissenters should be punished to make them do so. It is as if you had said, Men generally are

guilty of a fault; therefore let one sect, who have the ill luck to be of an opinion different from the

magistrate, be punished. This at first sight shocks any who has the least spark of sense, reason,

or justice. But having spoken of this already, and concluding that upon second thoughts you

yourself will be ashamed of it, let us consider it put so as to be consistent with common sense,

and with all the advantage it can bear; and then let us see what you can make of it: “Men are

negligent in examining the religions they embrace, refuse, or persist in; therefore it is fit they

should be punished to make them do it.” This is a consequence, indeed, which may, without

defiance to common sense, be drawn from it. This is the use, the only use, which you think

punishment can indirectly, and at a distance, have, in matters of religion. You would have men by

punishments driven to examine. What? Religion. To what end? To bring them to the knowledge of

the truth. But I answer,

1. Every one has not the ability to do this.

2. Every one has not the opportunity to do it.

Would you have every poor protestant, for example, in the Palatinate, examine thoroughly

whether the pope be infallible, or head of the church; whether there be a purgatory; whether

saints are to be prayed to, or the dead prayed for; whether the scripture be the only rule of faith;

whether there be no salvation out of the church; and whether there be no church without

bishops; and an hundred other questions in controversy between the papists and those

protestants; and when he had mastered these, go on to fortify himself against the opinions and

objections of other churches he differs from? This, which is no small task, must be done, before a

man can have brought his religion to the bar of reason, and give it a fair trial there. And if you

will punish men till this be done, the countryman must leave off plowing and sowing, and betake

himself to the study of Greek and Latin; and the artisan must sell his tools, to buy fathers and

schoolmen, and leave his family to starve. If something less than this will satisfy you, pray tell me

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what is enough, Have they considered and examined enough, if they are satisfied themselves

where the truth lies? If this be the limits of their examination, you will find few to punish; unless

you will punish them to make them do what they have done already; for, however he came by his

religion, there is scarce any one to be found who does not own himself satisfied that he is in the

right. Or else, must they be punished to make them consider and examine till they embrace that

which you choose for truth? If this be so, what do you but in effect choose for them, when yet

you would have men punished, “to bring them to such a care of their souls, that no other person

might choose for them?” If it be truth in general, you would have them by punishments driven to

seek; that is to offer matter of dispute, and not a rule of discipline; for to punish any one to make

him seek till he find truth, without a judge of truth, is to punish for you know not what; and is all

one as if you should whip a scholar to make him find out the square root of a number you do not

know. I wonder not therefore that you could not resolve with yourself what degree of severity you

would have used, nor how long continued; when you dare not speak out directly whom you would

have punished, and are far from being clear to what end they should be under penalties.

Consonant to this uncertainty, of whom, or what to be punished, you tell us, “that there is no

question of the success of this method. Force will certainly do, if duly proportioned to the design

of it.”

What, I pray, is the design of it? I challenge you, or any man living, out of what you have said in

your book, to tell me directly what it is. In all other punishments that ever I heard of yet, till now

that you have taught the world a new method, the design of them has been to cure the crime

they are denounced against, and so I think it ought to be here. What I beseech you is the crime

here? Dissenting? That you say not any-where is a fault. Besides you tell us, “that the magistrate

hath not authority to compel any one to his religion:” and that you do “not require that men

should have no rule but the religion of the country.” And the power you ascribe to the magistrate

is given him to bring men, “not to his own, but to the true religion.” If dissenting be not the fault,

is it that a man does not examine his own religion, and the grounds of it? Is that the crime your

punishments are designed to cure? Neither that dare you say; lest you displease more than you

satisfy with your new discipline. And then again, as I said before, you must tell us how far you

would have them examine, before you punish them for not doing it. And I imagine, if that were all

we required of you, it would be long enough before you would trouble us with a law, that should

prescribe to every one how far he was to examine matters of religion; wherein if he failed and

came short, he was to be punished; if he performed, and went in his examination to the bounds

set by the law, he was acquitted and free. Sir, when you consider it again, you will perhaps think

this a case reserved to the great day, when the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open; for I

imagine it is beyond the power or judgment of man, in that variety of circumstances, in respect of

parts, tempers, opportunities, helps, &c. men are in, in this world, to determine what is every

one’s duty in this great business of search, inquiry, examination; or to know when any one has

done it. That which makes me believe you will be of this mind, is, that where you undertake for

the success of this method, if rightly used, it is with a limitation, upon such as are not altogether

incurable. So that when your remedy is prepared according to art, which art is yet unknown; and

rightly applied, and given in a due dose, all which are secrets; it will then infallibly cure. Whom?

All that are not incurable by it. And so will a pippin posset, eating fish in Lent, or a presbyterian

lecture, certainly cure all that are not incurable by them; for I am sure you do not mean it will

cure all, but those who are absolutely incurable; because you yourself allow one means left of

cure, when yours will not do, viz. the grace of God. Your words are, “what means is there left

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(except the grace of God) to reduce them, but lay thorns and briars in their way.” And here also,

in the place we were considering, you tell us, “the incurable are to be left to God.” Whereby, if

you mean they are to be left to those means he has ordained for men’s conversion and salvation,

yours must never be made use of: for he indeed has prescribed preaching and hearing of his

word; but as for those who will not hear, I do not find any-where that he has commanded they

should be compelled or beaten to it.

There is a third thing that you are as tender and reserved in, as either naming the criminals to be

punished, or positively telling us the end for which they should be punished: and that is with what

sort of penalties, what degree of punishment they should be forced. You are indeed so gracious to

them, that you renounce the severities and penalties hitherto made use of. You tell us, they

should be but moderate penalties. But if we ask you what are moderate penalties, you confess

you cannot tell us. So that by moderate here you yet mean nothing. You tell us, “the outward

force to be applied should be duly tempered.” But what that due temper is, you do not, or cannot

say: and so in effect it signifies just nothing. Yet if in this you are not plain and direct, all the rest

of your design will signify nothing; for it being to have some men, and to some end, punished;

yet if it cannot be found what punishment is to be used, it is, notwithstanding all you have said,

utterly useless. “You tell us modestly, that to determine precisely the just measure of the

punishment, will require some consideration.” If the faults were precisely determined, and could

be proved, it would require no more consideration to determine the measure of the punishment,

in this, than it would in any other case, where those were known. But where the fault is

undefined, and the guilt not to be proved, as I suppose it will be found in this present business of

examining; it will without doubt require consideration to proportion the force to the design. Just

so much consideration as it will require to fit a coat to the moon, or proportion a shoe to the foot

of those who inhabit her; for to proportion a punishment to a fault that you do not name, and so

we in charity ought to think you do not yet know; and a fault that when you have named it, will

be impossible to be proved who are or are not guilty of it; will I suppose require as much

consideration, as to fit a shoe to feet whose size and shape are not known.

However, you offer some measures whereby to regulate your punishments; which when they are

looked into, will be found to be just as good as none; they being impossible to be any rule in the

case. The first is “so much force, or such penalties as are ordinarily sufficient to prevail with men

of common discretion, and not desperately perverse and obstinate, to weigh matters of religion

carefully and impartially, and without which ordinarily they will not do this.” Where it is to be

observed,

1. That who are these men of common discretion, is as hard to know, as to know what is a fit

degree of punishment in the case; and so you do but regulate one uncertainty by another. Some

men will be apt to think, that he who will not weigh matters of religion, which are of infinite

concernment to him, without punishment, cannot in reason be thought a man of common

discretion. Many women of common discretion, enough to manage the ordinary affairs of their

families, are not able to read a page in an ordinary author, or to understand and give an account

what it means, when read to them. Many men of common discretion in their callings, are not able

to judge when an argument is conclusive or no; much less to trace it through a long train of

consequences. What penalties shall be sufficient to prevail with such who upon examination, I

fear, will not be found to make the least part of mankind, to examine and weigh matters of

religion carefully and impartially! The law allows all to have common discretion, for whom it has

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not provided guardians or bedlam; so that, in effect, your men of common discretion are all men,

not judged idiots or madmen: and penalties sufficient to prevail with all men of common

discretion, are penalties sufficient to prevail with all men, but idiots and madmen. Which what a

measure it is to regulate penalties by, let all men of common discretion judge.

2. You may be pleased to consider, that all men of the same degree of discretion, are not apt to

be moved by the same degree of penalties. Some are of a more yielding, some of a more stiff

temper; and what is sufficient to prevail on one, is not half enough to move the other; though

both men of common discretion; so that common discretion will be here of no use to determine

the measure of punishment: especially when in the same clause you except men desperately

perverse and obstinate, who are as hard to be known, as what you seek, viz. the just proportions

of punishments necessary to prevail with men to consider, examine, and weigh matters of

religion: wherein, if a man tells you he has considered, he has weighed, he has examined, and so

goes on in his former course; it is impossible for you ever to know whether he has done his duty,

or whether he be desperately perverse and obstinate; so that this exception signifies just nothing.

There are many things in your use of force and penalties, different from any I ever met with

elsewhere—One of them, this clause of yours concerning the measure of punishments, now under

consideration, offers me: wherein you proportion your punishments only to the yielding and

corrigible, not to the perverse and obstinate; contrary to the common discretion which has

hitherto made laws in other cases, which levels the punishments against refractory offenders, and

never spares them because they are obstinate. This, however, I will not blame as an oversight in

you. Your new method, which aims at such impracticable and inconsistent things as laws cannot

bear, nor penalties be useful to, forced you to it. The uselessness, absurdity and

unreasonableness of great severities, you had acknowledged in the foregoing paragraphs.

Dissenters you would have brought to consider by moderate penalties. They lie under them; but

whether they have considered or no, (for that you cannot tell) they still continue dissenters. What

is to be done now? Why, the incurable are to be left to God, as you tell us, p. 12. Your

punishments were not meant to prevail on the desperately perverse and obstinate, as you tell us

here; and so whatever be the success, your punishments are however justified.

You have given us in another place something like another boundary to your moderate penalties:

but when examined, it proves just like the rest, trifling only, in good words, so put together as to

have no direct meaning; an art very much in use amongst some sort of learned men. The words

are these: “such penalties as may not tempt persons who have any concern for their eternal

salvation, (and those who have none, ought not to be considered) to renounce a religion which

they believe to be true, or profess one which they do not believe to be so.” If by any concern, you

mean a true concern for their eternal salvation, by this rule you may make your punishments as

great as you please; and all the severities you have disclaimed may be brought in play again: for

none of those will be able to make a man, “who is truly concerned for his eternal salvation,

renounce a religion he believes to be true, or profess one he does not believe to be so.” If by

those who have any concern, you mean such who have some faint wishes for happiness

hereafter, and would be glad to have things go well with them in the other world, but will venture

nothing in this world for it; these the moderatest punishments you can imagine, will make change

their religion. If by any concern, you mean whatever may be between these two; the degrees are

so infinite, that to proportion your punishments by that, is to have no measure of them at all.

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One thing I cannot but take notice of in this passage, before I leave it: and that is, you say here,

“those who have no concern for their salvation, deserve not to be considered.” In other parts of

your letter, you pretend to have compassion on the careless, and provide remedies for them: but

here, of a sudden, your charity fails you; and you give them up to eternal perdition, without the

least regard, the least pity, and say they deserve not to be considered. Our Saviour’s rule was,

“the sick and not the whole need a physician.” Your rule here is, those that are careless are not to

be considered, but are to be left to themselves. This would seem strange, if one did not observe

what drew you to it. You perceived that if the magistrate was to use no punishments but such as

would make nobody change their religion, he was to use none at all; for the careless would be

brought to the national church, with any slight punishments; and when they are once there, you

are, it seems, satisfied, and look no farther after them. So that by your own measures, “if the

careless, and those who have no concern for their eternal salvation,” are to be regarded and

taken care of; if the salvation of their souls is to be promoted, there is to be no punishment used

at all; and therefore you leave them out as not to be considered.

There remains yet one thing to be inquired into, concerning the measure of the punishments, and

that is the length of their duration. Moderate punishments that are continued, that men find no

end of, know no way out of, sit heavy, and become immoderately uneasy. Dissenters, you would

have punished, to make them consider. Your penalties have had the effect on them you intended;

they have made them consider; and they have done their utmost in considering. What now must

be done with them? They must be punished on; for they are still dissenters. If it were just, if you

had reason at first to punish a dissenter, to make him consider, when you did not know but that

he had considered alredy; it is as just, and you have as much reason to punish him on, even

when he has performed what your punishments were designed for, when he has considered, but

yet remains a dissenter. For I may justly suppose, and you must grant, that a man may remain a

dissenter, after all the consideration your moderate penalties can bring him to; when we see

greater punishments, even those severities you disown, as too great, are not able to make men

consider so far as to be convinced, and brought over to the national church.

If your punishments may not be inflicted on men, to make them consider, who have or may have

considered already for aught you know; then dissenters are never to be once punished, no more

than any other sort of men. If dissenters are to be punished, to make them consider, whether

they have considered or no: then their punishments, though they do consider, must never cease,

as long as they are dissenters; which whether it be to punish them only to bring them to

consider, let all men judge. This I am sure; punishments, in your method, must either never

begin upon dissenters, or never cease. And so pretend moderation as you please, the

punishments which your method requires, must be either very immoderate, or none at all.

And now, you having yielded to our author, and that upon very good reasons which you yourself

urge, and which I shall set down in your own words, “that to prosecute men with fire and sword,

or to deprive them of their estates, to maim them with corporal punishments, to starve and

torture them in noisome prisons, and in the end even to take away their lives, to make them

christians, is but an ill way of expressing men’s desire of the salvation of those whom they treat

in this manner. And that it will be very difficult to persuade men of sense, that he who with dry

eyes and satisfaction of mind can deliver his brother to the executioner, to be burnt alive, does

sincerely and heartily concern himself to save that brother from the flames of hell in the world to

come. And that these methods are so very improper, in respect to the design of them, that they

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usually produce the quite contrary effect. For whereas all the use which force can have for the

advancing true religion, and the salvation of souls, is (as has already been showed) by disposing

men to submit to instruction, and to give a fair hearing to the reasons which are offered, for the

enlightening their minds, and discovering the truth to them; these cruelties have the misfortune

to be commonly looked upon as so just a prejudice against any religion that uses them, as makes

it needless to look any farther into it; and to tempt men to reject it, as both false and detestable,

without ever vouchsafing to consider the rational grounds and motives of it. This effect they

seldom fail to work upon the sufferers of them; and as to the spectators, if they be not before-

hand well instructed in those grounds and motives, they will be much tempted likewise, not only

to entertain the same opinion of such a religion, but withal to judge much more favourably of that

of the sufferers; who, they will be apt to think, would not expose themselves to such extremities,

which they might avoid by compliance, if they were not thoroughly satisfied of the justice of their

cause.” And upon these reasons you conclude, “that these severities are utterly unapt and

improper for the bringing men to embrace that truth which must save them.” Again, you having

acknowledged, “that the authority of the magistrate is not an authority to compel any one to his

religion.” And again, “that the rigour of laws and force of penalties are not capable to convince

and change men’s minds.” And yet farther, “that you do not require that men should have no

rule, but the religion of the court; or that they should be put under a necessity to quit the light of

their own reason, and oppose the dictates of their own consciences, and blindly resign up

themselves to the will of their governors; but that the power you ascribe to the magistrate, is

given him to bring men not to his own, but to the true religion.” Now you having, I say, granted

this, whereby you directly condemn and abolish all laws that have been made here, or anywhere

else, that ever I heard of, to compel men to conformity; I think the author, and whosoever else

are most for liberty of conscience, might be content with the toleration you allow, by condemning

the laws about religion, now in force; and are testified, until you had made your new method

consistent and practicable, by telling the world plainly and directly,

1. Who are to be punished.

2. For what.

3. With what punishments.

4. How long.

5. What advantage to true religion it would be, if magistrates every-where did so punish.

6. And lastly, whence the magistrate had commission to do so.

When you have done this plainly and intelligibly, without keeping in the uncertainty of general

expressions, and without supposing all along your church in the right, and your religion the true;

which can no more be allowed to you in this case, whatever your church or religion be, than it can

be to a papist or a lutheran, a presbyterian or an anabaptist; nay no more to you, than it can be

allowed to a jew or a mahometan; when, I say, you have by settling these points framed the

parts of your new engine, set it together, and show that it will work, without doing more harm

than good in the world; I think then men may be content to submit to it. But imagining this, and

an engine to show the perpetual motion, will be found out together, I think toleration in a very

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good state, notwithstanding your answer; wherein you have said so much for it, and for aught I

see nothing against it: unless an impracticable chimera be, in your opinion, something mightily to

be apprehended.

We have now seen and examined the main of your treatise; and therefore I think I might here

end, without going any farther. But, that you may not think yourself, or any of your arguments

neglected, I will go over the remainder, and give you my thoughts on every thing I shall meet

with in it, that seems to need any answer. In one place you argue against the author thus: if then

the author’s fourth proposition, as you call it, viz. That force is of no use for promoting true

religion and the salvation of souls, “be not true (as perhaps by this time it appears it is not) then

the last proposition, which is built upon it, must fall with it;” which last proposition is this, viz.

“that nobody can have any right to use any outward force or compulsion to bring men to the true

religion, and so to salvation.” If this proposition were built, as you allege, upon that which you

call his fourth, then indeed if the fourth fell, this built upon it would fall with it. But that not being

the author’s proposition, as I have showed, nor this built wholly on it, but on other reasons, as I

have already proved, and any one may see in several parts of his letter, particularly p. 351, 352,

what you allege falls of itself.

The business of the next paragraph is to prove, that if “force be useful, then somebody must

certainly have a right to use it.” The first argument you go about to prove it by, is this, “That

usefulness is as good an argument to prove there is somewhere a right to use it, as uselessness

is to prove nobody has such a right.” If you consider the things of whose usefulness or

uselessness we are speaking, you will perhaps be of another mind. It is punishment, or force used

in punishing. Now all punishment is some evil, some inconvenience, some suffering; by taking

away or abridging some good thing, which he who is punished has otherwise a right to. Now to

justify the bringing any such evil upon any man, two things are requisite. First, That he who does

it has commission and power so to do. Secondly, That it be directly useful for the procuring some

greater good. Whatever punishment one man uses to another, without these two conditions,

whatever he may pretend, proves an injury and injustice, and so of right ought to have been let

alone. And therefore, though usefulness, which is one of the conditions that makes punishments

just, when it is away, may hinder punishments from being lawful in any body’s hands; yet

usefulness, when present, being but one of those conditions, cannot give the other, which is a

commission to punish; without which also punishment is unlawful. From whence it follows, That

though useless punishment be unlawful from any hand, yet useful punishment from every hand is

not lawful. A man may have the stone, and it may be useful, more than indirectly, and at a

distance useful, to him to be cut; but yet this usefulness will not justify the most skilful surgeon in

the world, by force to make him endure the pain and hazard of cutting; because he has no

commission, no right without the patient’s own consent to do so. Nor is it a good argument,

cutting will be useful to him, therefore there is a right somewhere to cut him, whether he will or

no. Much less will there be an argument for any right, if there be only a possibility that it may

prove useful indirectly and by accident.

Your other argument is this: If force or punishment be of necessary use, “then it must be

acknowledged, that there is a right somewhere to use it; unless we will say (what without impiety

cannot be said) that the wise and benign disposer and governor of all things has not furnished

mankind with competent means for the promoting his own honour in the world, and the good of

souls.” If your way of arguing be true, it is demonstration, that force is not of necessary use. For

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I argue thus, in your form: We must acknowledge force not to be of necessary use; “unless we

will say (what without impiety cannot be said) that the wise disposer and governor of all things

did not, for above three hundred years after Christ, furnish his church with competent means for

promoting his own honour in the world, and the good of souls.” It is for you to consider whether

these arguments be conclusive or no. This I am sure, the one is as conclusive as the other. But if

your supposed usefulness places a right somewhere to use it, pray tell me in whose hands it

places it in Turkey, Persia, or China, or any country where christians of different churches live

under a heathen or mahometan sovereign? And if you cannot tell me in whose hands it places it

there, as I believe you will find it pretty hard to do; there are then, it seems, some places where,

upon your supposition of the necessary usefulness of force, “the wise and benign governor and

disposer of all things has not furnished men with competent means for promoting his own honour

and the good of souls;” unless you will grant that the “wise and benign disposer and governor of

all things hath, for the promoting of his honour and the good of souls, placed a power in

mahometan or heathen princes to punish christians, to bring them to consider reasons and

arguments proper to convince them.” But this is the advantage of so fine an invention, as that of

force doing some service indirectly and at a distance; which usefulness, if we may believe you,

places a right in mahometan or pagan princes hands, to use force upon christians; for fear lest

mankind in those countries should be unfurnished with means for the promoting God’s honour

and the good of souls. For thus you argue: “if there be so great use of force, then there is a right

somewhere to use it. And if there be such a right somewhere, where should it be but in the civil

sovereign?” Who can deny now, but that you have taken care, great care, for the promoting of

truth and the christian religion? But yet it is as hard for me, I confess, and I believe for others, to

conceive how you should think to do any service to truth and the christian religion, by putting a

right into mahometans or heathens hands to punish christians; as it was for you to conceive how

the author should think “to do any service to the truth, and the christian religion,” by exempting

the professors of it from punishment everywhere, since there are more pagan, mahometan, and

erroneous princes in the world, than orthodox; truth, and the christian religion, taking the world

as we find it, is sure to be more punished and suppressed, than errour and falsehood.

The author having endeavoured to show that no-body at all, of any rank or condition, had a

power to punish, torment, or use any man ill, for matters of religion; you tell us “you do not yet

understand, why clergymen are not as capable of such power as other men.” I do not remember

that the author any-where, by excepting ecclesiastics more than others, gave you any occasion to

show your concern in this point. Had he foreseen that this would have touched you so nearly, and

that you set your heart so much upon the clergy’s power of punishing; it is like he would have

told you, he thought ecclesiastics as capable of it as any men; and that if forwardness and

diligence in the exercise of such power may recommend any to it, clergymen in the opinion of the

world stand fairest for it. However, you do well to put in your claim for them, though the author

excludes them no more than their neighbours. Nay, they must be allowed the pretence of the

fairest title. For I never read of any severities that were to bring men to Christ, but those of the

law of Moses; which is therefore called a pedagogue, (Gal. iii. 24.) And the next verse tells us,

that “after that faith is come, we are no longer under a schoolmaster.” But yet if we are still to be

driven to Christ by a rod, I shall not envy them the pleasure of wielding it: only I desire them,

when they have got the scourge into their hands, to remember our Saviour, and follow his

example, who never used it but once; and that they would, like him, employ it only to drive vile

and scandalous traffickers for the things of this world, out of their church, rather than to drive

whoever they can into it. Whether the latter be not a proper method to make their church what

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our Saviour there pronounced of the temple, they who use it were best look. For in matters of

religion, none are so easy to be driven, as those who have nothing of religion at all; and next to

them, the vicious, the ignorant, the worldling, and the hypocrite; who care for no more of religion

but the name, nor no more of any church, but its prosperity and power: and who, not unlike

those described by our Saviour, (Luke xx. 47.) for a show come to, or cry up the prayers of the

church, “that they may devour widows, and other helpless people’s houses.” I say not this of the

serious professors of any church, who are in earnest in matters of religion. Such I value, who

conscientiously, and out of a sincere persuasion, embrace any religion, though different from

mine, and in a way, I think, mistaken. But no-body can have reason to think otherwise than what

I have said, of those who are wrought upon to be of any church, by secular hopes and fears.

Those truly place trade above all other considerations, and merchandize with religion itself, who

regulate their choice by worldly profit and loss.

You endeavour to prove, against the author, that civil society is not instituted only for civil ends,

i. e. the procuring, preserving, and advancing men’s civil interests: your words are, “I must say,

that our author does but beg the question, when he affirms that the commonwealth is constituted

only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing of the civil interests of the members of it. That

commonwealths are instituted for these ends, no man will deny. But if there be any other ends

besides these, attainable by the civil society and government, there is no reason to affirm, that

these are the only ends, for which they are designed. Doubtless commonwealths are instituted for

the attaining of all the benefits which political government can yield. And therefore, if the spiritual

and eternal interests of men may any way be procured or advanced by political government, the

procuring and advancing those interests must in all reason be reckoned among the ends of civil

societies, and so, consequently, fall within the compass of the magistrate’s jurisdiction.” I have

set down your words at large, to let the reader see, that you of all men had the least reason to

tell the author, he does but beg the question; unless you mean to justify yourself by the pretence

of his example. You argue thus, “If there be any other ends attainable by civil society, then civil

interests are not the only ends for which commonwealths are instituted.” And how do you prove

there be other ends? Why thus, “Doubtless commonwealths are instituted for the attaining of all

the benefits which political government can yield.” Which is as clear a demonstration, as

doubtless can make it to be. The question is, whether civil society be instituted only for civil ends?

You say, no; and your proof is, because doubtless it is instituted for other ends. If I now say,

doubtless this is a good argument; is not every one bound without more ado to admit it for such?

If not, doubtless you are in danger to be thought to beg the question.

But notwithstanding you say here, that the author begs the question; in the following page you

tell us, “That the author offers three considerations which seem to him abundantly to

demonstrate, that the civil power neither can, nor ought in any manner to be extended to the

salvation of souls.” He does not then beg the question. For the question being, “Whether civil

interest be the only end of civil society,” he gives this reason for the negative, “That civil power

has nothing to do with the salvation of souls;” and offers three considerations for the proof of it.

For it will always be a good consequence, that, if the civil power has nothing to do with the

salvation of souls, “then civil interest is the only end of civil society.” And the reason of it is plain;

because a man having no other interest but either in this world or the world to come; if the end

of civil society reach not to a man’s interest in the other world, all which is comprehended in the

salvation of his soul, it is plain that the sole end of civil society is civil interest, under which the

author comprehends the good things of this world.

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And now let us examine the truth of your main position, viz. “That civil society is instituted for the

attaining all the benefits that it may any way yield.” Which, if true, then this position must be

true, viz. “That all societies whatsoever are instituted for the attaining all the benefits that they

may any way yield;” there being nothing peculiar to civil society in the case, why that society

should be instituted for the attaining all the benefits it can any way yield, and other societies not.

By which argument it will follow, that all societies are instituted for one and the same end: i. e.

“for the attaining all the benefits that they can any way yield.” By which account there will be no

difference between church and state; a commonwealth and an army; or between a family, and

the East-India company; all which have hitherto been thought distinct sorts of societies instituted

for different ends. If your hypothesis hold good, one of the ends of the family must be to preach

the gospel, and administer the sacraments; and one business of an army to teach languages, and

propagate religion; because these are benefits some way or other attainable by those societies;

unless you take want of commission and authority to be a sufficient impediment; and that will be

so too in other cases.

It is a benefit to have true knowledge and philosophy embraced and assented to, in any civil

society or government. But will you say, therefore, that it is a benefit to the society, or one of the

ends of government, that all who are not peripatetics should be punished, to make men find out

the truth and profess it? This indeed might be thought a fit way to make some men embrace the

peripatetic philosophy, but not a proper way to find the truth. For perhaps the peripatetic

philosophy may not be true; perhaps a great many may have not time, nor parts to study it; and

perhaps a great many who have studied it, cannot be convinced of the truth of it: and therefore it

cannot be a benefit to the commonwealth, nor one of the ends of it, that these members of the

society should be disturbed, and diseased to no purpose, when they are guilty of no fault. For just

the same reason, it cannot be a benefit to civil society, that men should be punished in Denmark,

for not being lutherans; in Geneva, for not being calvinists; and in Vienna, for not being papists;

as a means to make them find out the true religion. For so, upon your grounds, men must be

treated in those places, as well as in England, for not being of the church of England. And then I

beseech you, consider the great benefit will accrue to men in society by this method; and I

suppose it will be a hard thing for you to prove, that ever civil governments were instituted to

punish men for not being of this, or that sect in religion: however by accident, indirectly and at a

distance, it may be an occasion to one perhaps of a thousand, or an hundred, to study that

controversy, which is all you expect from it. If it be a benefit, pray tell me what benefit it is. A

civil benefit it cannot be. For men’s civil interests are disturbed, injured, and impaired by it. And

what spiritual benefit can that be to any multitude of men, to be punished for dissenting from a

false or erroneous profession, I would have you find out: unless it be a spiritual benefit to be in

danger to be driven into a wrong way. For if in all differing sects, all but one is in the wrong, it is

a hundred to one but that from which one dissents, and is punished for dissenting from, is the

wrong.

I grant it is past doubt, that the nature of man is so covetous of good, that no one would have

excluded from any action he does, or from any institution he is concerned in, any manner of good

or benefit that it might any way yield. And if this be your meaning, it will not be denied you. But

then you speak very improperly, or rather very mistakenly, if you call such benefits as may any

way, i. e. indirectly, and at a distance, or by accident, be attained by civil or any other society,

the ends for which it is instituted. Nothing can “in reason be reckoned amongst the ends of any

society,” but what may in reason be supposed to be designed by those who enter into it. Now no-

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body can in reason suppose, that any one entered into civil society, for the procuring, securing, or

advancing the salvation of his soul; when he, for that end, needed not the force of civil society.

“The procuring, therefore, securing, and advancing the spiritual and eternal interest of men,

cannot in reason be reckoned amongst the ends of civil societies;” though perhaps it might so fall

out, that in some particular instance, some man’s spiritual interest might be advanced by your or

any other way of applying civil force. A nobleman, whose chapel is decayed or fallen, may make

use of his diningroom for praying and preaching. Yet whatever benefit were attainable by this use

of the room, no-body can in reason reckon this among the ends for which it was built; no more

than the accidental breeding of some bird in any part of it, though it were a benefit it yielded

could in reason be reckoned among the ends of building the house.

But, say you, “doubtless commonwealths are instituted for the attaining of all the benefits which

political government can yield; and therefore if the spiritual and eternal interests of men may any

way be procured or advanced by political government, the procuring and advancing those

interests, must in all reason be reckoned amongst the ends of civil society, and so consequently

fall within the compass of the magistrate’s jurisdiction.” Upon the same grounds, I thus reason:

Doubtless churches are instituted for the attaining of all the benefits which ecclesiastical

government can yield; and therefore, if the temporal and secular interests of men may any way

be procured or advanced by ecclesiastical polity, the procuring and advancing those interests

must in all reason be reckoned among the ends of religious societies, and so consequently fall

within the compass of churchmen’s jurisdiction. The church of Rome has openly made its

advantage of “secular interests to be procured or advanced, indirectly, and at a distance, and in

ordine ad spiritualia;” all which ways, if I mistake not English, are comprehended under your “any

way.” But I do not remember that any of the reformed churches have hitherto directly professed

it. But there is a time for all things. And if the commonwealth once invades the spiritual ends of

the church, by meddling with the salvation of souls, which she has always been so tender of, who

can deny, that the church should have liberty to make herself some amends by reprisals?

But, sir, however you and I may argue from wrong suppositions, yet unless the apostle, Eph. iv.

where he reckons up the church-officers which Christ hath instituted in his church, had told us

they were for some other ends than “for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry,

for the edifying of the body of Christ;” the advancing of their secular interests will scarce be

allowed to be their business, or within the compass of their jurisdiction. Nor till it can be shown

that civil society is instituted for spiritual ends, or that the magistrate has commission to

interpose his authority, or use force in matters of religion; your supposition “of spiritual benefits

indirectly and at a distance attainable” by political government, will never prove the advancing of

those interests by force to be the magistrate’s business, “and to fall within the compass of his

jurisdiction.” And till then, the force of the arguments which the author has brought against it, in

the 319th and following pages of his letter, will hold good.

Commonwealths, or civil societies and governments, if you will believe the judicious Mr. Hooker,

are, as St. Peter calls them, (1 Pet. ii. 13.) νρωπίνη τίσις, the contrivance and institution of

man; and he shows there for what end; viz. “for the punishment of evil-doers, and the praise of

them that do well.” I do not find any-where, that it is for the punishment of those who are not in

church-communion with the magistrate, to make them study controversies in religion, or hearken

to those who will tell them, “they have mistaken their way, and offer to show them the right one.”

You must show them such a commission, if you say it is from God. And in all societies instituted

by man, the ends of them can be no other than what the institutors appointed; which I am sure

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could not be their spiritual and eternal interest. For they could not stipulate about these one with

another, nor submit this interest to the power of the society, or any sovereign they should set

over it. There are nations in the West-Indies, which have no other end of their society, but their

mutual defence against their common enemies. In these, their captain, or prince, is sovereign

commander in time of war; but in time of peace, neither he nor any body else has any authority

over any of the society. You cannot deny but other, even temporal ends, are attainable by these

commonwealths, if they had been otherwise instituted and appointed to these ends. But all your

saying, “doubtless commonwealths are instituted for the attaining of all the benefits which they

can yield,” will not give authority to any one, or more, in such a society, by political government

or force, to procure directly or indirectly other benefits than that for which it was instituted: and

therefore there it falls not within the compass of those princes jurisdiction to punish any one of

the society for injuring another; because he has no commission so to do; whatever reason you

may think there is, that that should be reckoned amongst the ends of their society.

But to conclude: your argument has that defect in it which turns it upon yourself. And that is, that

the procuring and advancing the spiritual and eternal interests of souls, your way, is not a benefit

to the society: and so upon your own supposition, “the procuring and advancing the spiritual

interest of souls, any way, cannot be one of the ends of civil society;” unless the procuring and

advancing the spiritual interest of souls, in a way proper to do more harm than good towards the

salvation of souls, be to be accounted such a benefit as to be one of the ends of civil societies. For

that yours is such a way, I have proved already. So that were it hard to prove that political

government, whose only instrument is force, could no way by force, however applied, more

advance than hinder the spiritual and eternal interest of men; yet having proved it against your

particular new way of applying force, I have sufficiently vindicated the author’s doctrine from any

thing you have said against it. Which is enough for my present purpose.

Your next page tells us, that this reasoning of the author, viz. “that the power of the magistrate

cannot be extended to the salvation of souls, because the care of souls is not committed to the

magistrate; is proving the thing by itself.” As if you should say, when I tell you that you could not

extend your power to meddle with the money of a young gentleman you travelled with, as tutor,

because the care of his money was not committed to you, were proving the thing by itself. For it

is not necessary that you should have the power of his money: it may be entrusted to a steward

who travels with him: or it may be left to himself. If you have it, it is but a delegated power. And,

in all delegated powers, I thought this a fair proof; you have it not, or cannot use it, which is

what the author means here by extended to, because it is not committed to you. In the summing

up of this argument (p. 326.), the author says, “no-body therefore, in fine, neither

commonwealths, &c. hath any title to invade the civil rights and worldly goods of another, upon

pretence of religion.” Which is an exposition of what he means in the beginning of the argument,

by “the magistrate’s power cannot be extended to the salvation of souls.” So that if we take these

last cited words equivalent to those in the former place, his proof will stand thus, “the magistrate

has no title to invade the civil rights or worldly goods of any one, upon pretence of religion;

because the care of souls is not committed to him.” This is the same in the author’s sense with

the former. And whether either this, or that, be a proving the same thing by itself, we must leave

to others to judge.

You quote the author’s argument, which he brings to prove that the care of souls is not

committed to the magistrate, in these words; “it is not committed to him by God, because it

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appears not that God has ever given any such authority to one man over another, as to compel

any one to his religion.” This, when first I read it, I confess, I thought a good argument. But you

say, “this is quite beside the business;” and the reason you give, is, “for the authority of the

magistrate is not an authority to compel any to his religion, but only an authority to procure all

his subjects the means of discovering the way of salvation, and to procure withal, as much as in

him lies, that none remain ignorant of it,” &c. I fear, sir, you forget yourself. The author was not

writing against your new hypothesis, before it was known in the world. He may be excused if he

had not the gift of prophecy, to argue against a notion which was not yet started. He had in view

only the laws hitherto made, and the punishments, in matters of religion, in use in the world. The

penalties, as I take it, are lain on men for being of different ways of religion. Which, what is it

other, but to compel them to relinquish their own, and to conform themselves to that from which

they differ? If this be not to compel them to the magistrate’s religion, pray tell us what is? This

must be necessarily so understood; unless it can be supposed that the law intends not to have

that done, which with penalties it commands to be done; or that punishments are not compulsion,

not that compulsion the author complains of. The law says “do this and live;” embrace this

doctrine, conform to this way of worship, and be at ease, and free; or else be fined, imprisoned,

banished, burned. If you can show among the laws that have been made in England, concerning

religion, and I think I may say any-where else, any one that punishes men “for not having

impartially examined the religion they have embraced, or refused,” I think I may yield you the

cause. Law-makers have been generally wiser than to make laws that could not be executed: and

therefore their laws were against non-conformists, which could be known; and not for impartial

examination, which could not. It was not then besides the author’s business, to bring an

argument against the persecutions here in fashion. He did not know that any one, who was so

free as to acknowledge that “the magistrate has not authority to compel any one to his religion,”

and thereby at once, as you have done, give up all the laws now in force against dissenters; had

yet rods in store for them, and by a new trick would bring them under the lash of the law, when

the old pretences were too much exploded to serve any longer. Have you never heard of such a

thing as the religion established by law? Which is, it seems, the lawful religion of a country, and

to be complied with as such. There being such things, such notions yet in the world, it was not

quite besides the author’s business to allege, that “God never gave such authority to one man

over another as to compel any one to his religion.” I will grant, if you please, “religion established

by law” is a pretty odd way of speaking in the mouth of a christian; and yet it is much in fashion:

as if the magistrate’s authority could add any force or sanction to any religion, whether true or

false. I am glad to find you have so far considered the magistrate’s authority, that you agree with

the author, that “he hath none to compel men to his religion.” Much less can he, by any

establishment of law, add any thing to the truth or validity of his own, or any religion whatsoever.

It remains now to examine, whether the author’s argument will not hold good, even against

punishments in your way; “for if the magistrate’s authority be, as you here say, only to procure

all his subjects, (mark what you say,

ALL HIS SUBJECTS) the means of discovering the way of

salvation, and to procure withal, as much as in him lies, that

NONE remain ignorant of it, or refuse

to embrace it, either for want of using those means, or by reason of any such prejudices as may

render them ineffectual.” If this be the magistrate’s business, in reference to

ALL HIS SUBJECTS, I

desire you, or any man else, to tell me how this can be done by the application of force only to a

part of them: unless you will still vainly suppose ignorance, negligence, or prejudice, only

amongst that part which anywhere differs from the magistrate. If those of the magistrate’s church

may be ignorant of the way of salvation; if it be possible there may be amongst them those “who

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refuse to embrace it, either for want of using those means, or by reason of any such prejudices as

may render them ineffectual:” What, in this case, becomes of the magistrate’s authority to

procure all his subjects the means of discovering the way of salvation? Must these of his subjects

be neglected, and left without the means he has authority to procure them? Or must he use force

upon them too? And then, pray, show me how this can be done. Shall the magistrate punish

those of his own religion, “to procure them the means of discovering the way of salvation, and to

procure as much as in him lies, that they remain not ignorant of it, or refuse not to embrace it?”

These are such contradictions in practice, this is such condemnation of a man’s own religion, as

no one can expect from the magistrate; and I dare say you desire not of him. And yet this is that

he must do, “if his authority be to procure all his subjects the means of discovering the way to

salvation.” And if it be so needful as you say it is, that he should use it, I am sure force cannot do

that till it be applied wider, and punishment be laid upon more than you would have it; for “if the

magistrate be by force to procure, as much as in him lies, that none remain ignorant of the way

of salvation;” must he not punish all those who are ignorant of the way of salvation? And pray tell

me how this is any way practicable, but by supposing none in the national church ignorant, and

all out of it ignorant of the way of salvation. Which, what is it, but to punish men barely for not

being of the magistrate’s religion; the very thing you deny he has authority to do? So that the

magistrate having, by your own confession, no authority thus to use force; and it being

otherways impracticable “for the procuring all his subjects the means of discovering the way of

salvation;” there is an end of force. And so force being laid aside, either as unlawful, or

impracticable, the author’s argument holds good against force, even in your way of applying it.

But if you say, as you do in the foregoing page, that the magistrate has authority “to lay such

penalties upon those who refuse to embrace the doctrine of the proper ministers of religion, and

to submit to their spiritual government, as to make them bethink themselves so as not to be

alienated from the truth: (for, as for foolish humour, and uncharitable prejudice,” &c. which are

but words of course that opposite parties give one another, as marks of dislike and presumption,

I omit them, as signifying nothing to the question; being such as will with the same reason be

retorted by the other side), against that also the author’s argument holds, that the magistrate

has no such authority. 1. Because God never gave the magistrate an authority to be judge of

truth for another man in matters of religion: and so he cannot be judge whether any man be

alienated from the truth or no. 2. Because the magistrate had never authority given him “to lay

any penalties on those who refuse to embrace the doctrine of the proper ministers of his religion,

or of any other, or to submit to their spiritual government,” more than on any other men.

To the author’s argument, that the magistrate cannot receive such authority from the people;

because no man has power to leave it to the choice of any other man to choose a religion for him;

you give this pleasant answer: “As the power of the magistrate, in reference to religion, is

ordained for the bringing men to take such care as they ought of their salvation, that they may

not blindly leave it to the choice, neither of any other person, nor yet of their own lusts and

passions, to prescribe to them what faith or worship they shall embrace; so if we suppose this

power to be vested in the magistrate by the consent of the people; this will not import their

abandoning the care of their salvation, but rather the contrary. For if men, in choosing their

religion, are so generally subject, as has been showed, when left wholly to themselves, to be so

much swayed by prejudice and passion, as either not at all, or not sufficient to regard the reasons

and motives which ought alone to determine their choice; then it is every man’s true interest, not

to be left wholly to himself in this matter; but that care should be taken, that, in an affair of so

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vast concernment to him, he may be brought even against his own inclination, if it cannot be

done otherwise (which is ordinarily the case), to act according to reason and sound judgment.

And then what better course can men take to provide for this, than by vesting the power I have

described in him who bears the sword?”—Wherein I beseech you consider, 1. Whether it be not

pleasant, that you say—“the power of the magistrate is ordained to bring men to take such care;”

and thence infer, “Then it is every one’s interest to vest such power in the magistrate?” For if it

be the power of the magistrate, it is his. And what need the people vest it in him, unless there be

need, and it be the best course they can take, to vest a power in the magistrate, which he has

already? 2. Another pleasant thing you here say, is, “That the power of the magistrate is to bring

men to such a care of their salvation, that they may not blindly leave it to the choice of any

person, or their own lusts, or passions, to prescribe to them what faith or worship they shall

embrace; and yet that it is their best course to vest a power in the magistrate,” liable to the same

lusts and passions as themselves, to choose for them. For if they vest a power in the magistrate

to punish them, when they dissent from his religion; “to bring them to act, even against their own

inclination, according to their reason and sound judgment;” which is, as you explain yourself in

another place, to bring them to consider reasons and arguments proper and sufficient to convince

them: How far is this from leaving it to the choice of another man to prescribe to them what faith

or worship they shall embrace? Especially if we consider that you think it a strange thing, that the

author would have the care of every man’s soul left to himself alone. So that this care being

vested “in the magistrate, with a power to punish men to make them consider reasons and

arguments proper and sufficient to convince them” of the truth of his religion; the choice is

evidently in the magistrate, as much as it can be in the power of one man to choose for another

what religion he shall be of; which consists only in a power of compelling him by punishments to

embrace it.

I do neither you nor the magistrate injury, when I say that the power you give the magistrate of

“punishing men, to make them consider reasons and arguments proper and sufficient to convince

them” is to convince them of the truth of his religion, and to bring them to it. For men will never,

in his opinion, “act according to reason and sound judgment,” which is the thing you here say

men should be brought to by the magistrate, even against their “own inclination;” till they

embrace his religion. And if you have the brow of an honest man, you will not say the magistrate

will ever punish you “to bring you to consider any other reasons and arguments, but such as are

proper to convince you” of the truth of his religion, and to bring you to that. Thus you shift

forwards and backwards. You say “the magistrate has no power to punish men, to compel them

to his religion,” but only to “compel them to consider reasons and arguments proper to convince

them” of the truth of his religion, which is all one as to say, no-body has power to choose your

way for you to Jerusalem; but yet the lord of the manor has power to punish you, “to bring you to

consider reasons and arguments proper and sufficient to convince you.” Of what? That the way he

goes in, is the right, and so to make you join in company, and go along with him. So that, in

effect, what is all your going about, but to come at last to the same place again; and put a power

into the magistrate’s hands, under another pretence, to compel men to his religion; which use of

force the author has sufficiently overthrown, and you yourself have quitted. But I am tired to

follow you so often round the same circle.

You speak of it here as the most deplorable condition imaginable, that “men should be left to

themselves, and not be forced to consider and examine the grounds of their religion, and search

impartially and diligently after the truth.” This you make the great miscarriage of mankind. And

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for this you seem solicitous, all through your treatise, to find out a remedy; and there is scarce a

leaf wherein you do not offer yours. But what if, after all now, you should be found to

prevaricate? “Men have contrived to themselves, say you, a great variety of religions:” it is

granted. “They seek not the truth in this matter with that application of mind, and that freedom

of judgment which is requisite:” it is confessed. “All the false religions now on foot in the world

have taken their rise from the slight and partial consideration, which men have contented

themselves with, in searching after the true; and men take them up, and persist in them, for

want of due examination:” be it so. “There is need of a remedy for this, and I have found one

whose success cannot be questioned:” very well. What is it? Let us hear it. “Why, dissenters must

be punished.” Can any body that hears you say so, believe you in earnest; and that want of

examination is the thing you would have amended, when want of examination is not the thing

you would have punished? If want of examination be the fault, want of examination must be

punished; if you are, as you pretend, fully satisfied, that punishment is the proper and only

means to remedy it. But if, in all your treatise, you can show me one place, where you say that

the ignorant, the careless, the inconsiderate, the negligent in examining thoroughly the truth of

their own and others religion, &c. are to be punished; I will allow your remedy for a good one. But

you have not said any thing like this: and which is more, I tell you before-hand, you dare not say

it. And whilst you do not, the world has reason to judge, that however want of examination be a

general fault, which you with great vehemency have exaggerated; yet you use it only for a

pretence to punish dissenters; and either distrust your remedy, that it will not cure this evil, or

else care not to have it generally cured. This evidently appears from your whole management of

the argument. And he that reads your treatise with attention, will be more confirmed in this

opinion, when he shall find, that you who are so earnest to have men punished to bring them to

consider and examine, so that they may discover the way to salvation, have not said one word of

considering, searching, and hearkening to the scripture; which had been as good a rule for a

christian to have sent them to, “as to reasons and arguments proper to convince them” of you

know not what; “as to the instruction and government of the proper ministers of religion,” which

who they are, men are yet far from being agreed; “or as to the information of those who tell them

they have mistaken their way, and offer to show them the right; and to the like uncertain and

dangerous guides; which were not those that our Saviour and the apostles sent men to, but to

the scriptures.” “Search the scriptures, for in them you think you have eternal life,” says our

Saviour to the unbelieving persecuting jews, (John 39.) and it is the scriptures which, St. Paul

says, “are able to make wise unto salvation,” (2 Tim. iii. 15.)

Talk no more, therefore, if you have any care of your reputation, how much “it is every man’s

interest not to be left to himself, without molestation, without punishment in matters of religion.

Talk not of bringing men to embrace the truth that must save them, by putting them upon

examination.” Talk no more “of force and punishment, as the only way left to bring men to

examine.” It is evident you mean nothing less. For though want of examination be the only fault

you complain of, and punishment be in your opinion the only way to bring men to it; and this the

whole design of your book; yet you have not once proposed in it, that those, who do not

impartially examine, should be forced to it. And that you may not think I talk at random, when I

say you dare not; I will, if you please, give you some reasons for my saying so.

1. Because, if you propose that all should be punished, who are ignorant, who have not used

“such consideration as is apt and proper to manifest the truth; but to have been determined in

the choice of their religion by impressions of education, admiration of persons, worldly respects,

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prejudices, and the like incompetent motives; and have taken up their religion, without examining

it as they ought;” you will propose to have several of your own church, be it what it will,

punished; which would be a proposition too apt to offend two many of it, for you to venture on.

For whatever need there be of reformation, every one will not thank you for proposing such an

one as must begin at, or at least reach to the house of God.

2. Because, if you should propose that all those who are ignorant, careless, and negligent in

examining, should be punished, you would have little to say in this question of toleration. For if

the laws of the state were made, as they ought to be, equal to all the subjects, without distinction

of men of different professions in religion; and the faults to be amended by punishments, were

impartially punished, in all who are guilty of them; this would immediately produce a perfect

toleration, or show the uselessness of force in matters of religion. If therefore you think it so

necessary, as you say, for the “promoting of true religion, and the salvation of souls, that men

should be punished to make them examine;” do but find a way to apply force to all that have not

thoroughly and impartially examined, and you have my consent. For though force be not the

proper means of promoting religion; yet there is no better way to show the uselessness of it, than

the applying it equally to miscarriages, in whomsoever found; and not to distinct parties or

persuasions of men, for the reformation of them alone, when others are equally faulty.

3. Because without being for as large a toleration as the author proposes, you cannot be truly and

sincerely for a free and impartial examination. For whoever examines, must have the liberty to

judge, and follow his judgment; or else you put him upon examination to no purpose. And

whether that will not as well lead men from, as to your church, is so much a venture, that, by

your way of writing, it is evident enough you are loth to hazard it; and if you are of the national

church, it is plain your brethren will not bear with you in the allowance of such a liberty. You must

therefore either change your method; and if the want of examination be that great and dangerous

fault you would have corrected, you must equally punish all that are equally guilty of any neglect

in this matter, and then take your only means, your beloved force, and make the best of it; or

else you must put off your mask, and confess that you design not your punishments to bring men

to examination, but to conformity. For the fallacy you have used, is too gross to pass upon this

age.

What follows to p. 26. I think I have considered sufficiently already. But there you have found out

something worth notice. In this page, out of abundant kindness, when the dissenters have their

heads, without any cause, broken, you provide them a plaister. For, say you, “if upon such

examination of the matter” (i. e. brought to it by the magistrate’s punishment) “they chance to

find, that the truth does not lie on the magistrate’s side; they have gained thus much however,

even by the magistrate’s misapplying his power, that they know better than they did before,

where the truth does lie.” Which is as true, as if you should say, upon examination I find such a

one is out of the way to York; therefore I know better than I did before, that I am in the right. For

neither of you may be in the right. This were true indeed, if there were but two ways in all, a

right and a wrong. But where there be an hundred ways, and but one right; your knowing upon

examination, that that which I take is wrong, makes you not know any thing better than before,

that yours is the right. But if that be the best reason you have for it, it is ninety-eight to one still

against you, that you are in the wrong. Besides, he that has been punished, may have examined

before, and then you are sure he gains nothing. However you think you do well to encourage the

magistrate in punishing, and comfort the man who has suffered unjustly, by showing what he

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shall gain by it. Whereas, on the contrary, in a discourse of this nature, where the bounds of right

and wrong are inquired into, and should be established, the magistrate was to be showed the

bounds of his authority, and warned of the injury he did when he misapplies his power, and

punished any man who deserved it not; and not be soothed into injustice, by consideration of

gain that might thence accrue to the sufferer. “Shall we do evil that good may come of it?” There

are a sort of people who are very wary of touching upon the magistrate’s duty, and tender of

showing the bounds of his power, and the injustice and ill consequences of his misapplying it; at

least, so long as it is misapplied in favour of them and their party. I know not whether you are of

their number. But this I am sure, you have the misfortune here to fall into their mistake. The

magistrate, you confess, may in this case misapply his power; and instead of representing to him

the injustice of it, and the account he must give to his sovereign, one day, of this great trust put

into his hands, for the equal protection of all his subjects: you pretend advantages which the

sufferer may receive from it: and so instead of disheartening from, you give encouragement to,

the mischief. Which, upon your principle, joined to the natural thirst in man after arbitrary power,

may be carried to all manner of exorbitancy, with some pretence of right.

For thus stands your system: “If force, i. e. punishment, may be any way useful for the

promoting the salvation of souls, there is a right somewhere to use it. And this right, say you, is

in the magistrate.” Who then, upon your grounds, may quickly find reason, where it suits his

inclination, or serves his turn, to punish men directly to bring them to his religion. For if he may

use force, because it “may be, indirectly and at a distance, any way useful towards the salvation

of men’s souls,” towards the procuring any degree of glory; why may he not, by the same rule,

use it where it may be useful, at least indirectly and at a distance, towards the procuring a

greater degree of glory? For St. Paul assures us, “that the afflictions of this life work for us a far

more exceeding weight of glory.” So that why should they not be punished, if in the wrong, to

bring them into the right way; if in the right, to make them by their sufferings, “gainers of a far

more exceeding weight of glory?” But whatever you say “of punishment being lawful, because,

indirectly and at a distance, it may be useful;” I suppose upon cooler thoughts, you will be apt to

suspect that, however sufferings may promote the salvation of those who make a good use of

them, and so set men surer in the right way, or higher in a state of glory; yet those who make

men unduly suffer, will have the heavier account, and greater weight of guilt upon them, to sink

them deeper in the pit of perdition; and that therefore they should be warned to take care of so

using their power. Because whoever be gainers by it, they themselves will, without repentance

and amendment, be sure to be losers. But by granting that the magistrate misapplies his power,

when he punishes those who have the right on their side, whether it be to bring them to his own

religion, or whether it be “to bring them to consider reasons and arguments proper to convince

them,” you grant all that the author contends for. All that he endeavours is to show the bounds of

civil power; and that in punishing others for religion, the magistrate misapplies the force he has

in his hands, and so goes beyond right, beyond the limits of his power. For I do not think the

author of the letter so vain, I am sure for my part I am not, as to hope by arguments, though

ever so clear, to reform presently all the abuses in this matter; especially whilst men of art, and

religion, endeavour so industriously to palliate and disguise, what truth, yet sometimes unawares,

forces from them.

Do not think I make a wrong use of your saying, “the magistrate misapplies his power,” when I

say you therein grant all that the author contends for. For if the magistrate misapplies, or makes

wrong use of his power, when he punishes in matters of religion any one who is in the right,

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though it be but to make him consider, as you grant he does; he also misapplies, or makes wrong

use of his power, when he punishes any one whomsoever in matters of religion, to make him

consider. For every one is here judge for himself, what is right; and in matters of faith, and

religious worship, another cannot judge for him. So that to punish any one in matters of religion,

though it be but to make him consider, is by your own confession beyond the magistrate’s power.

And that punishing in matters of religion is beyond the magistrate’s power, is what the author

contends for.

You tell us in the following words, “all the hurt that comes to them by it, is only the suffering

some tolerable inconveniencies, for their following the light of their own reason, and the dictates

of their own consciences; which certainly is no such mischief to mankind, as to make it more

eligible, that there should be no such power vested in the magistrate, but the care of every man’s

soul should be left to himself alone (as this author demands it should be;) that is, that every man

should be suffered, quietly, and without the least molestation, either to take no care at all of his

soul, if he be so pleased; or, in doing it, to follow his own groundless prejudices, or unaccountable

humour, or any crafty seducer, whom he may think fit to take for his guide.” Why should not the

care of every man’s soul be left to himself, rather than the magistrate? Is the magistrate like to

be more concerned for it? Is the magistrate like to take more care of it? Is the magistrate

commonly more careful of his own, than other men are of theirs? Will you say the magistrate is

less exposed, in matters of religion, to prejudices, humours, and crafty seducers, than other

men? If you cannot lay your hand upon your heart, and say all this, what then will be got by the

change? And “why may not the care of every man’s soul be left to himself?” Especially if a man be

in so much danger to miss the truth, “who is suffered quietly, and without the least molestation,

either to take no care of his soul, if he be so pleased, or to follow his own prejudices,” &c. For if

want of molestation be the dangerous state, wherein men are likeliest to miss the right way; it

must be confessed, that, of all men, the magistrate is most in danger to be in the wrong, and so

the unfittest, if you take the care of men’s souls from themselves, of all men to be intrusted with

it. For he never meets with that great and only antidote of yours against errour, which you here

call molestation. He never has the benefit of your sovereign remedy, punishment, to make him

consider; which you think so necessary, that you look on it as a most dangerous state for men to

be without it; and therefore tell us, “it is every man’s true interest not to be left wholly to himself

in matters of religion.”

Thus, sir, I have gone through your whole treatise, and, as I think, have omitted nothing in it

material. If I have, I doubt not but I shall hear of it. And now I refer it to yourself, as well as to

the judgment of the world, whether the author of the letter, in saying no-body hath a right, or

you, in saying the magistrate hath a right, to use force in matters of religion, has most reason. In

the mean time, I leave this request with you: that if ever you write again, about “the means of

bringing souls to salvation,” which certainly is the best design any one can employ his pen in, you

would take care not to prejudice so good a cause, by ordering it so, as to make it look as if you

writ for a party.

I am, S

IR, Your most humble servant,

HILANTHROPUS.

May 27, 1690.

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A THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION.

To the AUTHOR of the Third LETTER concerning TOLERATION.

CHAPTER I.

SIR,

HE business which your Letter concerning Toleration found me engaged in, has taken up so much

of the time my health would allow me ever since, that I doubt whether I should now at all have

troubled you or the world with an answer, had not some of my friends, sufficiently satisfied of the

weakness of your arguments, with repeated instances, persuaded me it might be of use to truth,

in a point of so great moment, to clear it from those fallacies which might perhaps puzzle some

unwary readers; and therefore prevailed on me to show the wrong grounds and mistaken

reasonings you make use of to support your new way of persecution. Pardon me, sir, that I use

that name, which you are so much offended at; for if punishment be punishment, though it come

short of the discipline of fire and faggot, it is as certain that punishment for religion truly

persecution, though it be only such punishment as you in your clemency think fit to call

“moderate and convenient penalties.” But however you please to call them, I doubt not but to let

you see, that if you will be true to your own principles, and stand to what you have said, you

must carry your “some degrees of force,” as you phrase it, to all those degrees which in words

you declare against.

You have indeed in this last letter of yours altered the question; for, p. 26, you tell me the

question between us, is “whether the magistrate hath any right to use force to bring men to the

true religion?” Whereas you yourself own the question to be, “whether the magistrate has a right

to use force in matters of religion?” Whether this alteration be at all to the advantage of truth, or

your cause, we shall see. But hence you take occasion all along to lay a load on me for charging

you with the absurdities of a power in the magistrates to punish men, to bring them to their

religion; whereas you here tell us they have a right to use force “only to bring men to the true.”

But whether I were more to blame to suppose you to talk coherently and mean sense, or you in

expressing yourself so doubtfully and uncertainly, where you were concerned to be plain and

direct, I shall leave to our readers to judge; only here in the beginning, I shall endeavour to clear

myself of that imputation, I so often meet with, of charging on you consequences you do not

own, and arguing against an opinion that is not yours, in those places, where I show how little

advantage it would be to truth, or the salvation of men’s souls, that all magistrates should have a

right to use force to bring men to embrace their religion. This I shall do by proving, that if upon

your grounds the magistrate, as you pretend, be obliged to use force to bring men to the true

religion, it will necessarily follow that every magistrate, who believes his religion to be true, is

obliged to use force to bring men to his.

You tell us, “that by the law of nature the magistrate is invested with coactive power, and obliged

to use it for all the good purposes which it might serve, and for which it should be found needful,

even for the restraining of false and corrupt religion: and that it is the magistrate’s duty, to which

he is commissioned by the law of nature, but the scripture does not properly give it him.”

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I suppose you will grant me, that any thing laid upon the magistrate as a duty, is some way or

other practicable. Now the magistrate being obliged to use force in matters of religion, but yet so

as to bring men only to the true religion, he will not be in any capacity to perform this part of his

duty, unless the religion he is thus to promote be what he can certainly know, or else what it is

sufficient for him to believe, to be the true: either his knowledge or his opinion must point out

that religion to him, which he is by force to promote; or else he may promiscuously and

indifferently promote any religion, and punish men at a venture, to bring them from that they are

in, to any other. This last I think no-body has been so wild as to say.

If therefore it must be either his knowledge or his persuasion that must guide the magistrate

herein, and keep him within the bounds of his duty; if the magistrates of the world cannot know,

certainly know, the true religion to be the true religion, but it be of a nature to exercise their

faith; (for where vision, knowledge, and certainty is, there faith is done away;) then that which

gives them the last determination herein, must be their own belief, their own persuasion.

To you and me the christian religion is the true, and that is built, to mention no other articles of

it, on this, that Jesus Christ was put to death at Jerusalem, and rose again from the dead. Now do

you or I know this? I do not ask with what assurance we believe it, for that in the highest degree

not being knowledge, is not what we now inquire after. Can any magistrate demonstrate to

himself, and if he can to himself, he does ill not to do it to others, not only all the articles of his

church, but the fundamental ones of the christian religion? For whatever is not capable of

demonstration, as such remote matters of fact are not, is not, unless it be self-evident, capable to

produce knowledge, how well grounded and great soever the assurance of faith may be

wherewith it is received; but faith it is still, and not knowledge; persuasion, and not certainty.

This is the highest the nature of the thing will permit us to go in matters of revealed religion,

which are therefore called matters of faith: a persuasion of our own minds, short of knowledge, is

the last result that determines us in such truths. It is all God requires in the gospel for men to be

saved: and it would be strange if there were more required of the magistrate for the direction of

another in the way to salvation, than is required of him for his own salvation. Knowledge then,

properly so called, not being to be had of the truths necessary to salvation, the magistrate must

be content with faith and persuasion for the rule of that truth he will recommend and enforce

upon others; as well as of that whereon he will venture his own eternal condition. If therefore it

be the magistrate’s duty to use force to bring men to the true religion, it can be only to that

religion which he believes to be true: so that if force be at all to be used by the magistrate in

matters of religion, it can only be for the promoting that religion which he only believes to be

true, or none at all. I grant that a strong assurance of any truth settled upon prevalent and well-

grounded arguments of probability, is often called knowledge in popular ways of talking: but

being here to distinguish between knowledge and belief, to what degrees of confidence soever

raised, their boundaries must be kept, and their names not confounded. I know not what greater

pledge a man can give of a full persuasion of the truth of any thing, than his venturing his soul

upon it, as he does, who sincerely embraces any religion, and receives it for true. But to what

degree soever of assurance his faith may rise, it still comes short of knowledge. Nor can any one

now, I think, arrive to greater evidence of the truth of the christian religion, than the first

converts in the time of our Saviour and the apostles had; of whom yet nothing more was required

but to believe.

But supposing all the truths of the christian religion necessary to salvation could be so known to

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the magistrate, that, in his use of force for the bringing men to embrace these, he could be

guided by infallible certainty; yet I fear this would not serve your turn, nor authorise the

magistrate to use force to bring men in England, or any-where else, into the communion of the

national church, in which ceremonies of human institution were imposed, which could not be

known, nor, being confessed things in their own nature indifferent, so much as thought necessary

to salvation.

But of this I shall have occasion to speak in another place; all the use I make of it here, is to

show, that the cross in baptism, kneeling at the sacrament, and suchlike things, being impossible

to be known necessary to salvation, a certain knowledge of the truth of the articles of faith of any

church could not authorise the magistrate to compel men to embrace the communion of that

church, wherein any thing were made necessary to communion, which he did not know was

necessary to salvation.

By what has been already said, I suppose it is evident, that if the magistrate be to use force only

for promoting the true religion, he can have no other guide but his own persuasion of what is the

true religion, and must be led by that in his use of force, or else not use it at all in matters of

religion. If you take the latter of these consequences, you and I are agreed: if the former, you

must allow all magistrates, of whatsoever religion, the use of force to bring men to theirs, and so

be involved in all those ill consequences which you cannot it seems admit, and hoped to decline

by your useless distinction of force to be used, not for any, but for the true religion.

“It is the duty,” you say, “of the magistrate to use force for promoting the true religion.” And in

several places you tell us, he is obliged to it. Persuade magistrates in general of this, and then tell

me how any magistrate shall be restrained from the use of force, for the promoting what he

thinks to be the true? For he being persuaded that it is his duty to use force to promote the true

religion, and being also persuaded his is the true religion, what shall stop his hand? Must he

forbear the use of force till he be got beyond believing, into a certain knowledge that all he

requires men to embrace, is necessary to salvation? If that be it you will stand to, you have my

consent, and I think there will be no need of any other toleration. But if the believing his religion

to be the true, be sufficient for the magistrate to use force for the promoting of it, will it be so

only to the magistrates of the religion that you profess? And must all other magistrates sit still

and not do their duty till they have your permission? If it be your magistrate’s duty to use force

for the promoting the religion he believes to be the true, it will be every magistrate’s duty to use

force for the promoting what he believes to be the true, and he sins if he does not receive and

promote it as if it were true. If you will not take this upon my word, yet I desire you to do it upon

the strong reason of a very judicious and reverend prelate [Dr. John Sharp, archbishop of York] of

the present church of England. In a discourse concerning conscience, printed in quarto, 1687, p.

18, you will find these following words, and much more to this purpose: “Where a man is

mistaken in his judgment, even in that case it is always a sin to act against it. Though we should

take that for a duty which is really a sin, yet so long as we are thus persuaded, it will be highly

criminal in us to act in contradiction to this persuasion: and the reason of this is evident, because

by so doing we wilfully act against the best light which at present we have for direction of our

actions. So that when all is done, the immediate guide of our actions can be nothing but our

conscience, our judgment and persuasion. If a man for instance, should of a jew become a

christian, whilst yet in his heart he believed that the Messiah is not yet come, and that our Lord

Jesus was an impostor: or if a papist should renounce the communion of the Roman church, and

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join with ours, whilst yet he is persuaded that the Roman church is the only catholic church, and

that our reformed churches are heretical or schismatical; though now there is none of us that will

deny that the men in both these cases have made a good change, as having changed a false

religion for a true one, yet for all that I dare say we should all agree they were both of them great

villains for making that change; because they made it not upon honest principles, and in

pursuance of their judgment, but in direct contradiction to both.” So that it being the magistrate’s

duty to use force to bring men to the true religion, and he being persuaded his is the true, I

suppose you will no longer question but that he is as much obliged to use force to bring men to it,

as if it were the true; and then, Sir, I hope you have too much respect for magistrates, not to

allow them to believe the religions to be true which they profess.—These things put together, I

desire you to consider whether if magistrates are obliged to use force to bring men to the true

religion, every magistrate is not obliged to use force to bring men to that religion he believes to

be true?

This being so, I hope I have not argued so wholly beside the purpose, as you all through your

letter accuse me, for charging on your doctrine all the ill consequences, all the prejudice it would

be to the true religion, that magistrates should have power to use force to bring men to their

religions; and I presume you will think yourself concerned to give to all these places in the first

and second letter concerning toleration, which show the inconveniencies and absurdities of such

an use of force, some other answer, than that “you are for punishing only such as reject the true

religion. That it is plain the force you speak of is not force, my way applied, i. e. applied to the

promoting the true religion only, but to the promoting all the national religions in the world.” And

again, to my arguing that force your way applied, if it can propagate any religion, it is likelier to

be the false than the true, because few of the magistrates of the world are in the right way; you

reply, “this would have been to the purpose, if you” had asserted that every magistrate may use

force “your” indirect way (or any way) to bring men to his “own religion, whatever that be. But if

“you” asserted no such thing (as no man you think but an atheist will assert it), then this is quite

beside the business.” This is the great strength of your answer, and your refuge almost in every

page. So that I will presume it reasonable to expect that you should clearly and directly answer

what I have here said, or else find some other answer than what you have done to the second

letter concerning toleration; however acute you are, in your way, in several places, on this

occasion, as p. 11, 12, for my answer to which I shall refer you to another place.

To my argument against force, from the magistrate’s being as liable to errour as the rest of

mankind, you answer, That I “might have considered that this argument concerns none but those

who assert that every magistrate has a right to use force to promote his own religion, whatever it

be, which “you” think no man that has any religion will assert.” I suppose you may think now this

answer will scarce serve, and you must assert either no magistrate to have right to promote his

religion by force, or else be involved in the condemnation you pass on those who assert it of all

magistrates. And here I think, as to the decision of the question betwixt us, I might leave this

matter: but there being in your letter a great many other gross mistakes, wrong suppositions,

and fallacious arguings, which in those general and plausible terms you have made use of in

several places, as best served your turn, may possibly have imposed on yourself, as well as they

are fitted to do so on others, and therefore will deserve to have some notice taken of them; I

shall give myself the trouble of examining your letter a little farther.

To my saying “It is not for the magistrate, upon an imagination of its usefulness, to make use of

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any other means than what the author and finisher of our faith had directed;” you reply, “which,

how true soever, is not, I think, very much to the purpose; for if the magistrate does only assist

that ministry which our Lord has appointed, by using so much of his coactive power for the

furthering their service, as common experience discovers to be useful and necessary for that end;

there is no manner of ground to say, that, upon an imagination of its usefulness, he makes use of

any other means for the salvation of men’s souls, than what the author and finisher of our faith

has directed. It is true indeed the author and finisher of our faith has given the magistrate no new

power or commission, nor was there any need that he should, (if himself had had any temporal

power to give:) for he found him already, even by the law of nature, the minister of God to the

people for good, and bearing the sword not in vain, i. e. invested with coactive power, and

obliged to use it for all the good purposes which it might serve, and for which it should be found

needful; even for the restraining of false and corrupt religion; as Job long before (perhaps before

any part of the scriptures were written) acknowledged, when he said, that the worshipping the

sun or the moon was an iniquity to be punished by the judge. But though our Saviour has given

the magistrates no new power, yet being king of kings, he expects and requires that they should

submit themselves to his sceptre, and use the power which always belonged to them, for his

service, and for the advancing his spiritual kingdom in the world. And even that charity which our

great Master so earnestly recommends and so strictly requires of all his disciples, as it obliges all

men to seek and promote the good of others, as well as their own, especially their spiritual and

eternal good, by such means as their several places and relations enable them to use; so does it

especially oblige the magistrate to do it as a magistrate, i. e. by that power which enables him to

do it above the rate of other men.

“So far therefore is the christian magistrate, when he gives his helping hand to the furtherance of

the gospel, by laying convenient penalties upon such as reject it, or any part of it, from using any

other means for the salvation of men’s souls, than what the author and finisher of our faith has

directed, that he does no more than his duty to God, to his Redeemer, and to his subjects,

requires of him.”

The sum of your reply amounts to this, that by the law of nature the magistrate may make use of

his coactive power where it is useful and necessary for the good of the people. If it be from the

law of nature, it must be to all magistrates equally; and then I ask, whether this good they are to

promote without any new power or commission from our Saviour, be what they think to be so, or

what they certainly know to be so. If it be what they think to be so, then all magistrates may use

force to bring men to their religion: and what good this is like to be to men, or of what use to the

true religion, we have elsewhere considered. If it be only that good which they certainly know to

be so, they will be very ill enabled to do what you require of them, which you here tell us is to

assist that ministry which our Lord has appointed. Which of the magistrates of your time did you

know to have so well studied the controversies about ordination and church government, to be so

well versed in church-history and succession, that you can undertake that he certainly knew

which was the ministry which our Lord had appointed, either that of Rome, or that of Sweden;

whether the episcopacy in one part of this island, or the presbytery in another, were the ministry

which our Lord had appointed? If you say, being firmly persuaded of it be sufficient to authorize

the magistrate to use force; you, with the atheists, as you call them, who do so, give the people

up in every country to the coactive force of the magistrate to be employed for the assisting the

ministers of his religion; and king Lewis of good right comes in with his dragoons; for it is not

much doubted that he as strongly believed his popish priests and jesuits to be the ministry which

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our Lord appointed, as either king Charles or king James the second believed that of the church of

England to be so. And of what use such an exercise of the coactive power of all magistrates is to

the people, or to the true religion, you are concerned to show. But it is, you know, but to tell me,

I only trifle, and this is all answered.

What in other places you tell us, is to make men “hear, consider, study, embrace, and bring men

to the true religion,” you here do very well to tell us is to assist the ministry; and to that, it is

true, “common experience discovers the magistrate’s coactive force to be useful and necessary,”

viz. to those who taking the reward, but not over-busying themselves in the care of souls, find it

for their ease, that the magistrate’s coactive power should supply their want of pastoral care, and

be made use of to bring those into an outward conformity to the national church, whom either for

want of ability they cannot, or want of due and friendly application, joined with an exemplary life,

they never so much as endeavoured to prevail on heartily to embrace it. That there may be such

neglects in the best-constituted national church in the world, the complaints of a very knowing

bishop of our church, [Dr. Gilbert Burnet, bishop of Salisbury,] in a late discourse of the

PASTORAL

CARE

, is too plain an evidence.

Without so great an authority, I should scarce have ventured, though it lay just in my way, to

have taken notice of what is so visible, that it is in every one’s mouth; for fear you should have

told me again, “I made myself an occasion to show my good-will toward the clergy;” for you will

not, I suppose, suspect that eminent prelate to have any ill-will to them.

If this were not so, that some were negligent, I imagine the preachers of the true religion, which

lies, as you tell us, so obvious and exposed, as to be easily distinguished from the false, would

need or desire no other assistance, from the magistrate’s coactive power, but what should be

directed against the irregularity of men’s lives; their lusts being that alone, as you tell us, that

makes force necessary to assist the true religion; which, were it not for our depraved nature,

would by its light and reasonableness have the advantage against all false religions.

You tell us too, that the magistrate may impose creeds and ceremonies: indeed you say sound

creeds, and decent ceremonies, but that helps not your cause; for who must be judge of that

sound, and that decent? If the imposer, then those words signify nothing at all, but that the

magistrate may impose those creeds and ceremonies which he thinks sound and decent, which is

in effect such as he thinks fit. Indeed you telling us a little above, in the same page, that it is, “a

vice not to worship God in ways prescribed by those to whom God has left the ordering of such

matters;” you seem to make other judges of what is sound and decent, and the magistrate but

the executor of their decrees, with the assistance of his coactive power. A pretty foundation to

establish creeds and ceremonies on, that God has left the ordering of them to those who cannot

order them! But still the same difficulty returns; for, after they have prescribed, must the

magistrate judge them to be sound and decent, or must he impose them, though he judge them

not sound or decent? If he must judge them so himself, we are but where we were: if he must

impose them when prescribed, though he judge them not sound nor decent, it is a pretty sort of

drudgery put on the magistrate. And how far is this short of implicit faith? But if he must not

judge what is sound and decent, he must judge at least who are those to whom God has left the

ordering of such matters; and then the king of France is ready again with his dragoons for the

sound doctrine and decent ceremonies of his prescribers in the council of Trent; and that upon

this ground, with as good right as any other as for the prescriptions of any others. Do not mistake

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me again, Sir; I do not say he judges as right; but I do say, that whilst he judges the council of

Trent, or the clergy of Rome to be those to whom God has left the ordering of those matters, he

has as much right to follow their decrees, as any other to follow the judgment of any other set of

mortal men whom he believes to be so.

But whoever is to be judge of what is sound or decent in the case, I ask,

Of what use and necessity is it to impose creeds and ceremonies? For that use and necessity is all

the commission you can find the magistrate hath to use his coactive power to impose them.

1. Of what use and necessity is it among christians that own the scripture to be the word of God

and rule of faith to make and impose a creed? What commission for this hath the magistrate from

the law of nature? God hath given a revelation that contains in it all things necessary to salvation,

and of this his people are all persuaded. What necessity now is there? How does their good

require it, that the magistrate should single out, as he thinks fit, any number of those truths as

more necessary to salvation than the rest, if God himself has not done it?

2. But next, are these creeds in the words of the scripture or not? If they are, they are certainly

sound, as containing nothing but truth in them: and so they were before, as they lay in the

scripture. But thus though they contain nothing but sound truths, yet they may be imperfect, and

so unsound rules of faith, since they may require more or less than God requires to be believed

as necessary to salvation. For what greater necessity, I pray, is there that a man should believe

that Christ suffered under Pontius Pilate, than that he was born at Bethlehem of Judah? Both are

certainly true, and no christian doubts of either: but how comes one to be made an article of

faith, and imposed by the magistrate as necessary to salvation, (for otherwise there can be no

necessity of imposition) and the other not?

Do not mistake me here, as if I would lay by that summary of the christian religion, which is

contained in that which is called the apostle’s creed; which though nobody, who examines the

matter, will have reason to conclude of the apostles compiling, yet is certainly of reverend

antiquity, and ought still to be preserved in the church. I mention it not to argue against it, but

against your imposition; and to show that even that creed, though of that antiquity, though it

contain in it all the credenda necessary to salvation, cannot yet upon your principles be imposed

by the coercive power of the magistrate, who, even by the commission you have found out for

him, can use his force for nothing but what is absolutely necessary to salvation.

But if the creed to be imposed be not in the words of divine revelation; then it is in plainer, more

clear and intelligible expressions, or not: If no plainer, what necessity of changing those, which

men inspired by the Holy Ghost made use of? If you say, they are plainer; then they explain and

determine the sense of some obscure and dubious places of scripture; which explication not being

of divine revelation, though sound to one man, may be unsound to another, and cannot be

imposed as truths necessary to salvation. Besides that, this destroys what you tell us of the

obviousness of all truths necessary to salvation.

And as to rites and ceremonies, are there any necessary to salvation, which Christ has not

instituted? If not, how can the magistrate impose them? What commission has he, from the care

he ought to have for the salvation of men’s souls, to use his coactive force for the establishment

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of any new ones which our Lord and Saviour, with due reverence be it spoken, had forgotten? He

instituted two rites in his church; can any one add any new one to them? Christ commanded

simply to baptize in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; but the signing the

cross, how came that necessary? “Human authority, which is necessary to assist the truth against

the corruption of nature,” has made it so. But it is a “decent” ceremony. I ask, is it so decent that

the administration of baptism, simply, as our Saviour instituted, would be indecent without it? If

not, then there is no reason to impose it for decency’s sake; for there can be no reason to alter or

add any thing to the institution of Christ, or introduce any ceremony or circumstance into religion

for decency, where the action would be decent without it. The command to “do all things

decently, and in order,” gave no authority to add to Christ’s institution any new ceremony; it only

prescribed the manner how, what was necessary to be done in the congregation, should be there

done, viz. after such a manner, that if it were omitted, there would appear some indecency,

whereof the congregation or collective body was to be judge, for to them that rule was given: And

if that rule go beyond what I have said, and gives power to men to introduce into religious

worship whatever they shall think decent, and impose the use of it; I do not see how the greatest

part of the infinite ceremonies of the church of Rome could be complained of, or refused, if

introduced into another church, and there imposed by the magistrate. But if such a power were

given to the magistrate, that whatever he thought a decent ceremony he might de novo impose,

he would need some express commission from God in Scripture, since the commission you say he

has from the law of nature, will never give him a power to institute new ceremonies in the

christian religion, which, be they decent, or what they will, can never be necessary to salvation.

The gospel was to be preached in their assemblies; the rule then was, that the habit, gesture,

voice, language, &c. of the preacher, for these were necessary circumstances of the action,

should have nothing ridiculous or indecent in it. The praises of God were to be sung; it must be

then in such postures and tunes as became the solemnity of that action. And so a convert was to

be baptized; Christ instituted the essential part of that action, which was washing with water in

the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: in which care was also to be had, that in the doing

this nothing should be omitted that preserved a decency in all the circumstances of the action.

But nobody will say, that, if the cross were omitted, upon that account there would be any thing

indecent in baptism.

What is to be done in the assemblies of christians for the salvation of souls, is sufficiently

prescribed in scripture: but since the circumstances of the actions were so various, and might in

several countries and ages have different appearances, as that appears decent in one country

which is quite contrary in another; concerning them there could be no other rule given than what

is, viz. “decently, in order, and to edification;” and in avoiding indecencies, and not adding any

new ceremonies, how decent soever, this rule consists.

I judge no man in the use of the cross in baptism. The imposition of that, or any other ceremony

not instituted by Christ himself, is what I argue against, and say, is more than you upon your

principles can make good.

Common sense has satisfied all mankind, that it is above their reach to determine what things, in

their own nature indifferent, were fit to be made use of in religion, and would be acceptable to the

superiour beings in their worship, and therefore they have every-where thought it necessary to

derive that knowledge from the immediate will and dictates of the gods themselves, and have

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taught that their forms of religion and outward modes of worship were founded upon revelation:

nobody daring to do so absurd and insolent a thing, as to take upon him to presume with himself,

or to prescribe to others by his own authority, which should in these indifferent and mean things

be worthy of the Deity, and make an acceptable part of his worship. Indeed they all agreed in the

duties of natural religion, and we find them by common consent owning that piety and virtue,

clean hands, and a pure heart not polluted with the breaches of the law of nature, was the best

worship of the gods. Reason discovered to them that a good life was the most acceptable thing to

the Deity; this the common light of nature put past doubt. But for their ceremonies and outward

performances, for them they appeal always to a rule received from the immediate direction of the

superiour powers themselves, where they made use of, and had need of revelation. A plain

confession of mankind that in these things we have neither knowledge to discern, nor authority to

prescribe: that men cannot by their own skill find out what is fit, or by their own power make any

thing worthy to be a part of religious worship. It is not for them to invent or impose ceremonies

that shall recommend men to the Deity. It was so obvious and visible, that it became men to

have leave from God himself, before they dared to offer to the divine majesty any of these

trifling, mean, and to him useless things, as a grateful and valuable part of his worship; that no-

body any-where, amongst the various and strange religions they led men into, bid such open

defiance to common sense, and the reason of all mankind, as to presume to do it without

vouching the appointment of God himself. Plato, who of all the heathens seems to have had the

most serious thoughts about religion, says that the magistrate, or whoever has any sense, will

never introduce of his own head any new rites into his religion: for which he gives this convincing

reason: “for,” says he, “he must know it is impossible for human nature to know any thing

certainly concerning these matters.” Epinom. post medium. It cannot therefore but be matter of

astonishment, that any who call themselves christians, who have so sure, and so full a revelation,

which declares all the counsel of God concerning the way of attaining eternal salvation; should

dare by their own authority to add any thing to what is therein prescribed, and impose it on

others as a necessary part of religious worship, without the observance of which human

inventions, men shall not be permitted the public worship of God. If those rites and ceremonies

prescribed to the jews by God himself, and delivered at the same time and by the same hand to

the jews that the moral law was; were called beggarly elements under the gospel, and laid by as

useless and burthensome; what shall we call those rites which have no other foundation, but the

will and authority of men, and of men very often, who have not much thought of the purity of

religion, and practised it less?

Because you think your argument for the magistrate’s right to use force has not had its due

consideration, I shall here set it down in your own words, as it stands, and endeavour to give you

satisfaction to it. You say there, “If such a degree of outward force as has been mentioned, be of

great and even necessary use, for the advancing those ends, (as taking the world as we find it, I

think it appears to be) then it must be acknowledged that there is a right somewhere to use it for

the advancing those ends, unless we will say (what without impiety cannot be said) that the wise

and benign disposer and governor of all things has not furnished mankind with competent means

for the promoting his own honour in the world, and the good of souls. And if there be such a right

somewhere, where should it be, but where the power of compelling resides? That is principally,

and in reference to the public, in the civil sovereign.” Which words, if they have any argument in

them, it in short stands thus: Force is useful and necessary: The good and wise God, who without

impiety cannot be supposed not to have furnished men with competent means for their salvation,

has therefore given a right to some men to use it, and those men are the civil sovereigns.

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To make this argument of any use to your purpose, you must speak a little more distinctly, for

here you, according to your laudable and safe way of writing, are wrapped up in the uncertainty

of general terms, and must tell us, besides the end for which it is useful and necessary, to whom

it is useful and necessary. Is it useful and necessary to all men? That you will not say, for many

are brought to embrace the true religion by bare preaching without any force. Is it then necessary

to all those, and those only, who, as you tell us, “reject the true religion tendered with sufficient

evidence, or at least so far manifested to them, as to oblige them to receive it, and to leave them

without excuse if they do not?” To all therefore, who rejecting the true religion so tendered, are

without excuse, your moderate force is useful and necessary. But is it to all those competent, i. e.

sufficient means? That, it is evident in matter of fact, it is not; for, after all, many stand out. It is

like, you will say, which is all you have to say, that those are such, to whom, having resisted this

last means, moderate force, God always refuseth his grace to, without which no means is

efficacious. So that you are competent, at last, are only such means as are the utmost that God

has appointed, and will have used, and which when men resist, they are without excuse, and shall

never after have the assistance of his grace to bring them to that truth they have resisted, and so

be as the apostle, 2 Tim. iii. 8. calls such, “men of corrupt minds, reprobate concerning the faith.”

If then it shall be, that the day of grace shall be over to all those who reject the truth manifested

to them, with such evidence, as leaves them without excuse, and that bare preaching and

exhortation shall be according to the good pleasure of the benign disposer of all things enough,

when neglected, “to make their hearts fat, their ears heavy, and shut their eyes that they should

not perceive nor understand, nor be converted that God should heal them:” I say, if this should

be the case, then your force, whatever you imagine of it, will neither be competent, useful, nor

necessary. So that it will rest upon you to prove that your moderate degrees of force are those

means of grace which God will have, as necessary to salvation, tried upon every one before he

will pass that sentence in Isaiah, “Make his heart fat, &c.” and that your degree of moderate force

is that beyond which God will have no other or more powerful means used, but that those whom

that works not upon, shall be left reprobate concerning the faith. And till you have proved this,

you will in vain pretend your moderate force, whatever you might think of it, if you had the

ordering of that matter in the place of God, to be useful, necessary, and competent means. For if

preaching, exhortation, instruction, &c. as seems by the whole current of the scripture (and it

appears not that Isaiah in the place above-cited made their hearts fat with any thing but his

words) be that means, which when rejected to such a degree, as he sees fit, God will punish with

a reprobate mind, and that there be no other means of grace to come after; you must confess,

that whatever good opinion you have of your moderate force after this sentence is passed, it can

do no good, have no efficacy, neither directly or indirectly and at a distance, towards the bringing

men to the truth.

If your moderate force be not that precise utmost means of grace, which when ineffectual, God

will not afford his grace to any other, then your moderate force is not the competent means you

talk of. This therefore you must prove, that preaching alone is not, but that your moderate force

joined to it, is that means of grace, which when neglected or resisted, God will assist no other

means with his grace to bring men into the obedience of the truth; and this, let me tell you, you

must prove by revelation. For it is impossible to know, but by revelation, the just measures of

God’s long-suffering, and what those means are, which when men’s corruptions have rendered

ineffectual, his spirit shall no longer strive with them, nor his grace assist any other means for

their conversion or salvation. When you have done this, there will be some ground for you to talk

of your moderate force, as the means which God’s wisdom and goodness are engaged to furnish

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men with; but to speak of it as you do now, as if it were that both necessary and competent

means, that it would be an imputation to the wisdom and goodness of God, if men were not

furnished with it, when it is evident, that that greatest part of mankind have always been

destitute of it; will I fear be not easily cleared from that impiety you mention; for though the

magistrate had the right to use it, yet wherever that moderate force was not made use of, there

men were not furnished with your competent means of salvation.

It is necessary for the vindication of God’s justice and goodness, that those who miscarry should

do so by their own fault, that their destruction should be from themselves, and they be left

inexcusable: But pray how will you show us, that it is necessary, that any who have resisted the

truth tendered to them only by preaching, should be saved, any more than it is necessary that

those who have resisted the truth when moderate force has been joined to the same preaching,

should be saved? They are inexcusable one as well as the other, and thereby have incurred the

wrath of God, under which he may justly leave the one as well as the other; and therefore he

cannot be said not to have been furnished with competent means of salvation, who having

rejected the truth preached to him, has never any penalties laid on him by the magistrate to

make him consider the truths he before rejected.

All the stress of your hypothesis for the necessity of force, lies on this, That the majority of

mankind are not prevailed on by preaching, and therefore the goodness and wisdom of God are

obliged to furnish them some more effectual means, as you think. But who told you that the

majority of mankind should ever be brought into the strait way and narrow gate? Or that force in

your moderate degree was the necessary and competent, i. e. the just fit means to do it, neither

over nor under, but that that only, and nothing but that could do it? If to vindicate his wisdom

and goodness God must furnish mankind with other means, as long as the majority, yet

unwrought upon, shall give any forward demander occasion to ask, “What other means is there

left?” He must also, after your moderate penalties have left the greater part of mankind

unprevailed on, be bound to furnish mankind with higher degrees of force upon this man’s

demand: and those degrees of force proving ineffectual to the majority to make them truly and

sincerely christians; God must be bound to furnish the world again with a new supply of miracles

upon the demand of another wise controller, who having set his heart upon miracles, as you have

yours on force, will demand, what other means is there left but miracles? For it is like this last

gentleman would take it very much amiss of you, if you should not allow this to be a good and

unquestionable way of arguing; or if you should deny that, after the utmost force had been used,

miracles might not do some service at least, indirectly and at a distance, towards the bringing

men to embrace the truth. And if you cannot prove that miracles may not thus do some service,

he will conclude just as you do, that the cause is his.

Let us try your method a little farther. Suppose that when neither the gentlest admonitions, nor

the most earnest entreaties will prevail, something else is to be done as the only means left.

What is it must be done? What is this necessary competent means that you tell us of? “It is to lay

briars and thorns in their way.” This therefore being supposed necessary, you say, “there must

somewhere be a right to use it.” Let it be so. Suppose I tell you that right is in God, who certainly

has a power to lay briars and thorns in the way of those who are got into a wrong one, whenever

he has graciously pleased that other means besides instructions and admonitions should be used

to reduce them. And we may as well expect that those thorns and briars laid in their way by

God’s providence, without telling them for what end, should work upon them as effectually,

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though indirectly and at a distance, as those laid in their way by the magistrate, without telling

them for what end. God alone knows where it is necessary, and on whom it will be useful, which

no man being capable of knowing, no man, though he has coercive power in his hand, can be

supposed to be authorized to use it by the commission he has to do good, on whomsoever you

shall judge it to be of great and even necessary use: no more than your judging it to be of great

and even necessary use would authorize any one, who had got one of the incision-knives of the

hospital in his hand, to cut those for the stone with it, whom he could not know needed cutting,

or that cutting would do them any good, when the master of the hospital had given him no

express order to use his incision-knife in that operation; nor was it known to any but the master,

who needed, and on whom it would be useful; nor would he fail to use it himself wherever he

found it necessary.

Be force of as great and necessary use as you please; let it be so the competent means for the

promoting the honour of God in the world, and the good of souls, that the right to use it must

necessarily be somewhere. This right cannot possibly be, where you would have it, in the civil

sovereigns, and that for the very reason you give, viz. because it must be where the power of

compelling resides. For since civil sovereigns cannot compel themselves, nor can the compelling

power of one civil sovereign reach another civil sovereign; it will not in the hands of the civil

sovereigns reach the most considerable part of mankind, and those who, both for their own and

their subjects good, have most need of it. Besides, if it go along with the power of compelling, it

must be in the hands of all civil sovereigns alike; which, by this, as well as several other reasons I

have given, being unavoidable to be so, this right will be so far from useful, that whatever

efficacy force has, it will be employed to the doing more harm than good; since the greatest part

of civil sovereigns being of false religions, force will be employed for the promoting of those.

But let us grant what you can never prove, that though all civil sovereigns have compelling

power, yet only those of the true religion have a right to use force in matters of religion: your

own argument of mankind being unfurnished, which is impiety to say, with competent means for

the promoting the honour of God, and the good of souls, still presses you. For the compelling

power of each civil sovereign not reaching beyond his own dominions, the right of using force in

the hands only of the orthodox civil sovereigns, leaves the rest, which is the far greater part of

the world, destitute of this your necessary and competent means for promoting the honour of God

in the world, and the good of souls.

Sir, I return you my thanks for having given me this occasion to take a review of your argument,

which you told me I had mistaken; which I hope I now have not, and have answered to your

satisfaction.

I confess I mistook when I said that cutting, being judged useful, could not authorize even a

skilful surgeon to cut a man without any farther commission: for it should have been thus: that

though a man has the instruments in his hand, and force enough to cut with, and cutting be

judged by you of great and even necessary use in the stone; yet this, without any farther

commission, will not authorize any one to use his strength and knife in cutting, who knows not

who has the stone, nor has any light or measures to judge to whom cutting may be necessary or

useful.

But let us see what you say in answer to my instance: 1. “That the stone does not always kill,

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though it be not cured; but men do often live to a great age with it, and die at last of other

distempers. But aversion to the true religion is certainly and inevitably mortal to the soul, if not

cured, and so of absolute necessity to be cured.” Is it of absolute necessity to be cured in all? If

so, will you not here again think it requisite that the wise and benign disposer and governor of all

things should furnish competent means for what is of absolute necessity? For will it not be impiety

to say, that God has so left mankind unfurnished of competent, i. e. sufficient means for what is

absolutely necessary? For it is plain, in your account, men have not been furnished with sufficient

means for what is of absolute necessity to be cured in all, if in any of them it be left uncured. For

as you allow none to be sufficient evidence, but what certainly gains assent; so by the same rule

you cannot call that sufficient means, which does not work the cure. It is in vain to say, the

means were sufficient, had it not been for their own fault, when that fault of theirs is the very

thing to be cured. You go on: “and yet if we should suppose the stone as certainly destructive of

this temporal life, as that aversion is of men’s eternal salvation: even so the necessity of curing it

would be as much less than the necessity of curing that aversion, as this temporal life falls short

in value of that which is eternal.” This is built upon a supposition, that the necessity of the means

is increased by the value of the end, which being in this case the salvation of men’s souls, that is

of infinite concernment to them, you conclude salvation absolutely necessary: which makes you

say that aversion, &c. being inevitably mortal to the soul, is of absolute necessity to be cured.

Nothing is of absolute necessity but God: whatsoever else can be said to be of necessity, is so

only relatively in respect to something else; and therefore nothing can indefinitely thus be said to

be of absolute necessity, where the thing it relates to is not absolutely necessary. We may say,

wisdom and power in God are absolutely necessary, because God himself is absolutely necessary;

but we cannot crudely say, the curing in men their aversion to the true religion, is absolutely

necessary, because it is not absolutely necessary that men should be saved. But this is very

proper and true to be said, that curing this aversion is absolutely necessary in all that shall be

saved. But I fear that would not serve your turn, though it be certain, that your absolute

necessity in this case reaches no farther than this, that to be cured of this aversion is absolutely

necessary to salvation, and salvation is absolutely necessary to happiness; but neither of them,

nor the happiness itself of any man, can be said to be absolutely necessary.

This mistake makes you say, that supposing “the stone certainly destructive of this temporal life,

yet the necessity of curing it would be as much less than the necessity of curing that aversion, as

this temporal life falls short in value of that which is eternal.” Which is quite otherwise: for if the

stone will certainly kill a man without cutting, it is as absolutely necessary to cut a man for the

stone for the saving of his life, as it is to cure the aversion for the saving of his soul. Nay, if you

have but eggs to fry, fire is as absolutely necessary as either of the other, though the value of the

end be in these cases infinitely different; for in one of them you lose only your dinner, in the

other your life, and in the other your soul. But yet, in these cases, fire, cutting, and curing that

aversion, are each of them absolutely and equally necessary to their respective ends, because

those ends cannot be attained without them.

You say farther, “Cutting for the stone is not always necessary in order to the cure: but the

penalties you speak of are altogether necessary (without extraordinary grace) to cure that

pernicious and otherwise untractable aversion.” Let it be so; but do the surgeons know who has

this stone, this aversion, so that it will certainly destroy him, unless he be cut? Will you undertake

to tell when the aversion is such in any man, that it is incurable by preaching, exhortation, and

intreaty, if his spiritual physician will be instant with him in season, and out of season; but

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certainly curable, if moderate force be made use of? Till you are sure of the former of these, you

can never say your moderate force is necessary: Till you are sure of the latter, you can never

say, it is competent means. What you will determine concerning extraordinary grace, and when

God bestows that, I leave you to consider, and speak clearly of it at your leisure.

You add, that even where “cutting for the stone is necessary, it is withal hazardous by my

confession. But your penalties can no way endanger or hurt the soul, but by the fault of him that

undergoes them.” If the magistrate use force to bring men to the true religion, he must judge

which is the true religion; and he can judge no other to be it but that which he believes to be the

true religion, which is his own religion. But for the magistrate to use force to bring men to his

own religion, has so much danger in it to men’s souls, that by your own confession, none but an

atheist will say that magistrates may use force to bring men to their own religion.

This I suppose is enough to make good all that I aimed at in my instance of cutting for the stone,

which was, that though it were judged useful, and I add now necessary to cut men for the stone,

yet that was not enough to authorize a surgeon to cut a man, but he must have, besides that

general one of doing good, some more special commission; and that which I there mentioned,

was the patient’s consent. But you tell me, “That though, as things now stand, no surgeon has

any right to cut his calculous patient without his consent; yet if the magistrate should by a public

law appoint and authorize a competent number of the most skilful in that art, to visit such as

labour under that disease, and to cut those (whether they consent or not) whose lives they

unanimously judge it impossible to save otherwise: you are apt to think I would find it hard to

prove, that in so doing he exceeded the bounds of his power; and you are sure it would be as

hard to prove that those artists would have no right in that case to cut such persons.” Show such

a law from the great governor of the universe, and I shall yield that your surgeons shall go to

work as fast as you please. But where is the public law? “Where is the competent number of

magistrates skilful in the art, who must unanimously judge of the disease and its danger?” You

can show nothing of all this, yet you are so liberal of this sort of cure, that one cannot take you

for less than cutting Morecraft himself. But, sir, if there were a competent number of skilful and

impartial men, who were to use the incision-knife on all in whom they found this stone of aversion

to the true religion; what do you think, would they find no work in your hospital?

Aversion to the true religion, you say, is of absolute necessity to be cured: what I beseech you is

that true religion? that of the church of England? For that you own to be the only true religion;

and whatever you say, you cannot upon your principles name any other national religion in the

world, that you will own to be the true. It being then of absolute necessity that men’s aversion to

the national religion of England should be cured: has all mankind in whom it has been absolutely

necessary to be cured, been furnished with competent and necessary means for the cure of this

aversion?

In the next place, what is your necessary and sufficient means for this cure that is of absolute

necessity? and that is moderate penalties made use of by the magistrate, where the national is

the true religion, and sufficient means are provided for all men’s instruction in the true religion.

And here again I ask, have all men to whom this cure is of absolute necessity, been furnished

with this necessary means?

Thirdly, How is your necessary remedy to be applied? And that is in a way wherein it cannot work

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the cure, though we should suppose the true religion the national every-where, and all the

magistrates in the world zealous for it. To this true religion say you men have a natural and great

aversion of absolute necessity to be cured, and the only cure for it is force your way applied, i. e.

penalties must be laid upon all that dissent from the national religion, till they conform. Why are

men averse to the true? Because it crosses the profits and pleasures of this life; and for the same

reason they have an aversion to penalties: these therefore, if they be opposed one to another,

and penalties be so laid that men must quit their lusts, and heartily embrace the true religion, or

else endure the penalties, there may be some efficacy in force towards bringing men to the true

religion: but if there be no opposition between an outward profession of the true religion and

men’s lusts; penalties laid on men till they outwardly conform, are not a remedy laid to the

disease. Punishments so applied have no opposition to men’s lusts, nor from thence can be

expected any cure. Men must be driven from their aversion to the true religion by penalties they

have a greater aversion to. This is all the operation of force. But if by getting into the communion

of the national church they can avoid the penalties, and yet retain their natural corruption and

aversion to the true religion, what remedy is there to the disease by penalties so applied. You

would, you say, have men made uneasy. This no doubt will work on men, and make them

endeavour to get out of this uneasy state as soon as they can. But it will always be by that way

wherein they can be most easy; for it is the uneasiness alone they fly from, and therefore they

will not exchange one uneasiness for another; not for a greater, nor an equal, nor any at all, if

they can help it. If therefore it be so uneasy for men to mortify their lusts, as you tell us, which

the true religion requires of them, if they embrace it in earnest: but which outward conformity to

the true religion, or any national church, does not require; what need or use is there of force

applied so, that it meets not at all with men’s lusts, or aversion to the true religion, but leaves

them the liberty of a quiet enjoyment of them, free from force and penalties in a legal and

approved conformity? Is a man negligent of his soul, and will not be brought to consider?

obstinate, and will not embrace the truth? is he careless, and will not be at the pains to examine

matters of religion? corrupt, and will not part with his lusts, which are dearer to him than his first-

born? It is but owning the national profession, and he may be so still: if he conform, the

magistrate has done punishing, he is a son of the church, and need not consider any thing farther

for fear of penalties; they are removed, and all is well. So that at last there neither being an

absolute necessity that aversion to the true religion should in all men be cured; nor the

magistrate being a competent judge who have this stone of aversion, or who have it to that

degree as to need force to cure it, or in whom it is curable, were force a proper remedy, as it is

not; nor having any commission to use it, notwithstanding what you have answered: it is still not

only as, but more reasonable for the magistrate, upon pretence of its usefulness or necessity, to

cut any one for the stone without his own consent, than to use force your way to cure him of

aversion to the true religion.

To my question, in whose hands this right, we were a little above speaking of, was in Turkey,

Persia, or China? you tell me, “you answer roundly and plainly, in the hands of the sovereign, to

use convenient penalties for the promoting the true religion.” I will not trouble you here with a

question you will meet with elsewhere, who in these countries must be judge of the true religion?

But I will ask, whether you or any wise man would have put a right of using force into a

mahommedan or pagan prince’s hand, for the promoting of christianity? Which of my pagans or

mahommedans would have done otherwise?

But God, you say, has done it, and you make it good by telling me in the following words, “If this

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startle me, then you must tell me farther, that you look upon the supreme power to be the same

all the world over, in what hands soever it is placed, and this right to be contained in it: and if

those that have it do not use it as they ought, but instead of promoting true religion by proper

penalties set themselves to inforce mahommedism or paganism, or any other false religion: all

that can, or that needs be said to the matter, is, that God will one day call them to an account for

the neglect of their duty, for the dishonour they do to him, and for the souls that perish by their

fault.” Your taking this right to be a part of the supreme power of all civil sovereigns, which is the

thing in question, is not, as I take it, proving it to be so. But let us take it so for once, what then

is your answer? “God will one day call those sovereigns to an account for the neglect of their

duty.” The question is not, what God will do with the sovereigns who have neglected their duty;

but how mankind is furnished with your competent means of promoting God’s honour in the

world, and the good of souls in countries where the sovereign is of a wrong religion? For there,

how clearly soever the right of using it be in the sovereign, yet as long as he uses not force to

bring his subjects to the true religion, they are destitute of your competent means. For I imagine

you do not make the right to use that force, but the actual application of it by penal laws, to be

your useful and necessary means. For if you think the bare having that right be enough, if that be

your sufficient means without the actual use of force, we readily allow it you. And, as I tell you

elsewhere, I see not then what need you had of miracles “to supply the want of the magistrates

assistance till christianity was supported and encouraged by the laws of the empire:” for, by your

own rule, the magistrates of the world, during the three first centuries after the publishing the

christian religion, had the same right, if that had been enough, that they have now in Turkey,

Persia, or China. That this is all that can be said in this matter, I easily grant you; but that it is all

that needs be said to make good your doctrine, I must beg your pardon.

In the same sentence wherein you tell me I should have added necessity to usefulness, I call it

necessary usefulness, which I imagine is not much different. But that with the following words

wherein my argument lay, had the ill luck to be overseen; but if you please to take my argument,

as I have now again laid it before you, it will serve my turn.

In your next paragraph you tell me, that what is said by me is with the same ingenuity I have

used in other places; my words in that place are these: “The author having endeavoured to show

that nobody at all, of any rank or condition, had any power to punish, torment, or use any man ill

for matters of religion: you tell us, you do not yet understand why clergymen are not as capable

of such power as other men;” which words of mine containing in them nothing but true matter of

fact, give you no reason to tax my ingenuity: nor will what you allege make it otherwise than

such power; for if the power you there speak of were externally coactive power, is not that the

same power the author was speaking of, made use of to those ends he mentions of tormenting

and punishing? And do not you own that those who have that power, ought to punish those who

offend in rejecting the true religion? As to the remaining part of that paragraph, I shall leave the

reader to judge whether I sought any occasion so much as to name the clergy; or whether the

itching of your fingers to be handling the rod guided not your pen to what was nothing to the

purpose: for the author had not said any thing so much as tending to exclude the clergy from

secular employments, but only, if you will take your own report of it, that no ecclesiastical officer,

as such, has any externally coactive power, whereupon you cry out, that “you do not yet

understand why ecclesiastics or clergymen are not as capable of such power as other men.” Had

you stood to be constable of your parish, or of the hundred, you might have had cause to

vindicate thus your capacity, if orders had been objected to you; or if your aim be at a justice of

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the peace, or lord chief justice of England, much more. However you must be allowed to be a

man of forecast, in clearing the way to secular power, if you know yourself, or any of your friends

desirous of it: otherwise I confess you have reason to be on this occasion a little out of humour,

as you are, for bringing this matter in question so wholly out of season. Nor will, I fear, the ill-

fitted excuse you bring, give yourself, or one who consults the places in both yours and the

author’s letter, a much better opinion of it. However I cannot but thank you for your wonted

ingenuity, in saying, that “it seems I wanted an occasion to show my good-will to the clergy, and

so I made myself one.” And to find more work for the excellent gift you have this way, I desire

you to read over that paragraph of mine again, and tell me, whether you can find any thing said

in it not true? Any advice in it that you yourself would disown? any thing that any worthy

clergyman that adorns his function is concerned in? And when you have set it down in my words,

the world shall be judge, whether I have showed any ill-will to the clergy. Till then I may take the

liberty to own, that I am more a friend to them and their calling, than those amongst them who

show their forwardness to leave the word of God to serve other employments. The office of a

minister of the gospel requires so the whole man, that the very looking after their poor was, by

the joint voice of the twelve apostles, called “leaving the word of God, and serving of tables.” Acts

iv. 2. But if you think no man’s faults can be spoken of without ill-will, you will make a very ill

preacher: or if you think this to be so only in speaking of mistakes in any of the clergy, there

must be in your opinion something peculiar in their case, that makes it so much a fault to

mention any of theirs; which I must be pardoned for, since I was not aware of it: and there will

want but a little cool reflection to convince you, that had not the present church of England a

greater number in proportion, than possibly any other age of the church ever had, of those who

by their pious lives and labours in their ministry adorn their profession; such busy men as cannot

be content to be divines without being laymen too, would so little keep up the reputation which

ought to distinguish the clergy, or preserve the esteem due to a holy, i. e. a separate order; that

nobody can show greater good-will to them than by taking all occasions to put a stop to any

forwardness to be meddling out of their calling. This, I suppose, made a learned prelate of our

church, out of kindness to the clergy, mind them of their stipulation and duty in a late treatise,

and tell them that “the pastoral care is to be a man’s entire business, and to possess both his

thoughts and his time.” Disc. of Past. Care, p. 121.

To your saying, “That the magistrate may lay penalties upon those who refuse to embrace the

doctrine of the proper ministers of religion, or are alienated from the truth:” I answered, “God

never gave the magistrate an authority to be judge of truth for another man.” This you grant: but

withal say, “That if the magistrate knows the truth, though he has no authority to judge of truth

for another man; yet he may be judge whether other men be alienated from the truth or no; and

so may have authority to lay some penalties upon those whom he sees to be so, to bring them to

judge more sincerely for themselves.” For example, the doctrine of the proper ministers of

religion is, that the three creeds, Nice, Athanasius’s, and that commonly called the Apostles

Creed, ought to be thoroughly received and believed: as also that the Old and New Testament

contain all things necessary to salvation. The one of these doctrines a papist subject embraces

not; and a socinian the other. What now is the magistrate by your commission to do? He is to lay

penalties upon them, and continue them: How long? Only till they conform, i. e. till they profess

they embrace these doctrines for true. In which case he does not judge of the truth for other

men: he only judges that other men are alienated from the truth. Do you not now admire your

own subtilty and acuteness? I that cannot comprehend this, tell you my dull sense in the case. He

that thinks another man in an error, judges him, as you phrase it, alienated from the truth, and

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then judges of truth and falsehood only for himself. But if he lays any penalty upon others, which

they are to lie under till they embrace for a truth what he judges to be so, he is then so far a

judge of truth for those others. This is what I think to judge of truth for another means: If you

will tell me what else it signifies, I am ready to learn.

“You grant, you say, God never gave the magistrate any authority to be judge of truth for another

man:” and then add, “But how does it follow from thence that he cannot be judge, whether any

man be alienated from the truth or no?” And I ask you, who ever said any such thing did follow

from thence? That which I say, and which you ought to disprove, is, that whoever punishes others

for not being of the religion he judges to be true, judges of truth for others. But you prove that a

man may be judge of truth, without having authority to judge of it for other men, or to prescribe

to them what they shall believe, which you might have spared, till you meet with somebody that

denies it. But yet your proof of it is worth remembering: “rectum, say you, est index sui et

obliqui. And certainly whoever does but know the truth, may easily judge whether other men be

alienated from it or no.” But though “rectum be index sui et obliqui;” yet a man may be ignorant

of that which is the right, and may take error for truth. The truth of religion, when known, shows

what contradicts it is false: but yet that truth may be unknown to the magistrate, as well as to

any other man. But you conclude, I know not upon what ground, as if the magistrate could not

miss it, or were surer to find it than other men. I suppose you are thus favourable only to the

magistrate of your own profession, as no doubt in civility a papist or a presbyterian would be to

those of his. And then infer: “And therefore if the magistrate knows the truth, though he has no

authority to judge of truth for other men, yet he may judge whether other men be alienated from

the truth or no.” Without doubt! who denies it him? It is a privilege that he and all men have, that

when they know the truth, or believe the truth, or have embraced an errour for truth, they may

judge whether other men are alienated from it or no, if those other men own their opinions in

that matter.

You go on with your inference, “and so may have authority to lay some penalties upon those

whom he sees to be so.” Now, sir, you go a little too fast. This he cannot do without making

himself judge of truth for them: the magistrate, or any one, may judge as much as he pleases of

men’s opinions and errours; he in that judges only for himself; but as soon as he uses force to

bring them from their own to his opinion, he makes himself judge of truth for them; let it be to

bring them to judge more sincerely for themselves, as you here call it, or under what pretence or

colour soever, for that what you say is but a pretence, the very expression discovers. For does

any one ever judge insincerely for himself, that he needs penalties to make him judge more

sincerely for himself? A man may judge wrong for himself, and may be known or thought to do

so: but who can either know or suppose another is not sincere in the judgment he makes for

himself, or, which is the same thing, that any one knowingly puts a mixture of falsehood into the

judgment he makes? for as speaking insincerely is to speak otherwise than one thinks, let what

he says be true or false; so judging insincerely must be to judge otherwise than one thinks, which

I imagine is not very feasible. But how improper soever it be to talk of judging insincerely for

one’s self, it was better for you in that place to say, penalties were to bring men to judge more

sincerely, rather than to say, more rightly, or more truly: for had you said, the magistrate might

use penalties to bring men to judge more truly, that very word had plainly discovered, that he

made himself a judge of truth for them. You therefore wisely chose to say what might best cover

this contradiction to yourself, whether it were sense or no; which perhaps whilst it sounded well,

every one would not stand to examine.

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One thing give me leave here to observe to you, which is, that when you speak of the

entertainment subjects are to give to truth, i. e. the true religion, you call it believing; but this in

the magistrate you call knowing. Now let me ask you whether any magistrate, who laid penalties

on any who dissented from what he judged the true religion, or, as you call it here, were

alienated from the truth; was or could be determined in his judging of that truth by any

assurance greater than believing? When you have resolved that, you will then see to what

purpose is all you have said here concerning the magistrate’s knowing the truth; which at last

amounting to no more than the assurance wherewith a man certainly believes and receives a

thing for true, will put every magistrate under the same, if there be any obligation to use force,

whilst he believes his own religion. Besides, if a magistrate knows his religion to be true, he is to

use means not to make his people believe, but know it also; knowledge of them, if that be the

way of entertaining the truths of religion, being as necessary to the subjects as the magistrate. I

never heard yet of a master of mathematics, who had the care of informing of others in those

truths, who ever went about to make any one believe one of Euclid’s propositions.

The pleasantness of your answer, notwithstanding what you say, doth remain still the same: for

you making, as is to be seen, “the power of the magistrate

ORDAINED for the bringing men to take

such care as they ought of their salvation;” the reason why it is every man’s interest to vest this

power in the magistrate, must suppose this power so ordained, before the people vested it; or

else it could not be an argument for their vesting it in the magistrate. For if you had not here built

upon your fundamental supposition, that this power of the magistrate is ordained by God to that

end, the proper and intelligible way of expressing your meaning had not been to say as you do:

“As the power of the magistrate is ordained for bringing, &c. so if we suppose this

POWER vested

in the magistrate by the people:” in which way of speaking this power of the magistrate is

evidently supposed already ordained. But a clear way of making your meaning understood had

been to say, That for the people to ordain such a power of the magistrate, or to vest such a

power in the magistrate, which is the same thing, was their true interest: but whether it were

your meaning, or your expression that was guilty of the absurdity, I shall leave it with the reader.

As to the other pleasant thing of your answer, it will still appear by barely reciting it: the pleasant

thing I charge on you is, that you say, That “the power of the magistrate is to bring men to such

a care of their salvation, that they may not blindly leave it to the choice of any person, or their

own lusts or passions, to prescribe to them what faith or worship they shall embrace;” and yet

that it is their best course “to vest a power in the magistrate,” liable to the same lusts and

passions as themselves, to choose for them. To this you answer, by asking, where it is that you

say that it is the people’s best course to vest a power in the magistrate to choose for them? That

you tell me I do not pretend to show. If you had given yourself the pains to have gone on to the

end of the paragraph, or will be pleased to read it as I have here again set it down for your

perusal, you will find that I at least pretended to show it; my words are these: “If they vest a

power in the magistrate to punish them when they dissent from his religion, to bring them to act

even against their own inclination, according to reason and sound judgment,” which is, as you

explain yourself in another place, “to bring them to consider reasons and arguments proper and

sufficient to convince them; how far is this from leaving it to the choice of another man to

prescribe to them, what faith or worship they shall embrace?” Thus far you cite my words, to

which let me join the remaining part of the paragraph, to let you see that I pretended to show

that the course you proposed to the people as best for them, was to vest a power in the

magistrate to choose for them. My words which follow those where you left off, are these:

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“Especially if we consider, that you think it a strange thing, that the author would have the care

of every man’s soul left to himself alone. So that this care being vested in the magistrate, with a

power to punish men to make them consider reasons and arguments proper and sufficient to

convince them of the truth of his religion; the choice is evidently in the magistrate, as much as it

can be in the power of one man to choose for another what religion he shall be of; which consists

only in a power of compelling him by punishments to embrace it.” But all this you tell me “is just

nothing to the purpose:” Why, I beseech you? “Because you speak not of the magistrate’s

religion, but of the true religion, and that proposed with sufficient evidence.”

The case in short is this: men are apt to be misled by their passions, lusts, and other men, in the

choice of their religion. For this great evil you propose a remedy, which is, that men (for you

must remember you are here speaking of the people putting this power into the magistrate’s

hand) should choose some of their fellow-men, and give them a power by force to guard them,

that they might not be alienated from the truth by their own passions, lusts, or by other men. So

it was in the first scheme; or, as you have it now, to punish them, whenever they rejected the

true religion, and that proposed with sufficient evidence of the truth of it. A pretty remedy, and

manifestly effectual at first sight; that because men were all promiscuously apt to be misled in

their judgment, or choice of their religion, by passion, lust, and other men, therefore they should

choose some amongst themselves, who might, they and their successors, men made just like

themselves, punish them that rejected the true religion.

“If the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch,” says our Saviour. If men apt to be

misled by their passions and lusts, will guard themselves from falling into errour, by punishments

laid on them, by men as apt to be misled by passions and lusts as themselves, how are they safer

from falling into errour? Now hear the infallible remedy for this inconvenience, and admire: the

men to whom they have given this power, must not use it, till they find those who gave it them in

an errour. A friend, to whom I showed this expedient, answered, This is none: For why is not a

man as fit to judge for himself when he is in an errour, as another to judge for him, who is as

liable to errour himself? I answered, This power however in the other can do him no harm, but

may indirectly and at a distance do him good; because the magistrate who has this power to

punish him, must never use it but when he is in the right, and he that is punished is in the wrong.

But, said my friend, who shall be judge whether he be in the right or no? For men in an errour

think themselves in the right, and that as confidently as those who are most so. To which I

replied, Nobody must be judge; but the magistrate may know when he is in the right. And so may

the subject too, said my friend, as well as the magistrate, and therefore it was as good still to be

free from a punishment that gives a man no more security from errour than he had without it.

Besides, said he, who must be judge whether the magistrate knows or no? For he may mistake,

and think it to be knowledge and certainty, when it is but opinion and belief. It is no matter, for

that in this scheme, replied I, the magistrate, we are told, may know which is the true religion,

and he must not use force but to bring men to the true religion; and if he does, God will one day

call him to an account for it, and so all is safe. As safe as beating the air can make a thing,

replied my friend, for if believing, being assured, confidently being persuaded that they know that

the religion they profess is true, or any thing else short of true knowledge, will serve the turn, all

magistrates will have this power alike, and so men will be well guarded, or recovered from false

religions, by putting it into the magistrate’s hand to punish them when they have alienated

themselves from it.

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If the magistrate be not to punish men but when he knows, i. e. is infallibly certain, (for so is a

man in what he knows,) that his national religion is all true, and knows also, that it has been

proposed to those he punishes with sufficient evidence of the truth of it: it would have been as

good this power had never been given him, since he will never be in a condition to exercise it;

and at best it was given him to no purpose, since those who gave it him were one with another as

little indisposed to consider impartially, examine diligently, study, find, and infallibly know the

truth, as he. But, said he at parting, to talk thus of the magistrate’s punishing men that reject the

true religion, without telling us who those magistrates are, who have a power to judge which is

the true religion, is to put this power in all magistrates hands alike, or none; for to say he only is

to be judge which is the true religion, who is of it, is but to begin the round of inquiries again,

which can at last end nowhere but in every one’s supposing his own to be it. But, said he, if you

will continue to talk on thus, there is nothing more to be done with you, but to pity or laugh at

you; and so he left me.

I assure you, Sir, I urged this part of your hypothesis, with all the advantage I thought your

answer afforded me; and if I have erred in it, or there be any way to get out of the strait, (if force

must in your way be used,) either of the magistrate’s punishing men for rejecting the true

religion, without judging which is the true religion; or else that the magistrate should judge which

is the true religion; which way ever of the too you shall determine it, I see not what advantage it

can be to the people, to keep them from choosing amiss, that this power of punishing them shall

be put into the magistrate’s hands.

And then, if the magistrate must judge which is the true religion; as how he should, without

judging, punish any one who rejects it, is hard to find; and punish men who reject it until they

embrace it, let it be to make them consider, or what you please, he does, I think, choose their

religion for them. And if you have not the dexterity to choose the national religion wherever you

are, I doubt not but that you would think so too if you were in France, though there were none

but moderate penalties laid on you to bring you even against your own inclination to act

according to what they there call reason and sound judgment.

That paragraph and mine to which it is an answer run thus:

L. II. P. 427.—

“I do neither you nor the magistrate injury

when I say that the power you give the

magistrate of punishing men, to make

them consider reasons and arguments

proper and sufficient to convince them, is

to convince them of the truth of his

religion, and to bring them to it. For men

will never, in his opinion, act according to

reason and sound judgment, which is the

thing you here say men should be brought

to by the magistrate, even against their

own inclination, till they embrace his

religion. And if you have the brow of an

L. III. P. 67.

“But it seems you have not done with t

yet: For you say,” you do neither me n

the magistrate injury, when you say th

the power I give the magistrate, of

punishing men to make them consider

reasons and arguments proper and

sufficient to convince them, is to convi

them of the truth of his religion, whate

that be, and to bring them to it. “Which

seems a little strange and pleasant too

But thus you prove it:” For men will ne

in his opinion, act according to reason

sound judgment, till they embrace his

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The beginning of this answer is part of the old song of

triumph: “What! reasons and arguments proper and

sufficient to convince men of the truth of falsehood?” Yes,

Sir, the magistrate may use force to make men consider

those reasons and arguments, which he thinks proper

and sufficient to convince men of the truth of his religion,

though his religion be a false one. And this is as possible

for him to do, as for a man as learned as yourself to write

a book, and use such arguments, as he thinks proper and

sufficient to convince men of the truth of his opinion,

though it be a falsehood.

As to the remaining part of your answer, the question is

not, whether the “magistrate’s opinion can change the

nature of things, or the power he has, or excuse him to

his judge for misusing of it?” But this, that since all

magistrates, in your opinion, have commission, and are

obliged to promote the true religion by force, and they

honest man, you will not say the

magistrate will ever punish you, to bring

you to consider any other reasons and

arguments, but such as are proper to

convince you of the truth of his religion,

and to bring you to that. Thus you shift

forwards and backwards. You say, the

magistrate has no power to punish men to

compel them to his religion; but only to

compel them to consider reasons and

arguments proper to convince them of the

truth of his religion; which is all one as to

say, nobody has power to choose your

way for you to Jerusalem; but yet the lord

of the manor has power to punish you, to

bring you to consider reasons and

arguments proper and sufficient to

convince you. Of what? that the way he

goes in, is the right, and so to make you

join in company, and go along with him.

So that, in effect, what is all your going

about, but to come at last to the same

place again; and put a power into the

magistrate’s hands, under another

pretence, to compel men to his religion?

which use of force the author has

sufficiently overthrown, and you yourself

have quitted. But I am tired to follow you

so often round the same circle.”

religion. And if you have the brow of an

honest man, you will not say the

magistrate will ever punish you, to brin

you to consider any other reasons and

arguments but such as are proper to

convince you of the truth of his religion

and to bring you to that. Which (beside

the pleasant talk of such reasons and

arguments as are proper and sufficient

convince men of the truth of the

magistrate’s religion, “though it be a fa

one) is just as much as to say, It is so,

because in the magistrate’s opinion it is

so; and because it is not to be expecte

that he will act against his opinion. As i

the magistrate’s opinion could change t

nature of things, and turn a power to

promote the true religion into a power

promote a false one. No, Sir, the

magistrate’s opinion has no such virtue.

may indeed keep him from exercising t

power he has to promote the true religi

and it may lead him to abuse the prete

of it to the promoting a false one: but i

can neither destroy that power nor ma

it any thing but what it is. And therefor

whatever the magistrate’s opinion be, h

power was given him (as the apostles

power was to them) for edification only

not for destruction: And it may always

said of him, (what St. Paul said of hims

that he can do nothing against the trut

but for the truth. And therefore if the

magistrate punishes me to bring me to

false religion; it is not his opinion that

excuse him, when he comes to answer

it to his judge. For certainly men are as

accountable for their opinions (those of

them, I mean, which influence their

practice) as they are for their actions.”

“Here is therefore no shifting forwards

backwards, as you pretend; nor any cir

but in your own imagination. For thoug

be true that I say,” the magistrate has

power to punish men, to compel them t

his religion, “yet I nowhere say, nor wil

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can be guided in the discharge of this

duty by nothing but their own opinion of

the true religion, what advantage can

this be to the true religion, what benefit

to their subjects, or whether it amounts

to any more than a commission to every

magistrate to use force for the promoting

his own religion? To this question

therefore you will do well to apply your

answer, which a man of less skill than

you will be scarce able to do.

You tell us indeed, that “whatever the

magistrate’s opinion be, his power was given him (as the apostles power was to them) for

edification only, and not for destruction.” But if the apostles power had been given them for one

end, and St. Paul, St. Peter, and nine other of the twelve had nothing to guide them but their own

opinion, which led them to another end; I ask you whether the edification of the church could

have been carried on as it was?

You tell us farther, that “it may always be said of the magistrate (what St. Paul said of himself)

that he can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth.” Witness the king of France. If you say

this in the same sense that St. Paul said it of himself, who, in all things requisite for edification,

had the immediate direction and guidance of the unerring spirit of God, and so was infallible, we

need not go to Rome for an infallible guide, every country has one in their magistrate. If you

apply these words to the magistrate in another sense, than what St. Paul spoke them in of

himself, sober men will be apt to think, you have a great care to insinuate into others a high

veneration for the magistrate; but that you yourself have no over-great reverence for the

scripture, which you thus use; nor for truth, which you thus defend.

To deny the magistrate to have a power to compel men to his religion; but yet to say the

magistrate has a power, and is bound to punish men to make them consider, till they cease to

reject the true religion; of which true religion he must be judge, or else nothing can be done in

discharge of this his duty; is so like going round about to come to the same place, that it will

always be a circle in mine and other people’s imagination, and not only there, but in your

hypothesis.

All that you say turns upon the truth or falsehood of this proposition: “That whoever punishes any

one in matters of religion to make him consider, takes upon him to be judge for another what is

right in matters of religion.” This you think plainly involves a contradiction; and so it would if

these general terms had in your use of them their ordinary and usual meaning. But, Sir, be but

pleased to take along with you, that whoever punishes any man your way in matters of religion,

to make him consider, as you use the word consider, takes upon him to be judge for another

what is right in matters of religion: and you will find it so far from a contradiction, that it is a plain

truth. For your way of punishing is a peculiar way, and is this: that the magistrate, where the

national religion is the true religion, should punish those who dissent from it, to make them

consider as they ought, i. e. till they cease to reject, or, in other words, till they conform to it. If

therefore he punishes none but those who dissent from, and punishes them till they conform to

follow from any thing I do say,” That he

has power to compel them to consider

reasons and arguments proper to convince

them of the truth of his religion. “But I do

not much wonder that you endeavour to

put this upon me. For I think by this time

it is pretty plain, that otherwise you would

have but little to say; and it is an art very

much in use amongst some sort of learned

men, when they cannot confute what an

adversary does say, to make him say what

he does not; that they may have

something which they can confute.”

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that which he judges the true religion, does he not take on him to judge for them what is the true

religion?

It is true indeed what you say, there is no other reason to punish another to make him consider,

but that he should judge for himself: and this will always hold true amongst those who, when

they speak of considering, mean considering, and nothing else. But then these things will follow

from thence; 1. That in inflicting of penalties to make men consider, the magistrate of a country,

where the national religion is false, no more misapplies his power, than he whose religion is true;

for one has as much right to punish the negligent to make them consider, study, and examine

matters of religion, as the other. 2. If the magistrate punishes men in matters of religion, truly to

make them consider, he will punish all that do not consider, whether conformists or non-

conformists. 3. If the magistrate punishes in matters of religion to make men consider, it is, as

you say, “to make men judge for themselves: for there is no use of considering, but in order to

judging.” But then when a man has judged for himself, the penalties for not considering are to be

taken off: for else your saying “that a man is punished to make him consider, that he may judge

for himself,” is plain mockery. So that either you must reform your scheme, or allow this

proposition to be true, viz. “Whoever punishes any man in matters of religion, to make him in

your sense consider, takes upon him to judge for another what is right in matters of religion;”

and with it the conclusion, viz. “Therefore whoever punishes any one in matters of religion, to

make him consider, takes upon him to do what no man can do, and consequently misapplies his

power of punishing, if he has that power. Which conclusion, you say, you should readily admit as

sufficiently demonstrated, if the proposition before-mentioned were true.”

But further, if it could enter into the head of any law-maker but you to punish men for the

omission of, or to make them perform any internal act of the mind, such as is consideration;

whoever in matters of religion would lay an injunction on men to make them consider, could not

do it without judging for them in matters of religion; unless they had no religion at all, and then

they come not within our author’s toleration; which is a toleration only of men of different

religions, or of different opinions in religion; for supposing you the magistrate with full power,

and, as you imagined, right of punishing any one in matters of religion, how could you possibly

punish any one to make him consider, without judging for him what is right in matters of religion?

I will suppose myself brought before your worship, under what character you please, and then I

desire to know what one or more questions you would ask me, upon my answer to which you

could judge me fit to be punished to make me consider, without taking upon you to judge for me

what is right in matters of religion? For I conclude from the fashion of my coat, or the colour of

my eyes, you would not judge that I ought to be punished in matters of religion to make me

consider. If you could, I should allow you not only as capable, but much more capable of coactive

power than other men.

But since you could not judge me to need punishment in matters of religion, to make me

consider, without knowing my thoughts concerning religion, we will suppose you, being of the

church of England, would examine me in the catechism and liturgy of that church, which possibly

I could neither say nor answer right to. It is like, upon this, you would judge me fit to be

punished to make me consider. Wherein, it is evident, you judged for me, that the religion of the

church of England was right; for without that judgment of yours you would not have punished

me. We will suppose you to go yet further, and examine me concerning the gospel, and truth of

the principles of the christian religion, and you will find me answer therein not to your liking: here

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again no doubt you will punish me to make me consider; but is it not because you judge for me,

that the christian religion is the right? Go on thus as far as you will, and till you find I had no

religion at all, you could not punish me to make me consider, without taking upon you to judge

for me what is right in matters of religion.

To punish without a fault is injustice: and to punish a man without judging him guilty of that fault,

is also injustice; and to punish a man who has any religion to make him consider, or, which is the

same thing, for not having sufficiently considered; is no more nor less, but punishing him for not

being of the religion you think best for him; that is the fault, and that is the fault you judge him

guilty of, call it considering as you please: for let him fall into the hands of a magistrate of whose

religion he is, he judgeth him to have considered sufficiently. From whence it is plain, it is religion

is judged of, and not consideration, or want of consideration. And it is in vain to pretend that he is

punished to make him judge for himself; for he that is of any religion, has already judged for

himself; and if you punish him after that, under pretence to make him consider that he may

judge for himself; it is plain you punish him to make him judge otherwise than he has already

judged, and to judge as you have judged for him.

Your next paragraph complains of my not having contradicted the following words of yours, which

I had cited out of your A. p. 26, which that the reader may judge of, I shall here set down again:

“And all the hurt that comes to them by it, is only the suffering some tolerable inconveniences,

for their following the light of their own reason, and the dictates of their own consciences: which

certainly is no such mischief to mankind, as to make it more eligible, that there should be no such

power vested in the magistrate; but the care of every man’s soul should be left to him alone, (as

this author demands it should be:) that is, that every man should be suffered quietly, and without

the least molestation, either to take no care at all of his soul, if he be so pleased; or, in doing it,

to follow his own groundless prejudices, or unaccountable humour, or any crafty seducer, whom

he may think fit to take for his guide.” To which I shall here subjoin my answer and your reply:

L. II. P. 432.

“Why should not the care of every man’s

soul be left to himself, rather than the

magistrate? Is the magistrate like to be

more concerned for it? Is the magistrate

like to take more care of it? Is the

magistrate commonly more careful of his

own than other men are of theirs? Will you

say the magistrate is less exposed, in

matters of religion, to prejudices,

humours, and crafty seducers, than other

men? If you cannot lay your hand on your

heart, and say all this, what then will be

got by the change? And why may not the

care of every man’s soul be left to

himself? Especially, if a man be in so

much danger to miss the truth, who is

suffered quietly, and without the least

L. III. P. 76.

“Which words you set down at large; b

instead of contradicting them, or offeri

to show that the mischief spoken of, is

such as makes it more eligible, &c. you

only demand,” Why should not the car

every man’s soul be left to himself, rat

than the magistrate? Is the magistrate

to be more concerned for it? Is the

magistrate like to take more care of it?

“

s if not to leave the care of every ma

soul to himself alone, were, as you

express it afterwards, to take the care

men’s souls from themselves: or as if t

vest a power in the magistrate, to proc

as much as in him lies (i. e. as far as it

can be procured by convenient penaltie

that men take such care of their souls

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Your complaint of my not having formally contradicted the

words above cited out of A. p. 26. looking as if there were

some weighty argument in them: I must inform my

reader, that they are subjoined to those, wherein you

recommend the use of force in matters of religion, by the

gain those that are punished shall make by it, though it

be misapplied by the magistrate to bring them to a wrong

religion. So that these words of yours, “all the hurt that

comes to them by it,” is all the hurt that comes to men by

a misapplication of the magistrate’s power, who being of

a false religion, he uses force to bring men to it. And then

your proposition stands thus, “That the suffering what

you call tolerable inconveniences for their following the

light of their own reasons, and the dictates of their own

consciences, is no such mischief to mankind as to make it

more eligible, that there should be no power vested in the

magistrate” to use force to bring men to the true religion,

though the magistrates misapply this power, i. e. use it to

bring men to their own religion when false.

This is the sum of what you say, if it has any coherent

meaning in it: for it being to show the usefulness of such

a power vested in the magistrate, under the miscarriages

and misapplications it is in common practice observed to

be liable to; can have no other sense. But I having

proved, that if such a power be by the law of nature

vested in the magistrate, every magistrate is obliged to

molestation, either to take no care of his

soul, if he be so pleased, or to follow his

own prejudices,” &c. For “if want of

molestation be the dangerous state

wherein men are likeliest to miss the right

way, it must be confessed, that, of all

men, the magistrate is most in danger to

be in the wrong; and so the unfittest, if

you take the care of men’s soul from

themselves, of all men, to be intrusted

with it. For he never meets with that great

and only antidote of yours against errour,

which you here call molestation. He never

has the benefit of your sovereign remedy,

punishment, to make him consider; which

you think so necessary, that you look on it

as a most dangerous state for men to be

without it; and therefore tell us,” It is

every “man’s true interest, not to be left

wholly to himself in matters of religion.”

they ought to do, were to leave the car

of their souls “to the magistrate rather

than to themselves:” “Which no man b

yourself will imagine. I acknowledge as

freely as you can do, that as every ma

more concerned than any man else can

be, so he is likewise more obliged to ta

care of his soul; and that no man can b

any means be discharged of the care o

his soul; which, when all is done, will

never be saved but by his own care of i

But do I contradict any thing of this, w

I say, that the care of every man’s soul

ought not to be left to himself alone? O

that it is the interest of mankind, that t

magistrate be entrusted and obliged to

take care, as far as lies in him, that no

man neglect his own soul? I thought, I

confess, that every man was in some s

charged with the care of his neighbour’

soul. But, in your way of reasoning, he

that affirms this, takes away the care o

every man’s soul from himself, and lea

it to his neighbour rather than to himse

But if this be plainly absurd, as every o

sees it is, then so it must be likewise to

say, that he that vests such a power as

here speak of in the magistrate, takes

away the care of men’s souls from

themselves, and places it in the

magistrate, rather than in themselves.

”

“What trifling then is it to say here,” If

cannot lay your hand upon your heart,

and say all this, viz. that the magistrat

like to be more concerned for other me

souls than themselves, &c. What then

be got by the change? “For it is plain, h

is no such change as you would insinua

but the care of souls which I assert to t

magistrate, is so far from discharging a

man of the care of his own soul, or

lessening his obligation to it, that it ser

to no other purpose in the world, but to

bring men, who otherwise would not, t

consider and do what the interest of th

souls obliges them to.

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use it for the promoting of his religion as

far as he believes it to be true, shall not

much trouble myself, if like a man of art

you should use your skill to give it

another sense: for such is your natural

talent, or great caution, that you love to

speak indefinitely, and, as seldom as

may be, leave yourself accountable for

any propositions of a clear determined

sense; but under words of doubtful but

seeming plausible signification, conceal a

meaning, which plainly expressed would,

at first sight, appear to contradict your

own positions, or common sense?

instances whereof, more than one, we

have here in this sentence of yours. For,

1. The words tolerable inconveniencies

carry a very fair show of some very slight

matter; and yet, when we come to

examine them, may comprehend any of

those severities lately used in France; for

these tolerable inconveniencies are the

same you in this very page and

elsewhere call convenient penalties.

Convenient for what? In this very place

they must be such, as may keep men

“from following their own groundless

prejudices, unaccountable humours, and

crafty seducers.” And you tell us, the

magistrate may require men “under

convenient penalties to forsake their

false religions, and embrace the true.”

Who now must be judge, in these cases,

what are convenient penalties? Common

sense will tell us, the magistrate that

uses them: but besides, we have your

word for it, that the magistrate’s

prudence and experience enable him to

judge best what penalties do agree with

your rule of moderation, which, as I have

shown, is no rule at all. So that at last

your tolerable inconveniencies are such

as the magistrate shall judge convenient

to oppose to men’s prejudices, humours,

and to seducers; such as he shall think

convenient to bring men from their false

religions, or to punish their rejecting the

“It is therefore manifest, that the thing

here to be considered, is not, whether the

magistrate be” like to be more concerned

for other men’s souls, or to take more

care of them than themselves: nor,

whether he be commonly more careful of

his own soul, than other men are of

theirs: nor, whether he be less exposed,

in matters of religion, to prejudices,

humours, and crafty seducers, than other

men: nor yet, whether he be not more in

danger to be in the wrong than other men,

inregard that he never meets with that

great and only antidote of mine (as you

call it) against errour, which I here call

molestation. “But the point upon which

this matter turns, is only this, whether the

salvation of souls be not better provided

for, if the magistrate be obliged to

procure, as much as in him lies, that every

man take such care as he ought of his

soul, than if he be not so obliged, but the

care of every man’s soul be left to himself

alone? which certainly any man of

common sense may easily determine. For

as you will not, I suppose, deny but God

has more amply provided for the salvation

of your own soul, by obliging your

neighbour, as well as yourself, to take

care of it; though it is possible your

neighbour may not be more concerned for

it than yourself: or may not be more

careful of his own soul, than you are of

yours; or may be no less exposed, in

matters of religion, to prejudices, &c. than

you are; because if you are yourself

wanting to your own soul, it is more likely

that you will be brought to take care of it,

if your neighbour be obliged to admonish

and exhort you to it, than if he be not;

though it may fall out that he will not do

what he is obliged to do in that case. So I

think it cannot be denied, but the

salvation of all men’s souls is better

provided for, if besides the obligation

which every man has to take care of his

own soul (and that which every man’s

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true; which, whether they will not reach

men’s estates and liberties, or go as far

as any the king of France has used, is

more than you can be security for. 2.

Another set of good words we have here,

which at first hearing are apt to engage

men’s concern, as if too much could not

be done to recover men from so perilous

a state as they seem to describe; and

those are “men following their own

groundless prejudices, unaccountable

humours, or crafty seducers.” Are not

these expressions to set forth a

deplorable condition, and to move pity in

all that hear them? Enough to make the

unattentive reader ready to cry out, help

for the Lord’s sake! do any thing rather

than suffer such poor prejudiced seduced

people to be eternally lost! Where he that

examines what persons these words can

in your scheme describe, will find they are only such as anywhere dissent from those articles of

faith, and ceremonies of outward worship, which the magistrate, or at least you his director,

approve of; for whilst you talk thus of the true religion in general, and that so general, that you

cannot allow yourself to descend so near to particulars, as to recommend the searching and study

of the scriptures to find it; and that the power in the magistrate’s hands to use force is to bring

men to the true religion; I ask, whether you do not think, either he or you must be judge, which

is the true religion, before he can exercise that power? and then he must use his force upon all

those who dissent from it, who are then the prejudiced, humoursome, and seduced, you here

speak of. Unless this be so, and the magistrate be judge, I ask, who shall resolve which is the

prejudiced person, the prince with his politics, or he that suffers for his religion? Which the more

dangerous seducer, Lewis XIV. with his dragoons, or Mr. Claud with his sermons? It will be no

small difficulty to find out the persons who are guilty of following groundless prejudices,

unaccountable humours, or crafty seducers, unless in those places where you shall be graciously

pleased to decide the question; and out of the plenitude of your power and infallibility to declare

which of the civil sovereigns now in being do, and which do not, espouse the one only true

religion; and then we shall certainly know that those who dissent from the religion of those

magistrates, are these prejudiced, humoursome, seduced persons.

But truly as you put it here, you leave the matter very perplexed, when you defend the

eligibleness of vesting a power in the magistrate’s hands, to remedy by penalties men’s following

their own groundless prejudices, unaccountable humours, and crafty seducers; when in the same

sentence you suppose the magistrate, who is vested with this power, may inflict those penalties

on men, “for their following the light of their own reason, and the dictates of their own

consciences;” which when you have considered, perhaps you will not think my answer so wholly

beside the matter, though it showed you but that one absurdity, without a formal contradiction to

so loose and undetermined a proposition, that it required more pains to unravel the sense of what

was covered under deceitful expressions, than the weight of the matter contained in them was

neighbour has likewise to do it) the

magistrate also be intrusted and obliged

to see that no man neglect his soul; than

it would be, if every man were left to

himself in this matter; because though we

should admit that the magistrate is not

like to be, or is not ordinarily more

concerned for other men’s souls, than

they themselves are, &c. it is nevertheless

undeniably true still, that whoever

neglects his soul, is more likely to be

brought to take care of it, if the

magistrate be obliged to do what lies in

him to bring him to do it, than if he be

not. Which is enough to show, that it is

every man’s true interest, that the care of

his soul should not be left to himself

alone, but that the magistrate should be

so far intrusted with it as I contend that

he is.”

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worth.

For besides what is already said to it: how is it possible for any one, who had the greatest mind in

the world to contradiction, to deny it to be more eligible that such a power should be vested in

the magistrate, till he knows to whom you affirm it to be more eligible? Is it more eligible to those

who suffer by it, for following the light of their own reason, and the dictates of their own

consciences? for these you know are gainers by it, for they know better than they did before

where the truth does lie. Is it more eligible to those who have no other thoughts of religion, but

to be of that of their country without any farther examination? Or is it more eligible to those who

think it their duty to examine matters of religion, and to follow that which upon examination

appears to them the truth? The former of these two make, I think, the greater part of mankind,

though the latter be the better advised: but upon what grounds it should be more eligible to

either of them, that the magistrate should, than that he should not, have a power vested in him,

to use force to bring men to the true religion, when it cannot be employed but to bring men to

that which he thinks the true, i. e. to his own religion; is not easy to guess. Or is it more eligible

to the priests and ministers of national religions every-where, that the magistrate should be

vested with this power? who being sure to be orthodox, will have right to claim the assistance of

the magistrate’s power to bring those whom their arguments cannot prevail on to embrace their

true religion, and to worship God in decent ways prescribed by those to whom God has left the

ordering of such matters. Or last of all, is it more eligible to all mankind? And are the magistrates

of the world so careful or so lucky in the choice of their religion, that it would be an advantage to

mankind, that they should have a right to do what in them lies, i. e. to use all the force they

have, if they think convenient, to bring men to the religion they think true? When you have told

us to which of these, or what other, it is more eligible; I suppose the reader will, without my

contradicting it, see how little truth there is in it, or how little to your purpose.

If you will pardon me for not having contradicted that passage of yours we have been

considering, I will endeavour to make you amends in what you say in reply to my answer to it,

and tell you, that, notwithstanding all you say to the contrary, such a power as you would have to

be vested in the magistrate, takes away the care of men’s souls from themselves, and places it in

the magistrate rather than in themselves; for if when men have examined, and upon examination

embrace what appears to them the true religion, the magistrate has a right to treat them as

misled by prejudice, humour, or seducers; if he may use what force, and inflict what

punishments, he shall think convenient till they conform to the religion the magistrate judges the

true; I think you will scarce deny, but that the care of their souls is by such a power placed rather

in the magistrate than in themselves, and taken as much from them as by force and authority it

can be. This, whatever you pretend, is the power which your system places in the magistrate. Nor

can he upon your principles exercise it otherwise, as I imagine I have showed.

You speak here, as if this power, which you would have to be vested in the magistrate, did not at

all discharge, but assist the care every one has or ought to have of his own soul. I grant, were

the power you would place in the magistrate such as every man has to take care of his

neighbour’s soul, which is to express itself only by counsel, arguments, and persuasion; it left him

still the free liberty of judging for himself; and so the care of his soul remained still in his own

hands. But if men be persuaded, that the wise and good God has vested a power in the

magistrate, to be so far judge for them, what is the true religion, as to punish them for rejecting

the religion which the magistrate thinks the true, when offered with such evidence as he judges

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sufficient to convince them; and to punish them on till they consider so as to embrace it; what

remains but that they render themselves to the care and conduct of a guide that God in his

goodness has appointed them, who having authority and commission from God to be judge for

them, which is the true religion, and what are arguments proper and sufficient to convince any

one of it; and he himself being convinced of it; why should they be so foolish, as to suffer

punishments in opposition to a power which is in the right, and they ought to submit to? To what

purpose should they, under the weight of penalties, waste time and pains in examining, since

whatever they should judge upon examination, the magistrate judging the arguments and

reasons he offers for the truth of his religion proper and sufficient to convince them, they must

still lie under the punishment the magistrate shall think convenient till they do comply?

Besides, when they are thus punished by their magistrate for not conforming, what need they

examine? Since you tell them, “It is not strictly necessary to salvation, that all that are of the true

religion, should understand the grounds of it.” The magistrate, being of the one only true religion,

knows it to be so; and he knows that that religion was tendered to them with sufficient evidence,

and therefore is obliged to punish them for rejecting it. This is that which men must upon your

scheme suppose; for it is what you yourself must suppose, before the magistrate can exercise

that power you contend to be vested in him, as is evident to any one, who will put your system

together, and particularly weigh what you say.

When therefore men are put into such a state as this, that the magistrate may judge what is the

true religion; the magistrate may judge what is sufficient evidence of its truth; the magistrate

may be judge to whom it is tendered with sufficient evidence, and punish them that reject it so

proposed with such penalties as he also shall judge convenient; and all this by God’s

appointment, and an authority received from the wise and benign Governor of all things; I ask,

whether the care of men’s souls is not taken out of their own hands, and put into the

magistrate’s? Whether in such a state they can or will think there is any need, or that it is to any

purpose for them to examine? And whether this be a cure for the natural aversion that is in men

to consider and weigh matters of religion; and the way to force, or so much as encourage them to

examine?

But, say you, “the salvation of all men’s souls is better provided for, if, besides the obligation that

every man has to take care of his own soul, the magistrate also be entrusted and obliged to see

that no man neglect his own soul, than it would be if every man were left to himself in that

matter.” Whatever ground another may have to say this, you can have none: You who give so

good reason why conformists, though ever so ignorant and negligent in examining matters of

religion, cannot yet be punished to make them consider, must acknowledge that “

ALL

men’s

salvation is not the better provided for by a power vested in the magistrate,” which cannot reach

the far greatest part of men, which are every-where the conformists to the national religion. You

that plead so well for the magistrate’s not examining whether those that conform, do it upon

reason and conviction; but say it is ordinarily presumable they do so; wherein I beseech you do

you put this care of men’s salvation that is placed in the magistrate? even in bringing them to

outward conformity to the national religion, and there leaving them. And are the souls of all

mankind the better provided for, if the magistrates of the world are vested with a power to use

force to bring men to an outward profession of what they think the true religion, without any

other care of their salvation? For thither, and no farther, reaches their use of force in your way of

applying it.

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Give me leave therefore to trifle with you once again, and to desire you to lay your hand upon

your heart, and tell me what mankind shall gain by the change? For I hope by this time it is not

so much a paradox to you, that if the magistrate be commissioned by God to take care of men’s

souls, in your way it takes away the care of men’s souls from themselves in all those who have

need of this assistance of the magistrate, i. e. all those who neglect to consider, and are averse to

examination.

One thing more give me leave to observe to you, and that is, that taking care of men’s souls, or

taking care that they neglect not their souls, and laying penalties on them to bring them in

outward profession to the national religion, are two very different things: though in this place and

elsewhere you confound them, and would have penal laws, requiring church-conformity, pass

under the name of care of men’s souls; for that is the utmost your way of applying force does or

can reach to; and what care is therein taken of men’s souls, may be seen by the lives and

knowledge observable in not a few conformists. This is not said to lay any blame on conformity,

but to show how improperly you speak, when you call penal laws made to promote conformity,

and force used to bring men to it, a care of men’s souls; when even the exactest observers and

most zealous advancers of conformity may be as irreligious, ignorant, and vicious, as any other

men.

In the first treatise we heard not a syllable of any other use or end of force in matters of religion,

but only to make men consider. But in your second, being forced to own bare-faced the punishing

of men for their religion, you call it, “a vice to reject the true faith, and to refuse to worship God

in decent ways prescribed by those to whom God has left the ordering it;” and tell us, that “it is a

fault which may justly be punished by the magistrate, not to be of the national religion, where the

true is the national religion.” To make this doctrine of persecution seem limited, and go down the

better, to your telling us it must be only where the national religion is the true, and that the

penalties must be moderate and convenient; both which limitations having no other judge but the

magistrate, as I have showed elsewhere, are no limitations at all; you in words add a third, that

in effect signifies just as much as the other two; and that is, “If there be sufficient means of

instruction provided for all for instructing them in the truth of it;” of which provision the

magistrate also being to be judge, your limitations leave him as free to punish all dissenters from

his own religion, as any persecutor can wish: for what he will think sufficient means of instruction,

it will be hard for you to say.

In the mean time, as far as may be gathered from what you say in another place, we will

examine what you think sufficient provision for instructing men, which you have expressed in

these words: “For if the magistrate provides sufficiently for the instruction of all his subjects in

the true religion, and then requires them all under convenient penalties to hearken to the

teachers and ministers of it, and to profess and exercise it with one accord under their direction in

public assemblies.”—That which stumbles one at the first view of this your method of instruction,

is, that you leave it uncertain, whether dissenters must first be instructed, and then profess; or

else first profess, and then be instructed in the national religion. This you will do well to be a little

more clear in the next time; for your mentioning no instruction but in public assemblies, and

perhaps meaning it for a country where there is little other pains taken with dissenters but the

confutation and condemnation of them in assemblies, where they are not; they must cease to be

dissenters before they can partake of this sufficient means of instruction.

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And now for those who do with one accord put themselves under the direction of the ministers of

the national, and hearken to these teachers of the true religion: I ask whether one-half of those

whereof most of the assemblies are made up, do or can, so ignorant as they are, understand

what they hear from the pulpit? And then whether if a man did understand, what in many

assemblies ordinarily is delivered once a week there for his instruction, he might not yet at

threescore years end be ignorant of the grounds and principles of the christian religion? Your

having so often in your letter mentioned sufficient provision of instruction, has forced these two

short questions from me. But I forbear to tell you what I have heard very sober people, even of

the church of England, say upon this occasion: For you have warned me already, that it shall be

interpreted to be a quarrel to the clergy in general, if any thing shall be taken notice of in any of

them worthy to be mended. I leave it to those whose profession it is to judge, whether divinity be

a science wherein men may be instructed by an harangue or two once a week, upon any subject

at a venture, which has no coherence with that which preceded, or that which is to follow, and

this made to people that are ignorant of the first principles of it, and are not capable of

understanding such discourses. I am sure he that should think this a sufficient means of

instructing people in any other science, would at the end of seven or twenty years find them very

little advanced in it; and bating perhaps some terms and phrases belonging to it, as far from all

true and useful knowledge of it as when they first began. Whether it be so in matters of religion,

those who have the opportunity to observe must judge; and if it appear that amongst those of

the national church there be very many so ignorant, that there is nothing more frequent than for

the ministers themselves to complain of it; it is manifest from those of the national church,

whatever may be concluded from dissenters, that the means of instruction provided by the law

are not sufficient; unless that be sufficient means of instruction, which men of sufficient capacity

for other things, may live under many years, and yet know very little by. If you say it is for want

of consideration, must not your remedy of force be used to bring them to it? Or how will the

magistrate answer for it, if he use force to make dissenters consider, and let those of his own

church perish for want of it?

This being all one can well understand by your sufficient means of instruction, as you there

explain it, I do not see but men who have no aversion to be instructed, may yet fail of it,

notwithstanding such a provision. Perhaps, by “exercising the true religion with one accord, under

the direction of the ministers of it in public assemblies,” you mean something farther; but that not

being an ordinary phrase, will need your explication to make it understood.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE MAGISTRATE

’S COMMISSION TO USE FORCE IN MATTERS OF RELIGION.

THOUGH in the foregoing chapter, on examining your doctrine concerning the magistrates who

may or who may not use force in matters of religion, we have in several places happened to take

notice of the commission whereby you authorise magistrates to act; yet we shall in this chapter

more particularly consider that commission. You tell us, “to use force in matters of religion, is a

duty of the magistrate as old as the law of nature, in which the magistrate’s commission lies: for

the scripture does not properly give it him, but supposes it.” And more at large you give us an

account of the magistrate’s commission in these words: “It is true indeed, the author and finisher

of our faith has given the magistrate no new power or commission: nor was there any need that

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he should (if himself had any temporal power to give:) for he found him already, even by the law

of nature, the minister of God to the people for good, and bearing the sword not in vain, i. e.

invested with coactive power, and obliged to use it for all the good purposes which it might serve,

and for which it should be found needful; even for the restraining of false and corrupt religion: as

Job long before (perhaps before any of the scriptures were written) acknowledged, when he said,

chap. xxxi. 26, 27, 28, that the worshipping the sun or the moon, was an iniquity to be punished

by the judge. But though our Saviour has given the magistrates no new power, yet being king of

kings, he expects and requires that they should submit themselves to his sceptre, and use the

power which always belonged to them, for his service, and for the advancing his spiritual kingdom

in the world. And even that charity which our great master so earnestly recommends, and so

strictly requires of all his disciples, as it obliges all men to seek and promote the good of others,

as well as their own, especially their spiritual and eternal good, by such means as their several

places and relations enable them to use; so does it especially oblige the magistrate, to do it as a

magistrate, i. e. by that power which enables him to do it above the rate of other men.

“So far therefore is the christian magistrate, when he gives his helping hand to the furtherance of

the gospel, by laying convenient penalties upon such as reject it, or any part of it, from using any

other means for the salvation of men’s souls, than what the author and finisher of our faith has

directed, that he does no more than his duty to God, to his redeemer, and to his subjects,

requires of him.

“Christ, you say, has given no new power or commission to the magistrate:” and for this you give

several reasons. 1. “There was no need that he should.” Yet it seems strange that the christian

magistrates alone should have an exercise of coactive power in matters of religion, and yet our

Saviour should say nothing of it, but leave them to that commission which was common to them

with all other magistrates. The christian religion in cases of less moment is not wanting in its

rules; and I know not whether you will not charge the New Testament with a great defect, if that

law alone which teaches the only true religion, that law which all magistrates who are of the true

religion, receive and embrace, should say nothing at all of so necessary and important a duty to

those who alone are in a capacity to discharge it, but leave them only to that general law of

nature, which others who are not qualified to use this force have in common with them.

This at least seems needful, if a new commission does not, that the christian magistrates should

have been instructed what degree of force they should use, and been limited to your moderate

penalties; since for above these twelve hundred years, though they have readily enough found

out your commission to use force, they never found out your moderate use of it, which is that

alone which you assure us is useful and necessary.

2. You say, “If our Saviour had any temporal power to give;” whereby you seem to give this as a

reason why he gave not the civil magistrate power to use force in matters of religion, that he had

it not to give. You tell us in the same paragraph, that “he is the king of kings;” and he tells us

himself, “That all power is given unto him in heaven and in earth,” Mat. xxviii. 18. So that he

could have given what power, to whom, and to what purpose he had pleased: and concerning this

there needs no if.

3. “For he found him already by the law of nature invested with coactive power, and obliged to

use it for all the good purposes which it might serve, and for which it should be found needful.”

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He found also fathers, husbands, masters, invested with their distinct powers by the same law,

and under the same obligation; and yet he thought it needful to prescribe to them in the use of

those powers. But there was no need he should do so to the civil magistrates in the use of their

power in matters of religion; because, though fathers, husbands, masters, were liable to excess in

the use of theirs, yet christian magistrates were not, as appears by their having always kept to

those moderate measures, which you assure us to be the only necessary and useful.

And what at last is their commission? “Even that of charity, which obliges all men to seek and

promote the good of others, especially their spiritual and eternal good, by such means as their

several places and relations enable them to use, especially magistrates as magistrates.” This duty

of charity is well discharged by the magistrate as magistrate, is it not? in bringing men to an

outward profession of any, even of the true religion, and leaving them there? But, Sir, I ask you

who must be judge, what is for the spiritual and eternal good of his subjects, the magistrate

himself or no? If not he himself, who for him? Or can it be done without any one’s judging at all?

If he, the magistrate, must judge every-where himself what is for the spiritual and eternal good

of his subjects; as I see no help for it, if the magistrate be every-where by the law of nature

obliged to promote their spiritual and eternal good; is not the true religion like to find great

advantage in the world by the use of force in the magistrate’s hands? And is not this a plain

demonstration that God has by the law of nature given commission to the magistrate to use force

for the promoting the true religion, since, as it is evident, the execution of such a commission will

do so much more harm than good?

To show that your indirect and at a distance usefulness, with a general necessity of force,

authorizes the civil power in the use of it, you use the following words, “That force does some

service towards the making of scholars and artists, I suppose you will easily grant. Give me leave

therefore to ask, how it does it? I suppose you will say, not by its direct and proper efficacy, (for

force is no more capable to work learning or arts, than the belief of the true religion in men, by its

direct and proper efficacy;) but by prevailing upon those who are designed for scholars or artists

to receive instruction, and to apply themselves to the use of those means and helps which are

proper to make them what they are designed to be: that is, it does it indirectly and at a distance.

Well then, if all the usefulness of the force towards the bringing scholars or apprentices to the

learning or skill they are designed to attain, be only an indirect and at a distance usefulness; I

pray what is it that warrants and authorizes schoolmasters, tutors or masters, to use force upon

their scholars or apprentices, to bring them to learning, or the skill of their arts and trade, if such

an indirect and at a distance usefulness of force, together with that necessity of it which

experience discovers, will not do it? I believe you will acknowledge that even such an usefulness,

together with that necessity, will serve the turn in these cases. But then I would fain know, why

the same kind of usefulness, joined with the like necessity, will not as well do it in the case before

us? I confess I see no reason why it should not; nor do I believe you can assign any. You ask

here, what authorizes schoolmasters or masters to use force on their scholars and apprentices, if

such an indirect and at a distance usefulness, together with necessity, does not do it?” I answer,

neither your indirect and at a distance usefulness, nor the necessity you suppose of it. For I do

not think you will say that any schoolmaster has a power to teach, much less to use force on any

one’s child without the consent and authority of the father: but a father, you will say, has a power

to use force to correct his child to bring him to learning or skill in that trade he is designed to;

and to this the father is authorized by the usefulness and necessity of force. This I deny, that the

mere supposed usefulness and necessity of force authorize the father to use it; for then whenever

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he judged it useful and necessary for his son, to prevail with him to apply himself to any trade, he

might use force upon him to that purpose; which I think neither you nor any body else will say, a

father has a right to do on his idle and perhaps married son at thirty or forty years old.

There is then something else in the case; and whatever it be that authorizes the father to use

force upon his child, to make him a proficient in it, authorizes him also to choose that trade, art

or science he would have him a proficient in: for the father can no longer use force upon his son,

to make him attain any art or trade, than he can prescribe to him the art or trade he is to attain.

Put your parallel now if you please: The father by the usefulness and necessity of force is

authorized to use it upon his child, to make him attain any art or science: therefore the

magistrate is authorized to use force to bring men to the true religion, because it is useful and

necessary. Thus far you have used it, and you think it does well. But let us go on with the

parallel: this usefulness and necessity of force authorizes the father to use it, to make his son

apply himself to the use of the means and helps which are proper to make him what he is

designed to be, no longer than it authorizes the father to design what his son shall be, and to

choose for him the art or trade he shall be of; and so the usefulness and necessity you suppose in

force to bring men to any church, cannot authorize the magistrate to use force any farther, than

he has a right to choose for any one what church or religion he shall be of. So that if you will stick

to this argument, and allow the parallel between a magistrate and a father, and the right they

have to use force for the instructing of their subjects in religion, and children in arts, you must

either allow the magistrate to have power to choose what religion his subjects shall be of, which

you have denied, or else that he has no power to use force to make them use means to be of it.

A father being entrusted with the care and provision for his child, is as well bound in duty, as

fitted by natural love and tenderness, to supply the defects of his tender age. When it is born the

child cannot move itself for the ease and help of natural necessities, the parents hands must

supply that inability, and feed, cleanse, and swaddle it. Age having given more strength, and the

exercise of the limbs, the parents are discharged from the trouble of putting meat into the mouth

of the child, clothing or unclothing, or carrying him in their arms. The same duty and affection

which required such kind of helps to the infant, makes them extend their thoughts to other cares

for him when he is grown a little bigger; it is not only a present support, but a future comfortable

subsistence begins to be thought on: to this some art or science is necessary, but the child’s

ignorance and want of prospect makes him unable to choose. And hence the father has a power

to choose for him, that the flexible and docile part of life may not be squandered away, and the

time of instruction and improvement be lost for want of direction. The trade or art being chosen

by the father, it is the exercise and industry of the child must acquire it to himself: but industry

usually wanting in children the spur which reason and foresight gives to the endeavours of grown

men; the father’s rod and correction is fain to supply that want, to make him apply himself to the

use of those means and helps which are proper to make him what he is designed to be. But when

the child is once come to the state of manhood, and to be the possessor and free disposer of his

goods and estate, he is then discharged from this discipline of his parents, and they have no

longer any right to choose any art, science, or course of life for him, or by force to make him

apply himself to the use of those means which are proper to make him be what he designs to be.

Thus the want of knowledge to choose a fit calling, and want of knowledge of the necessity of

pains and industry to attain skill in it, puts a power into the parents hands to use force where it is

necessary to procure the application and diligence of their children in that, which their parents

have thought fit to set them to: but it gives this power to the parents only, and to no other,

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whilst they live; and if they die whilst their children need it, to their substitutes; and there it is

safely placed: for since their want of knowledge during their nonage, makes them want direction;

and want of reason often makes them need punishment and force to excite their endeavours, and

keep them intent to the use of those means that lead to the end they are directed to; the

tenderness and love of parents will engage them to use it only for their good, and generally to

quit it too, when by the title of manhood they come to be above the direction and discipline of

children. But how does this prove that the magistrate has any right to force men to apply

themselves to the use of those means and helps which are proper to make them of any religion,

more than it proves that the magistrate has a right to choose for them what religion they shall be

of?

To your question therefore, “what is it that warrants and authorizes schoolmasters, tutors, and

masters to use force upon their scholars or apprentices?” I answer, a commission from the father

or mother, or those who supply their places; for without that no indirect or at a distance

usefulness, or supposed necessity, could authorize them.

But then you will ask, Is it not this usefulness and necessity that gives this power to the father

and mother? I grant it. “I would fain know then, say you, why the same usefulness joined with

the like necessity, will not as well do in the case before us?” And I, sir, will as readily tell you:

because the understanding of the parents is to supply the want of it in the minority of their

children; and therefore they have a right not only to use force to make their children apply

themselves to the means of acquiring any art or trade, but to choose also the trade or calling they

shall be of. But when being come out of the state of minority, they are supposed of years of

discretion to choose what they will design themselves to be, they are also at liberty to judge what

application, and industry they will use for the attaining of it; and then how negligent soever they

are in the use of the means, how averse soever to instruction or application they are past the

correction of a schoolmaster, and their parents can no longer choose or design for them what

they shall be, nor “use force to prevail with them to apply themselves to the use of those means

and helps which are proper to make them what they are designed to be.” He that imagines a

father or tutor may send his son to school at thirty or forty years old, and order him to be

whipped there, or that any indirect and at a distance usefulness will authorize him to be so used,

will be thought fitter to be sent thither himself, and there to receive due correction.

When you have considered, it is otherwise in the case of the magistrate using force your way in

matters of religion; that there his understanding is not to supply the defect of understanding in

his subjects, and that only for a time; that he cannot choose for any of his subjects what religion

he shall be of, as you yourself confess; and that this power of the magistrate, if it be, as is

claimed by you, over men of all ages, parts and endowments; you will perhaps “see some reason

why it should not do in the case before us, as well as in that of schoolmasters and tutors, though

you believe I cannot assign any.” But, sir, will your indirect and at a distance usefulness, together

with your supposed necessity, authorize the master of the shoe-makers company to take any one

who comes in his hands, and punish him for not being of the shoe-makers company, and not

coming to their guild, when he, who has a right to choose of what trade and company he will be,

thinks it not his interest to be a shoe-maker? Nor can he or any body else imagine that this force,

this punishment, is used to make him a good shoe-maker, when it is seen and avowed that the

punishments cease, and they are free from it who enter themselves of the company, whether

they are really shoe-makers, or in earnest apply themselves to be so or no. How much it differs

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from this, that the magistrate should punish men for not being of his church, who choose not to

be of it, and when they are once entered into the communion of it, are punished no more, though

they are as ignorant, unskilful, and unpractised in the religion of it as before: how much, I say,

this differs from the case I proposed, I leave you to consider. For after all your pretences of using

force for the salvation of souls, and consequently to make men really christians, you are fain to

allow, and you give reasons for it, that force is used only to those who are out of your church: but

whoever are once in it, are free from force, whether they be really christians, and apply

themselves to those things which are for the salvation of their souls, or no.

As to what you say, that whether they choose it or no, they ought to choose it; for your

magistrate’s religion is the true religion, that is the question between you and them: but be that

as it will, if force be to be used in the case, I have proved that be the magistrate’s religion true or

false, he, whilst he believes it to be true, is under an obligation to use force, as if it were true.

But since you think your instance of children so weighty and pressing, give me leave to return

you your question; I ask you then, are not parents as much authorized to teach their children

their religion, as they are to teach them their trade, when they have designed them to it? May

they not as lawfully correct them to make them learn their catechism, or the principles of their

religion, as they may to make them learn Clenard’s grammar? Or may they not use force to make

them go to mass, or whatever they believe to be the worship of the true religion, as to go to

school, or to learn any art or trade? If they may, as I think you will not deny, unless you will say,

that none but orthodox parents may teach their children any religion: if they may, I say then,

pray tell me a reason, if your arguments from the discipline of children be good, why the

magistrate may not use force to bring men to his religion, as well as parents may use force to

instruct children, and bring them up in theirs? When you have considered this, you will perhaps

find some difference between the state of children and grown men, betwixt those under tutelage,

and those who are free and at their own disposal; and be inclined to think that those reasons

which subject children in their non-age to the use of force, may not, nor do concern men at years

of discretion.

You tell us farther, “that commonwealths are instituted for the attaining of all the benefits which

political government can yield: and therefore if the spiritual and eternal interests of men may any

way be procured or advanced by political government, the procuring and advancing those

interests must in all reason be received amongst the ends of civil society, and so consequently fall

within the compass of the magistrate’s jurisdiction.” Concerning the extent of the magistrate’s

jurisdiction, and the ends of civil society, whether the author or you have begged the question,

which is the chief business of your 56th and two or three following pages, I shall leave it to the

readers to judge, and bring the matter, if you please, to a shorter issue. The question is, whether

the magistrate has any power to interpose force in matters of religion, or for the salvation of

souls? The argument against it is, that civil societies are not constituted for that end, and the

magistrate cannot use force for ends for which the commonwealth was not constituted.

The end of a commonwealth constituted can be supposed no other, than what men in the

constitution of, and entering into it, proposed; and that could be nothing but protection from such

injuries from other men, which they desiring to avoid, nothing but force could prevent or remedy;

all things but this being as well attainable by men living in neighbourhood without the bounds of a

commonwealth, they could propose to themselves no other thing but this in quitting their natural

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liberty, and putting themselves under the umpirage of a civil sovereign, who therefore had the

force of all the members of the commonwealth put into his hands, to make his decrees to this end

be obeyed. Now since no man, or society of men, can by their opinions in religion, or ways of

worship, do any man who differed from them any injury, which he could not avoid or redress, if

he desired it, without the help of force; the punishing any opinion in religion, or ways of worship

by the force given the magistrate, could not be intended by those who constituted or entered into

the commonwealth; and so could be no end of it, but quite the contrary. For force from a stronger

hand to bring a man to a religion, which another thinks the true, being an injury which in the

state of nature every one would avoid; protection from such injury is one of the ends of a

commonwealth, and so every man has a right to toleration.

If you will say, that commonwealths are not voluntary societies constituted by men, and by men

freely entered into; I shall desire you to prove it.

In the mean time allowing it you for good, that commonwealths are constituted by God for ends

which he has appointed, without the consent and contrivance of men: If you say, that one of

those ends is the propagation of the true religion, and the salvation of men’s souls; I shall desire

you to show me any such end expressly appointed by God in revelation; which since, as you

confess, you cannot do, you have recourse to the general law of nature; and what is that? The

law of reason, whereby every one is commissioned to do good. And the propagating the true

religion for the salvation of men’s souls being doing good, you say, the civil sovereigns are

commissioned and required by that law to use their force for those ends. But since by this law all

civil sovereigns are commissioned and obliged alike to use their coactive power for the

propagating the true religion, and the salvation of souls; and it is not possible for them to execute

such a commission, or obey that law, but by using force to bring men to that religion which they

judge the true; by which use of force, much more harm than good would be done towards the

propagating the true religion in the world, as I have showed elsewhere: therefore no such

commission, whose execution would do more harm than good, more hinder than promote the end

for which it is supposed given; can be a commission from God by the law of nature. And this I

suppose may satisfy you about the end of civil societies or commonwealths, and answer what you

say concerning the ends attainable by them.

But that you may not think the great position of yours, which is so often ushered in with

doubtless; for which you imagine you have sufficient warrant in a misapplied school-maxim, is

past over too slightly; and is not sufficiently answered; I shall give you that farther satisfaction.

You say, “civil societies are instituted for the attaining all the benefits which civil society or

political government can yield;” and the reason you give for it; “because it has hitherto been

universally acknowledged that no power is given in vain;” and therefore “if I except any of those

benefits, I shall be obliged to admit that the power of attaining them was given in vain.” And if I

do admit it, no harm will follow in human affairs: or if I may borrow an elegant expression of

yours out of the foregoing leaf, “the fortune of Europe does not turn upon it.” In the voluntary

institution, and bestowing of power, there is no absurdity or inconvenience at all, that power,

sufficient for several ends, should be limited by those that give the power only to one or some

part of them. The power which a general commanding a potent army has, may be enough to take

more towns than one from the enemy; or to suppress a domestic sedition; and yet the power of

attaining those benefits, which is in his hand, will not authorize him to employ the force of the

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army therein, if he be commissioned only to besiege and take one certain place. So it is in a

commonwealth. The power that is in the civil sovereign is the force of all the subjects of the

commonwealth, which supposing it sufficient for other ends, than the preserving the members of

the commonwealth in peace from injury and violence: yet if those who gave him that power,

limited the application of it to that sole end, no opinion of any other benefits attainable by it can

authorise him to use it otherwise.

Our Saviour tells us expressly, that “all power was given him in heaven and earth,” Matt. xxviii.

11. By which power I imagine you will not say, that the “spiritual and eternal interest” of those

men whom you think need the help of political force, and of all other men too, could not any way

be procured or advanced; and yet if you will hear him in another place, you will find this power,

which being all power, could certainly have wrought on all men, limited to a certain number: he

says, “thou hast given him [i.e. thy son] power over all flesh, that he should give eternal life to as

many as thou hast given him,” John xvii. 2. Whether your universally acknowledged maxim of

logic be true enough to authorize you to say, that any part of this power was given him in vain,

and to enable you to draw consequences from it, you were best see.

But were your maxim so true that it proved, that since it might “indirectly and at a distance” do

some service towards the “procuring or advancing the spiritual interest” of some few subjects of a

commonwealth, therefore force was to be employed to that end; yet that will scarce make good

this doctrine of yours: “doubtless, commonwealths are instituted for the attaining all those

benefits which political government can yield; therefore if the spiritual and eternal interests of

men may any way be procured or advanced by political government, the procuring and advancing

those interests must in all reason be reckoned among the ends of civil societies, and so

consequently fall within the compass of the magistrate’s jurisdiction.” For granting it true that

“commonwealths are instituted for the attaining all those benefits which political government can

yield,” it does not follow “that the procuring and advancing the spiritual and eternal interest” of

some few members of the commonwealth by an application of power, which indirectly and at a

distance, or by accident, may do some service that way, whilst at the same time it prejudices a

far greater number in their civil interests; can with reason be reckoned among the ends of civil

society.

“That commonwealths are instituted for those ends, viz. for the procuring, preserving, and

advancing men’s civil interests, you say, No man will deny.” To sacrifice therefore these civil

interests of a great number of people, which are the allowed ends of the commonwealths, to the

uncertain expectation of some service to be done indirectly and at a distance to a far less

number, as experience has always showed those really converted to the true religion by force to

be, if any at all; cannot be one of the ends of the commonwealth. Though the advancing of the

spiritual and eternal interest be of infinite advantage to the persons who receive that benefit, yet

if it can be thought a benefit to the commonwealth when it is procured them with the diminishing

or destroying the civil interests of great numbers of their fellow citizens: then the ravaging of an

enemy, the plague, or a famine, may be said to bring a benefit to the commonwealth; for either

of these may indirectly and at a distance do some service towards the advancing or procuring the

spiritual and eternal interest of some of those who suffer in it.

In the two latter paragraphs you except against my want of exactness, in setting down your

opinion I am arguing against. Had it been any way to take off the force of what you say, or that

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the reader could have been misled by my words in any part of the question I was arguing against,

you had had reason to complain: if not, you had done better to have entertained the reader with

a clearer answer to my argument, than spent your ink and his time needlessly, to show such

niceness.

My argument is as good against your tenet in your own words, as in mine which you except

against: your words are, “doubtless commonwealths are instituted for the attaining all the

benefits which political government can yield; and therefore if the spiritual and eternal interest of

men may any way be procured or advanced by political government, the procuring and advancing

those interests must in all reason be reckoned amongst the ends of civil societies.”

To which I answered, that if this be so, “Then this position must be true, viz. That all societies

whatsoever are instituted for the attaining all the benefits that they may any way yield: there

being nothing peculiar to civil society in the case, why that society should be instituted for the

attaining all the benefits it can any way yield, and other societies not. By which argument it will

follow, that all societies are instituted for one and the same end, i. e. for the attaining all the

benefits that they can any way yield. By which account there will be no difference between church

and state, a commonwealth and an army, or between a family and the East-India company; all

which have hitherto been thought distinct sorts of societies, instituted for different ends. If your

hypothesis hold good, one of the ends of the family must be to preach the gospel, and administer

the sacraments; and one business of an army to teach languages, and propagate religion;

because these are benefits some way or other attainable by those societies: unless you take want

of commission and authority to be a sufficient impediment: and that will be so in other cases.” To

which you reply, “Nor will it follow from hence, that all societies are instituted for one and the

same end, (as you imagine it will,) unless you suppose all societies enabled by the power they are

endued with to attain the same end, which I believe no man hitherto did ever affirm. And

therefore, notwithstanding this position, there may be still as great a difference as you please

between church and state, a commonwealth and an army, or between a family and the East-India

company. Which several societies, as they are instituted for different ends, so they are likewise

furnished with different powers proportionate to their respective ends.” In which the reason you

give to destroy my inference, I am to thank you for, if you understood the force of it, it being the

very same I bring to show that my inference from your way of arguing is good. I say, that from

your way of reasoning about the ends of government, “It would follow that all societies were

instituted for one and the same end; unless you take want of commission and authority to be a

sufficient impediment.” And you tell me here it will not follow, “unless I suppose all societies

enabled by the power they are endued with, to attain the same end;” which in other words is,

unless I suppose all who have in their hands the force of any society to have all of them the same

commission.

The natural force of all the members of any society, or of those who by the society can be

procured to assist it, is in one sense called the power of that society. This power of force is

generally put into some one or few persons hands with direction and authority how to use it; and

this in another sense is called also the power of the society: and this is the power you here speak

of, and in these following words, viz. “Several societies, as they are instituted for different ends;

so likewise are they furnished with different powers proportionate to their respective ends.” The

power therefore of any society in this sense, is nothing but the authority and direction given to

those that have the management of the force or natural power of the society, how and to what

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ends to use it, by which commission the ends of societies are known and distinguished. So that all

societies wherein those who are intrusted with the management of the force or natural power of

the society, have commission and authority to use the force or natural power of the society to

attain the same benefits, are instituted for the same end. And therefore, if in all societies those

who have the management of the force or natural power of the society, are commissioned or

authorized to use that force to attain all the benefits attainable by it, all societies are instituted to

the same end: and so what I said will still be true, viz. “That a family and an army, a

commonwealth and a church, have all the same end. And if your hypothesis hold good, one of the

ends of a family must be to preach the gospel, and administer the sacraments; and one business

of an army to teach languages, and propagate religion, because these are benefits some way or

other attainable by those societies; unless you take want of commission and authority to be a

sufficient impediment: and that will be so too in other cases.” To which you have said nothing but

what does confirm it, which you will a little better see, when you have considered that any benefit

attainable by force or natural power of a society, does not prove the society to be instituted for

that end; till you also show, that those to whom the management of the force of the society is

intrusted, are commissioned to use it to that end.

And therefore to your next paragraph I shall think it answer enough to print here, side by side

with it, that paragraph of mine to which you intended it as an answer.

L. II. P. 389.

“It is a benefit to have true knowledge and

philosophy embraced and assented to, in

any civil society or government. But will

you say, therefore, that it is a benefit to

the society, or one of the ends of

government, that all who are not

peripatetics should be punished, to make

men find out the truth, and profess it?

This indeed might be thought a fit way to

make some men embrace the peripatetic

philosophy, but not a proper way to find

the truth. For perhaps the peripatetic

philosophy may not be true; perhaps a

great many have not time, nor parts to

study it; perhaps a great many who have

studied it, cannot be convinced of the

truth of it: and therefore it cannot be a

benefit to the commonwealth, nor one of

the ends of it, that these members of the

society should be disturbed, and diseased

to no purpose, when they are guilty of no

fault. For just the same reason, it cannot

be a benefit to civil society, that men

should be punished in Denmark for not

being lutherans, in Geneva for not being

L. III. P. 58.—

To your next paragraph, after what ha

already been said, I think it may suffic

say as follows. Though perhaps the

peripatetic philosophy may not be true,

(and perhaps it is no great matter, if it

not,) yet the true religion is undoubted

true. And though perhaps a great man

have not time, nor parts to study that

philosophy, (and perhaps it may be no

great matter neither, if they have not,)

yet all that have the true religion duly

tendered them, have time, and all, but

idiots and madmen, have parts likewis

study it, as much as it is necessary for

them to study it. And though perhaps

great many who have studied that

philosophy cannot be convinced of the

truth of it, (which perhaps is no great

wonder,) yet no man ever studied the

religion with such care and diligence as

might and ought to use, and with an

honest mind, but he was convinced of

truth of it. And that those who cannot

otherwise be brought to do this, shall b

little disturbed and diseased to bring th

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You tell us, “the true religion is

undoubtedly true.” If you had told us

too, who is undoubtedly judge of it,

you had put all past doubt: but till you

will be pleased to determine that, it

would be undoubtedly true, that the

king of Denmark is as undoubtedly

judge of it at Copenhagen, and the emperor at Vienna, as the king of England in this island: I do

not say they judge as right, but they are by as much right judges, and therefore have as much

right to punish those who dissent from lutheranism and popery in those countries, as any other

civil magistrate has to punish any dissenters from the national religion any-where else. And who

can deny but these briars and thorns laid in their way by the penal laws of those countries, may

do some service indirectly and at a distance, to bring men there severely and impartially to

examine matters of religion, and so to embrace the truth that must save them, which the bare

outward profession of any religion in the world will not do?

“This true religion, which is undoubtedly true, you tell us too, never any body studied with such

care and diligence as he might and ought to use, and with an honest mind, but he was convinced

of the truth of it.”

If you will resolve it in your short circular way, and tell me such diligence as one ought to use, is

such diligence as brings one to be convinced, it is a question too easy to be asked. If I should

desire to know plainly what is to be understood by it, it would be a question too hard for you to

calvinists, and in Vienna for not being

papists, as a means to make them find out

the true religion. For so, upon your

grounds, men must be treated in those

places, as well as in England, for not being

of the church of England. And then, I

beseech you, consider the great benefit

will accrue to men in society by this

method; and I suppose it will be a hard

thing for you to prove, That ever civil

governments were instituted to punish

men for not being of this or that sect in

religion; however by accident, indirectly

and at a distance, it may be an occasion

to one perhaps of a thousand, or an

hundred, to study that controversy, which

is all you expect from it. If it be a benefit,

pray tell me what benefit it is. A civil

benefit it cannot be. For men’s civil

interests are disturbed, injured, and

impaired by it. And what spiritual benefit

that can be to any multitude of men to be

punished for dissenting from a false or

erroneous profession, I would have you

find out; unless it be a spiritual benefit to

be in danger to be driven into a wrong

way. For if in all differing sects one is in

the wrong, it is a hundred to one but that

from which any one dissents, and is

punished for dissenting from, is the

wrong.”

to it, I take to be the interest, not only

those particular persons who by this

means may be brought into the way of

salvation, but of the commonwealth

likewise, upon these two accounts.

1. Because the true religion, which this

method propagates, makes good men;

and good men are always the best

subjects, or members of the

commonwealth; not only as they do m

sincerely and zealously promote the pu

good than other men; but likewise in

regard of the favour of God, which the

often procure to the societies of which

they are members. And,

2. Because this care in any

commonwealth, of God’s honour and

men’s salvation, entitles it to his specia

protection and blessing. So that where

this method is used, it proves both a

spiritual and a civil benefit to the

commonwealth.

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answer, and therefore I shall not trouble you with demanding what this diligence which a man

may and ought to use, is; nor what you mean by an honest mind. I only ask you, whether force,

your way applied, be able to produce them? that so the commonwealth may have the benefits

you propose from men’s being convinced of, and consequently embracing, the true religion, which

you say nobody can miss, who is brought to that diligence, and that honest mind.

The benefits to the commonwealth are, 1. “That the true religion that this method propagates,

makes good men, and good men are always the best subjects, and often procure the favour of

God to the society they are members of.” Being forward enough to grant that nothing contributes

so much to the benefit of a society, as that it be made up of good men, I began presently to give

into your method, which promises so sure a way to make men so study the true religion, that

they cannot miss the being convinced of the truth of it, and so hardly avoid being really of the

true religion, and consequently good men. But, that I might not mistake in a thing of that

consequence, I began to look about in those countries where force has been made use of to

propagate what you allowed to be the true religion, and found complaints of as great a scarcity of

good men there, as in other places. A friend whom I discoursed on this point, said, It might

possibly be that the world had not yet had the benefit of your method: because law-makers had

not yet been able to find that just temper of penalties on which your propagation of the true

religion was built; and that therefore it was great pity you had not yet discovered this great

secret, but it was to be hoped you would. Another, who stood by, said he did not see how your

method could make men it wrought on, and brought to conformity, better than others, unless

corrupt nature with impunity were like to produce better men in one outward profession than in

another. To which I replied, That we did not look on conformists through a due medium; for if we

did, with you, allow it presumable that all who conformed did it upon conviction, there could be

no just complaint of the scarcity of good men: and so we got over that difficulty.

The second benefit you say your use of force brings to the commonwealth, is, “That this care in

any commonwealth, of God’s honour and men’s salvation, entitles it to his special protection and

blessing.”—Then certainly all commonwealths, that have any regard to the protection and

blessing of God, will not neglect to entitle themselves to it, by using of force to promote that

religion they believe to be true. But I beseech you what care is this of the honour of God and

men’s salvation you speak of? Is it, as you have owned it, a care by penalties to make men

outwardly conform, and without any farther care or inquiry to presume that they do it upon

conviction, and with a sincere embracing of, and obedience to the truth? But if the honour of God,

and men’s salvation, consists not in an outward conformity to any religion, but in something

farther; what blessing they may expect whose care goes so far, and then presume the rest, which

is the hardest part, and therefore least to be presumed, the prophet Jeremiah, chap. xlviii. 10,

will tell you, who says, “Cursed be he that does the work of the Lord negligently:” which those

who think it is the magistrate’s business to use force to bring men heartily to embrace the truth

that must save them, were best seriously to consider.

Your next paragraph containing nothing but positions of yours, which you suppose elsewhere

proved, and I elsewhere examined, it is not fit the reader should be troubled any farther about

them.

I once knew a gentleman, who having cracked himself with an ungovernable ambition, could

never afterwards hear the place he aimed at mentioned without showing marks of his distemper.

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I know not what the matter is, that when there comes in your way but the mention of secular

power in your or ecclesiastics hands, you cannot contain yourself: we have instances of it in other

parts of your letter; and here again you fall into a fit, which since it produces rather marks of

your breeding, than arguments for your cause, I shall leave them as they are to the reader, if you

can make them go down with him for reasons from a grave man, or for a sober answer to what I

say in that and the following paragraph.

Much-what of the same size is your ingenious reply to what I say in the next paragraph, viz.

“That commonwealths, or civil societies and governments, if you will believe the judicious Mr.

Hooker, are, as St. Peter calls them, 1 Pet. ii. 13, νθρωπίνη τίσις, the contrivance and

institution of man.” To which you smartly reply, for your choler was up, “it is well for St. Peter

that he had the judicious Mr. Hooker on his side.” And it would have been well for you too to have

seen that Mr. Hooker’s authority was made use of not to confirm the authority of St. Peter, but to

confirm that sense I gave of St. Peter’s words, which is not so clear in our translation, but that

there are those who, as I doubt not but you know, do not allow of it. But this being said when

passion it seems rather employed your wit than your judgment, though nothing to the purpose,

may yet perhaps indirectly and at a distance do some service.

And now, sir, if you can but imagine that men in the corrupt state of nature might be authorized

and required by reason, the law of nature, to avoid the inconveniencies of that state, and to that

purpose to put the power of governing them into some one or more men’s hands, in such forms,

and under such agreements as they should think fit; (which governors so set over them for a

good end by their own choice, though they received all their power from those, who by the law of

nature had a power to confer it on them, may very fitly be called powers ordained of God, being

chosen and appointed by those who had authority from God so to do: for he that receives

commission, limited according to the discretion of him that gives it, from another who had

authority from his prince so to do, may truly be said, so far as his commission reaches, to be

appointed or ordained by the prince himself;) it may serve as an answer to your two next

paragraphs, and to show that there is no opposition or difficulty in all that St. Peter, St. Paul, or

the judicious Mr. Hooker, says; nor any thing, in what either of them says, to your purpose. And

though it be true, those powers that are, are ordained of God; yet it may nevertheless be true,

that the power any one has, and the ends for which he has it, may be by the contrivance and

appointment of men.

To my saying, “the ends of commonwealths appointed by the institutors of them, could not be

their spiritual and eternal interest, because they could not stipulate about those one with another,

nor submit this interest to the power of the society, or any sovereign they should set over them.”

You reply, “very true, sir; but they can submit to be punished in their temporal interest, if they

despise or neglect those greater interests.” How they can submit to be punished by any men in

their temporal interest, for that which they cannot submit to be judged by any man, when you

can show, I shall admire your politics. Besides, if the compact about matters of religion be, that

those should be punished in their temporal, who neglect or despise their eternal interest; who I

beseech you is by this agreement rather to be punished, a sober dissenter, who appears

concerned for religion and his salvation, or an irreligious profane or debauched conformist? By

such as despise or neglect those greater interests, you here mean only dissenters from the

national religion; for those only you punish, though you represent them under such a description

as belongs not peculiarly to them; but that matters not, so long as it best suits your occasion.

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In your next paragraph you wonder at my news from the West-Indies; I suppose because you

found it not in your books of Europe or Asia. But whatever you may think, I assure you all the

world is not Mile-end. But that you may be no more surprised with news, let me ask you, whether

it be not possible that men, to whom the rivers and woods afforded the spontaneous provisions of

life, and so with no private possessions of land had no enlarged desires after riches or power;

should live together in society, make one people of one language under one chieftain, who shall

have no other power but to command them in time of common war against their common

enemies, without any municipal laws, judges, or any person with superiority established amongst

them, but ended all their private differences, if any arose, by the extemporary determination of

their neighbours, or of arbitrators chosen by the parties: I ask you, whether in such a

commonwealth the chieftain who was the only man of authority amongst them, had any power to

use the force of the commonwealth to any other end but the defence of it against an enemy,

though other benefits were attainable by it?

The paragraph of mine to which you mean your next for an answer, shall answer for itself.

That above annexed is all the answer

you think this paragraph of mine

deserves. But yet in that little you say,

you must give me leave to take

notice, “that if, as you say, the

magistrate’s authority may do much

towards the upholding and preserving

the true religion within his

jurisdiction;” so also may do much

towards the upholding and preserving

of a false religion, and in that respect,

if you say true, may be said to

establish it. For I think I need not

mind you here again, that it must

L. II. P. 392.

“You quote the author’s argument, which

he brings to prove that the care of souls is

not committed to the magistrate in these

words: It is not committed to him by God,

because it appears not that God has ever

given any such authority to one man over

another, as to compel any one to his

religion. This, when first I read it, I

confess I thought a good argument. But

you say, this is quite beside the business;

and the reason you give, is, for the

authority of the magistrate is not authority

to compel any one to his religion, but only

an authority to procure all his subjects the

means of discovering the way of salvation,

and to procure withal, as much as in him

lies, that none remain ignorant of it, &c. I

fear, Sir, you forget yourself. The author

was not writing against your new

hypothesis, before it was known in the

world. He may be excused, if he had not

the gift of prophecy, to argue against a

notion which was not yet started. He had

in view only the laws hitherto made, and

the punishments, in matters of religion, in

use in the world. The penalties, as I take

it, are laid on men for being of different

ways of religion: which, what is it other

but to compel them to relinquish their

L. III. P. 63.

s to your next paragraph, I think I mi

now wholly pass it over. I shall only tel

you, that as I have often heard, so I h

I shall always hear of “religion establis

by law.” For though the magistrate’s

authority can “add no force or sanction

any religion, whether true or false, nor

any thing to the truth or validity of his

own, or any religion whatsoever;” yet I

think it may do much toward the

upholding and preserving the true relig

within his jurisdiction; and in that resp

may properly enough be said to establi

it.

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unavoidably depend upon his opinion

what shall be established for true, or

rejected as false.

And thus you have my thoughts

concerning the most material of what

you say touching the magistrate’s

commission to use force in matters of

religion, together with some incident

places in your answer, which I have

taken notice of as they have come in

my way.

own, and to conform themselves to that

from which they differ? If this be not to

compel them to the magistrate’s religion,

pray tell us what is? This must be

necessarily so understood; unless it can

be supposed that the law intends not to

have that done, which with penalties it

commands to be done; or that

punishments are not compulsion, not that

compulsion the author complains of. The

law says, Do this, and live; embrace this

doctrine, conform to this way of worship,

and be at ease and free; or else be fined,

imprisoned, banished, burned. If you can

show among the laws that have been

made in England concerning religion, (and

I think I may say any-where else,) any

one that punishes man for not having

impartially examined the religion they

have embraced or refused, I think I may

yield you the cause. Law-makers have

been generally wiser than to make laws

that could not be executed: and therefore

their laws were against nonconformists,

which could be known; and not for

impartial examination, which could not. It

was not then beside the author’s business,

to bring an argument against the

persecutions here in fashion. He did not

know that any one, who was so free as to

acknowledge that the magistrate has not

an authority to compel any one to his

religion, and thereby at once, as you have

done, give up all the laws now in force

against the dissenters; had yet rods in

store for them, and by a new trick would

bring them under the lash of the law,

when the old pretences were too much

exploded to serve any longer. Have you

never heard of such a thing as the religion

established by law? which is it seems the

lawful religion of a country, and to be

complied with as such. There being such

things, such notions yet in the world, it

was not quite beside the author’s business

to allege, that God never gave such

authority to one man over another, as to

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CHAPTER III.

WHO ARE TO BE PUNISHED BY YOUR SCHEME.

TO justify the largeness of the author’s toleration, who would not have jews, mahometans, and

pagans excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth, because of their religion; I said, “I

feared it will hardly be believed, that we pray in earnest for their conversion, if we exclude them

from the ordinary and profitable means of it, either by driving them from, or persecuting them

when they are amongst us.” You reply: “now I confess I thought men might live quietly enough

among us, and enjoy the protection of the government against all violence and injuries, without

being endenizened, or made members of the commonwealth; which alone can entitle them to the

civil rights and privileges of it. But as to jews, mahometans, and pagans, if any of them do not

care to live among us, unless they may be admitted to the rights and privileges of the

commonwealth; the refusing them that favour is not, I suppose, to be looked upon as driving

them from us, or excluding them from the ordinary and probable means of conversion; but as a

just and necessary caution in a christian commonwealth, in respect to the members of it: who, if

such as profess judaism, or mahometanism, or paganism, were permitted to enjoy the same

rights with them, would be much the more in danger to be seduced by them; seeing they would

lose no worldly advantage by such a change of their religion: whereas if they could not turn to

any of those religions, without forfeiting the civil rights of the commonwealth by doing it, it is

likely they would consider well before they did it, what ground there was to expect that they

should get any thing by the exchange, which would countervail the loss they should sustain by it.”

I thought protection and impunity of men, not offending in civil things, might have been

accounted the civil rights of the commonwealth, which the author meant: but you to make it

seem more, add the word privileges. Let it be so. Live amongst you then jews, mahometans, and

pagans may; but endenizened they must not be. But why? Are there not those who are members

of your commonwealth, who do not embrace the truth that must save them, any more than they?

What think you of socinians, papists, anabaptists, quakers, presbyterians? If they do not reject

the truth necessary to salvation, why do you punish them? Or if some that are in the way to

perdition, may be members of the commonwealth, why must these be excluded upon the account

of religion? For I think there is no great odds, as to saving of souls, which is the only end for

which they are punished, amongst those religions, each whereof will make those who are of it

miss salvation. Only if there be any fear of seducing those who are of the national church, the

compel any one to his religion. I will grant,

if you please, religion established by law is

a pretty odd way of speaking in the mouth

of a christian, and yet it is much in

fashion, as if the magistrate’s authority

could add any force or sanction to any

religion, whether true or false. I am glad

to find you have so far considered the

magistrate’s authority, that you agree

with the author, that he hath none to

compel men to his religion. Much less can

he, by any establishment of law, add any

thing to the truth or validity of his own, or

any religion whatsoever.”

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danger is most from that religion which comes nearest to it, and most resembles it. However, this

you think, “but a just and necessary caution in a christian commonwealth in respect of the

members of it.” I suppose, for you love to speak doubtfully, these members of a christian

commonwealth you take such care of, are members also of the national church, whose religion is

the true; and therefore you call them in the next paragraph, subjects of Christ’s kingdom, to

whom he has a special regard. For dissenters, who are punished to be made good christians, to

whom force is used “to bring them to the true religion, and to the communion of the church of

God,” it is plain are not in your opinion good christians, or of the true religion; unless you punish

them to make them what they are already. The dissenters therefore who are already perverted,

and reject the truth that must save them, you are not I suppose so careful of, lest they should be

seduced. Those who have already the plague, need not be guarded from infection: nor can you

fear that men so desperately perverse, that penalties and punishments, joined to the light and

strength of the truth, have not been able to bring from the opinions they have espoused into the

communion of the church, should be seduced to judaism, mahometism, or paganism, neither of

which has the advantage of truth or interest to prevail by. It has therefore those of the national

church, as I conclude also from the close of this paragraph, where you speak of God’s own

peculiar people, whom you think would be much the more in danger to be seduced by them, if

they were endenizened, since they would lose no worldly advantage by such a change of their

religion, i. e. by quitting the national church, to turn jews, mahometans, or pagans.

This shows, whatever you say of the sufficient means of instruction provided by the law, how well

you think the members of the national church are instructed in the true religion. It shows also,

whatever you say of its being presumable that they embrace it upon conviction, how much you

are satisfied that the members of the national church are convinced of the truth of the religion

they profess, or rather herd with; since you think them in great danger to change it for judaism,

mahometanism, or paganism itself upon equal terms, and because they shall lose no worldly

advantage by such a change. But if the forfeiting the civil rights of the commonwealth be the

proper remedy to keep men in the communion of the church, why is it used to keep men from

judaism or paganism, and not from fanaticism? Upon this account why might not jews, pagans,

and mahometans be admitted to the rights of the commonwealth, as far as papists,

independents, and quakers? But you distribute to every one according to your good pleasure; and

doubtless are fully justified by these following words: “And whether this be not a reasonable and

necessary caution, any man may judge who does but consider within how few ages after the

flood, superstition and idolatry prevailed over the world, and how apt even God’s own peculiar

people were to receive that mortal infection, notwithstanding all that he did to keep them from

it.”

What the state of religion was in the first ages after the flood, is so imperfectly kown now, that,

as I have showed you in another place, you can make little advantage to your cause from thence.

And since it was the same corruption then, which, as you own, withdraws men now from the true

religion, and hinders it from prevailing by its own light, without the assistance of force; and it is

the same corruption that keeps dissenters, as well as jews, mahometans, and pagans, from

embracing of the truth; why different degrees of punishments should be used to them, till there

be found in them different degrees of obstinacy, would need some better reason. Why this

common pravity of human nature should make judaism, mahometism, or paganism more

catching than any sort of nonconformity, which hinders men from embracing the true religion; so

that jews, mahometans, and pagans must, for fear of infecting others, be shut out from the

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commonwealth, when others are not; I would fain know? Whatever it was that so disposed the

jews to idolatry before the captivity, sure it is, they firmly resisted it, and refused to change, not

only where they might have done it on equal terms, but have had great advantage to boot; and

therefore it is possible that there is something in this matter, which neither you nor I do fully

comprehend, and may with a becoming humility sit down and confess, that in this, as well as

other parts of his providence, God’s ways are past finding out. But of this we may be certain from

this instance of the jews, that it is not reasonable to conclude, that because they were once

inclined to idolatry, that therefore they, or any other people, are in danger to turn pagans,

whenever they shall lose no worldly advantage by such a change. But if we may oppose nearer

and known instances to more remote and uncertain, look into the world, and tell me, since Jesus

Christ brought life and immortality to light through the gospel, where the christian religion

meeting judaism, mahometism, or paganism upon equal terms, lost so plainly by it, that you

have reason to suspect the members of a christian commonwealth would be in danger to be

seduced to either of them, if they should lose no worldly advantage by such a change of their

religion, rather than likely to increase among them? Till you can find them some better reason for

excluding jews, &c. from the rights of the commonwealth, you must give us leave to look on this

as a bare pretence. Besides, I think you are under a mistake, which shows your pretence against

admitting jews, mahometans, and pagans to the civil rights of the commonwealth, is ill grounded;

for what law I pray is there in England, that they who turn to any of those religions, forfeit the

civil rights of the commonwealth by doing it? Such a law I desire you to show me; and if you

cannot, all this pretence is out of doors, and men of your church, since on that account they

would lose no worldly advantage by the change, are in as much danger to be seduced, whether

jews, mahometans, and pagans are endenizened or no.

But that you may not be thought too gracious, you tell us, “That as to pagans particularly, you

are so far from thinking that they ought not to be excluded from the civil rights of the

commonwealth, because of their religion, that you cannot see how their religion can be suffered

by any commonwealth that knows and worships the only true God, if they would be thought to

retain any jealousy for his honour, or even for that of human nature.” Thus then you order the

matter; jews and mahometans may be permitted to live in a christian commonwealth with the

exercise of their religion, but not be endenizened: pagans may also be permitted to live there, but

not to have the exercise of their religion, nor be endenizened.

This according to the best of my apprehension is the sense of your words; for the clearness of

your thoughts, or your cause, does not always suffer you to speak plainly and directly; as here,

having been speaking a whole page before what usage the persons of jews, mahometans, and

pagans, were to have, you on a sudden tell us their religion is not to be suffered, but say not

what must be done with their persons. For do you think it reasonable that men who have any

religion, should live amongst you without the exercise of that religion, in order to their

conversion? which is no other but to make them downright irreligious, and render the very notion

of a deity insignificant, and of no influence to them in order to their conversion. It being less

dangerous to religion in general to have men ignorant of a deity, and so without any religion;

than to have them acknowledge a superiour Being, but yet to teach or allow them to neglect or

refuse worshipping him in that way, that they believe he requires, to render them acceptable to

him: it being a great deal less fault (and that which we were every one of us once guilty of) to be

ignorant of him, than acknowledging a God, not to pay him the honour which we think due to

him. I do not see therefore how those who retain any jealousy for the honour of God, can permit

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men to live amongst them in order to their conversion, and require of them not to honour God,

according to the best of their knowledge: unless you think it a preparation to your true religion, to

require men sensibly and knowingly to affront the Deity; and to persuade them that the religion

you would bring them to, can allow men to make bold with the sense they have of him, and to

refuse him the honour which in their consciences they are persuaded is due to him, and which

must to them and every body else appear inconsistent with all religion. Since therefore to admit

their persons without the exercise of their religion, cannot be reasonable, nor conducing to their

conversion; if the exercise of their religion, as you say, be not to be suffered amongst us, till they

are converted, I do not see how their persons can be suffered amongst us, if that exception must

be added, till they are converted; and whether then they are not excluded from the ordinary

means of conversion, I leave you to consider.

I wonder this necessity had not made you think on another way of their having the ordinary

means of conversion, without their living amongst us, that way by which in the beginning of

christianity it was brought to the heathen world by the travels and preaching of the apostles. But

the successors of the apostles are not, it seems, successors to this part of the commission, Go

and teach all nations. And indeed it is one thing to be an ambassador from God to people that are

already converted, and have provided good benefices; another to be an ambassador from heaven

in a country where you have neither the countenance of the magistrate, nor the devout obedience

of the people. And who sees not how one is bound to be zealous for the propagating of the true

religion, and the convincing, converting, and saving of souls in a country where it is established

by law? who can doubt but that there those who talk so much of it are in earnest? Though yet

some men will hardly forbear doubting, that those men, however they pray for it, are not much

concerned for the conversion of pagans, who will neither go to them to instruct them, nor suffer

them to come to us for the means of conversion.

It is true what you say, “what pagans call religion is abomination to the Almighty.” But if that

requires any thing from those who retain any jealousy for the honour of God, it is something

more than barely about the place where those abominations shall be committed. The true concern

for the honour of God is not, that idolatry should be shut out of England, but that it should be

lessened every-where, and by the light and preaching of the gospel be banished out of the world.

If pagans and idolaters are, as you say, the “greatest dishonour conceivable to God almighty,”

they are as much so on the other side of Tweed, or the sea, as on this; for he from his throne

equally beholds all the dwellers upon earth. Those therefore who are truly jealous for the honour

of God, will not, upon the account of his honour, be concerned for their being in this or that place,

while there are idolaters in the world; but that the number of those who are such a dishonour to

him, should every day be as much as possible diminished, and they be brought to give him his

due tribute of honour and praise in a right way of worship. It is in this that a jealousy, which is in

earnest for God’s honour, truly shows itself, in wishing and endeavouring to abate the

abomination, and drive idolatry out of the world; not in driving idolaters out of any one country,

or sending them away to places and company, where they shall find more encouragement to it. It

is a strange jealousy for the honour of God, that looks not beyond such a mountain or river as

divides a christian and pagan country. Wherever idolatry is committed, there God’s honour is

concerned; and thither men’s jealousy for his honour, if it be sincere indeed, will extend, and be

in pain to lessen and take away the provocation. But the place God is provoked and dishonoured

in, which is a narrow consideration in respect of the Lord of all the earth, will no otherwise employ

their zeal, who are in earnest, than as it may more or less conduce to their conversion of the

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offenders.

But if your jealousy for the honour of God engages you so far against men’s committing idolatry

in certain places, that you think those ought to be excluded from the rights of the commonwealth,

and not to be suffered to be denizens, who, according to that place in the Romans brought by

you, are “without excuse, because when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, but

became vain in their imagination, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image

made like to corruptible man.” I shall only change some of the words in the text you cite of

Isaiah, “I have baked part thereof on the coals, and eaten it, and shall I make the residue thereof

a God? shall I fall down to that which comes of a plant?” and so leave them with you to consider

whether your jealousy in earnest carries you so far as you talk of; and whether when you have

looked about you, you are still of the mind, that those who do such things shall be disfranchised

and sent away, and the exercise of no such religion be any-where permitted amongst us? for

those things are no less an abomination to God under a christian than pagan name. One word

more I have to say to your jealousy for the honour of God, that if it be any thing more than in

talk, it will set itself no less earnestly against other abominations, and the practisers of them,

than against that of idolatry.

As to that in Job xxxi. 26, 27, 28, where he says “idolatry is to be punished by the judge;” this

place alone were there no other, is sufficient to confirm their opinion, who conclude that book writ

by a jew. And how little the punishing of idolatry in that commonwealth concerns our present

case, I refer you for information to the author’s letter. But how does your jealousy for the honour

of God carry you to an exclusion of the pagan religion from amongst you, but yet admit of the

jewish and mahometan? Or is not the honour of God concerned in their denying our Saviour?

If we are to look upon Job to have been writ before the time of Moses, as the author would have

it, p. 32, and so by a stranger to the commonwealth of Israel; it is plain the general apostacy he

lays so much stress on, was not spread so far, but that there was a government by his own

confession, established out of Judea, free from, nay zealous against idolatry: and why there

might not be many more as well as this, which we hear of but by chance, it will concern him to

show.

You go on, “But as to the converting jews, mahometans, and pagans to christianity, I fear there

will be no great progress made in it, till christians come to a better agreement and union among

themselves. I am sure our Saviour prayed that all that should believe in him, might be one in the

Father and him.” (i. e. I suppose in that holy religion which he taught them from the Father) that

the world might believe that the Father had sent him: “and therefore when he comes to make

inquisition, why no more jews, mahometans, and pagans have been converted to his religion; I

very much fear, that a great part of the blame will be found to lie upon the authors and

promoters of sects and divisions among the professors of it: which therefore, I think, all that are

guilty, and all that would not be guilty, ought well to consider.”

I easily grant that “our Saviour prayed that all might be one in that holy religion which he taught

them;” and in that very prayer teaches what that religion is, “This is life eternal, that they might

know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.” John xvii. 3. But must it be

expected, that therefore they should all be of one mind in things not necessary to salvation? for

whatever unity it was our Saviour prayed for here, it is certain the apostles themselves did not all

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of them agree in every thing: but even the chief of them have had differences amongst them in

matters of religion, as appears, Gal. ii. 11.

An agreement in truths necessary to salvation, and the maintaining of charity and brotherly

kindness with the diversity of opinions in other things, is that which will very well consist with

christian unity, and is all possibly to be had in this world, in such an incurable weakness and

difference of men’s understandings. This probably would contribute more to the conversion of

jews, mahometans, and pagans, if there were proposed to them and others, for their admittance

into the church, only the plain simple truths of the gospel necessary to salvation, than all the

fruitless pudder and talk about uniting christians in matters of less moment, according to the

draught and prescription of a certain set of men any-where.

“What blame will lie on the authors and promoters of sects and divisions,” and, let me add,

animosities amongst christians, “when Christ comes to make inquisition why no more jews,

mahometans, and pagans were converted, they who are concerned ought certainly well to

consider.” And to abate in great measure this mischief for the future, they who talk so much of

sects and divisions, would do well to consider too, whether those are not most authors and

promoters of sects and divisions, who impose creeds, and ceremonies and articles of men’s

making; and make things not necessary to salvation, the necessary terms of communion,

excluding and driving from them such as out of conscience and persuasion cannot assent and

submit to them; and treating them as if they were utter aliens from the church of God, and such

as were deservedly shut out as unfit to be members of it: who narrow christianity within bounds

of their own making, which the gospel knows nothing of; and often, for things by themselves

confessed indifferent, thrust men out of their communion, and then punish them for not being of

it.

Who sees not, but the bond of unity might be preserved, in the different persuasions of men

concerning things not necessary to salvation, if they were not made necessary to church

communion? What two thinking men of the church of England are there, who differ not one from

the other in several material points of religion, who nevertheless are members of the same

church, and in unity one with another? Make but one of those points the shibboleth of a party,

and erect it into an article of the national church, and they are presently divided; and he of the

two, whose judgment happens not to agree with national orthodoxy, is immediately cut off from

communion. Who I beseech you is it in this case that makes the sect? Is it not those who contract

the church of Christ within limits of their own contrivance? who, by articles and ceremonies of

their own forming, separate from their communion all that have not persuasions which just jump

with their model?

It is frivolous here to pretend authority. No man has or can have authority to shut any one out of

the church of Christ, for that for which Christ himself will not shut him out of heaven. Whosoever

does so, is truly the author and promoter of schism and division, sets up a sect, and tears in

pieces the church of Christ, of which every one who believes, and practises what is necessary to

salvation, is a part and member; and cannot, without the guilt of schism, be separated from, or

kept out of its external communion. In this “lording it over the heritage of God,” 1 Pet. v. 2, 3,

and thus over-seeing by imposition on the unwilling, and not consenting, (which seems to be the

meaning of St. Peter,) most of the lasting sects which so mangle christianity, had their original,

and continue to have their support: and were it not for these established sects under the specious

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names of national churches, which, by their contracted and arbitrary limits of communion, justify

against themselves the separation and like narrowness of others; the difference of opinions which

do not so much begin to be, as to appear and be owned under toleration, would either make no

select nor division; or else, if they were so extravagant as to be opposite to what is necessary to

salvation, and so necessitate a separation, the clear light of the gospel, joined with a strict

discipline of manners, would quickly chase them out of the world. But whilst needless impositions

and moot points in divinity are established by the penal laws of kingdoms, and the specious

pretences of authority; what hope is there, that there should be such an union amongst christians

anywhere, as might invite a rational Turk or infidel to embrace a religion, whereof he is told they

have a revelation from God, which yet in some places he is not suffered to read, and in no place

shall he be permitted to understand for himself, or to follow according to the best of his

understanding, when it shall at all thwart (though in things confessed not necessary to salvation)

any of those select points of doctrine, discipline, or outward worship, whereof the national church

has been pleased to make up its articles, polity, and ceremonies? And I ask, what a sober

sensible heathen must think of the divisions amongst christians not owing to toleration, if he

should find in an island, where christianity seems to be in its greatest purity, the south and north

parts establishing churches upon the differences of only whether fewer or more, thus and thus

chosen, should govern; though the revelation they both pretend to be their rule, say nothing

directly one way or the other: each contending with so much eagerness, that they deny each

other to be churches of Christ, that is, in effect, to be true christians? To which if one should add

transubstantiation, consubstantiation, real presence, articles and distinctions set up by men

without authority from scripture; and other less differences, which good christians may dissent

about without endangering their salvation, established by law in the several parts of

Christendom: I ask, whether the magistrates interposing in matters of religion, and establishing

national churches by the force and penalties of civil laws, with their distinct (and at home reputed

necessary) confessions and ceremonies, do not by law and power authorize and perpetuate sects

among christians, to the great prejudice of christianity, and scandal to infidels, more than any

thing that can arise from a mutual toleration, with charity and a good life?

Those who have so much in their mouths, “the authors of sects and divisions,” with so little

advantage to their cause, I shall desire to consider, whether national churches established as now

they are, are not as much sects and divisions in christianity, as smaller collections, under the

name of distinct churches, are in respect of the national? Only with this difference, that these

subdivisions and discountenanced sects, wanting power to enforce their peculiar doctrines and

discipline, usually live more friendly like christians, and seem only to demand christian liberty;

whereby there is less appearance of unchristian division among them; whereas those national

sects, being backed by the civil power, which they never fail to make use of, at least as a

pretence of authority over their brethren, usually breathe out nothing but force and persecution,

to the great reproach, shame, and dishonour of the christian religion.

I said, “that if the magistrates would severely and impartially set themselves against vice in

whomsoever it is found, and leave men to their own consciences in their articles of faith, and

ways of worship, true religion would spread wider, and be more fruitful in the lives of its

professors than ever hitherto it has done by the imposing of creeds and ceremonies.” Here I call

only immorality of manners, vice; you on the contrary, in your answer, give the name of vice to

errours in opinion, and difference in ways of worship from the national church: for this is the

matter in question between us, express it as you please. This being a contest only about the

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signification of a short syllable in the English tongue, we must leave to the masters of that

language to judge which of these two is the proper use of it. But yet, from my using the word

vice, you conclude presently, taking it in your sense, not mine, that the magistrate has a power in

England, for England we are speaking of, to punish dissenters from the national religion, because

it is a vice. I will, if you please, in what I said, change the word vice into that I meant by it, and

say thus, if the magistrates will severely and impartially set themselves against the dishonesty

and debauchery of men’s lives, and such immoralities as I contra-distinguish from errours in

speculative opinions of religion, and ways of worship; and then pray see how your answer will

look, for thus it runs: “It seems then with you the rejecting the true religion, and refusing to

worship God in decent ways prescribed by those to whom God has left the ordering of those

matters, are not comprehended in the name vice.” But you tell me, “If I except these things, and

will not allow them to be called by the name of vice, perhaps other men may think it as

reasonable to except some other things [i. e. from being called vices] which they have a kindness

for: for instance, some may perhaps except arbitrary divorce, polygamy, concubinage, simple

fornication, or marrying within degress thought forbidden.” Let them except these, and if you will,

drunkenness, theft and murder too, from the name of vice; nay, call them virtues: will they, by

their calling them so, be exempt from the magistrate’s power of punishing them? Or can they

claim an impunity by what I have said? Will these immoralities by the names any one shall give,

or forbear to give them, “become articles of faith, or ways of worship?” Which is all, as I expressly

say in the words you here cite of mine, that I would have the magistrates leave men to their own

consciences in. But, sir, you have, for me, liberty of conscience to use words in what sense you

please: only I think, where another is concerned, it savours more of ingenuity and love of truth,

rather to mind the sense of him that speaks, than to make a dust and noise with a mistaken

word, if any such advantage were given you.

You say, “that some men would through carelessness never acquaint themselves with the truths

which must save them, without being forced to do it, which (you suppose) may be very true,

notwithstanding that (as I say) some are called at the third hour, some at the ninth, and some at

the eleventh hour; and whenever they are called, they embrace all the truths necessary to

salvation. At least I do not show why it may not: and therefore this may be no slip, for any thing

I have said to prove it to be one.” This I take not to be an answer to my argument, which was,

that, since some are not called till the eleventh hour, nobody can know who those are, “who

would never acquaint themselves with those truths that must save them, without force,” which is

therefore necessary, and may indirectly and at a distance do them some service. Whether that

was my argument or no, I leave the reader to judge: but that you may not mistake it now again,

I tell you here it is so, and needs another answer.

Your way of using punishments in short is this, that all that conform not to the national church,

where it is true, as in England, should be punished; what for? “to make them consider.” This I

told you had something of impracticable. To which you reply, that you used the word only in

another sense, which I mistook. Whether I mistook your meaning in the use of that word or no,

or whether it was natural so to take it, or whether that opinion which I charged on you by that

mistake, when you tell us, “that not examining, is indeed the next end for which they are

punished,” be not your opinion, let us leave to the reader; for when you have that word in what

sense you please, what I said will be nevertheless true, viz. “That to punish dissenters, as

dissenters, to make them consider, has something impracticable in it, unless not to be of the

national religion, and not to consider, be the same thing.” These words you answer nothing to,

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having as you thought a great advantage of talking about my mistake of your word only. But

unless you will suppose, not to be of the national church, and not to consider, be the same thing,

it will follow, that to punish dissenters, as dissenters, to make them consider, has something of

impracticable in it.

The law punishes all dissenters: for what? To make them all conform, that’s evident; to what

end? To make them all consider, say you: that cannot be, for it says nothing of it; nor is it certain

that all dissenters have not considered; nor is there any care taken by the law to inquire whether

they have considered, when they do conform; yet this was the end intended by the magistrate.

So then with you it is practicable and allowable in making laws, for the legislator to lay

punishments by law on men, for an end which they may be ignorant of, for he says nothing of it;

on men, whom he never takes care to inquire, whether they have done it or no, before he relax

the punishment, which had no other next end but to make them do it. But though he says

nothing of considering, in laying on the penalties, nor asks any thing about it, when he takes

them off; yet every body must understand that he so meant it. Sir, Sancho Pancha, in the

government of his island, did not expect that men should understand his meaning by his gaping:

but in another island it seems, if you had the management, you would not think it to have any

thing of impracticable or impolitic in it: for how far the provision of means of instruction takes this

off, we shall see in another place. And, lastly, to lay punishments on men for an end which is

already attained, for some among the dissenters may have considered, is what other law-makers

look on as impracticable, or at least unjust. But to this you answer, in your usual way of circle,

That “if” I “suppose you are for punishing dissenters whether they consider or no,” I “am in a

great mistake; for the dissenters (which is my word, not yours) whom” you “are for punishing,

are only such as reject the true religion proposed to them, with reasons and arguments sufficient

to convince them of the truth of it, who therefore can never be supposed to consider those

reasons and arguments as they ought, whilst they persist in rejecting that religion, or (in my

language) continue dissenters; for if they did so consider them, they would not continue

dissenters.” Of the fault for which men were to be punished, distinguished from the end for which

they were to be punished, we heard nothing, as I remember, in the first draught of your scheme,

which we had in “the argument considered,” &c. But I doubt not but in your general terms you

will be able to find it, or what else you please: for now having spoken out, that men, who are of a

different religion from the true which has been tendered them with sufficient evidence, (and who

are they whom the wise and benign disposer and governor of all things has not furnished with

competent means of salvation?) are criminal, and are by the magistrate to be punished as such, it

is necessary your scheme should be completed; and whither that will carry you, it is easy to see.

But pray, sir, are there no conformists that so reject the true religion? and would you have them

punished too, as you here profess? Make that practicable by your scheme, and you have done

something to persuade us that your end in earnest, in the use of force, is to make men consider,

understand, and be of the true religion; and that the rejecting the true religion tendered with

sufficient evidence, is the crime which bonâ fide you would have punished; and till you do this, all

that you may say concerning punishing men “to make them consider as they ought, to make

them receive the true religion, to make them embrace the truth that must save them,” &c. will,

with all sober, judicious, and unbiassed readers, pass only for the mark of great zeal, if it scape

amongst men as warm and as sagacious as you are, a harsher name: whilst those conformists,

who neglect matters of religion, who reject the saving truths of the gospel, as visibly and as

certainly as any dissenters, have yet no penalties laid upon them.

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You talk much “of considering and not considering as one ought; of embracing and rejecting the

true religion,” and abundance more to this purpose; which all, however very good and savoury

words, that look very well, when you come to the application of force to procure that end

expressed in them, amount to no more but conformity and non-conformity. If you see not this, I

pity you; for I would fain think you a fair man, who means well, though you have not light upon

the right way to the end you propose: but if you see it, and persist in your use of these good

expressions to lead men into a mistake in this matter; consider what my pagans and

mahometans could do worse to serve a bad cause.

Whatever you may imagine, I write so in this argument, as I have before my eyes the account I

shall one day render for my intention and regard to truth in the management of it. I look on

myself as liable to errour as others; but this I am sure of, I would neither impose on you, myself,

nor any-body; and should be very glad to have the truth in this point clearly established: and

therefore it is, I desire you again to examine, whether all the ends you name to be intended by

your use of force, do in effect, when force is to be your way put in practice, reach any farther

than bare outward conformity? Pray consider whether it be not that which makes you so shy of

the term dissenters, which you tell me is mine, not your word. Since none are by your scheme to

be punished, but those who do not conform to the national religion, dissenters, I think, is the

proper name to call them by; and I can see no reason you have to boggle at it, unless your

opinion has something in it you are unwilling should be spoke out, and called by its right name:

but whether you like it or no, persecution and persecution of dissenters, are names that belong to

it as it stands now.

And now I think I may leave you your question, wherein you ask, “But cannot dissenters be

punished for not being of the national religion, as the fault, and yet only to make them consider,

as the end for which they are punished?” to be answered by yourself, or to be used again, where

you think there is any need of so nice a distinction, as between the fault for which men are

punished by laws, and the end for which they are punished. For to me I confess it is hard to find

any other immediate end of punishment in the intention of human laws, but the amendment of

the fault punished: though it may be subordinate to other and remoter ends. If the law be only to

punish non-conformity, one may truly say, to cure that fault, or to produce conformity, is the end

of that law: and there is nothing else immediately aimed at by that law, but conformity; and

whatever else it tends to as an end, must be only as a consequence of conformity, whether it be

edification, increase of charity, or saving of souls, or whatever else may be thought a

consequence of conformity. So that in a law, which with penalties requires conformity, and

nothing else; one cannot say, properly I think, that consideration is the end of that law; unless

consideration be a consequence of conformity, to which conformity is subordinate, and does

naturally conduce, or else is necessary to it.

To my arguing that it is unjust as well as impracticable, you reply, “Where the national church is

the true church of God, to which all men ought to join themselves, and sufficient evidence is

offered to convince men that it is so: there it is a fault to be out of the national church, because it

is a fault not to be convinced that the national church is that true church of God. And therefore

since there men’s not being so convinced, can only be imputed to their not considering as they

ought, the evidence which is offered to convince them; it cannot be unjust to punish them to

make them so to consider it.” Pray tell me which is a man’s duty, to be of the national church

first; or to be convinced first, that its religion is true, and then to be of it? If it be his duty to be

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convinced first, why then do you punish him for not being of it, when it is his duty to be

convinced of the truth of its religion, before it is his duty to be of it? If you say it is his duty to be

of it first; why then is not force used to him afterwards, though he be still ignorant and

unconvinced? But you answer, “It is his fault not to be convinced.” What, every one’s fault every-

where? No, you limit it to places where “sufficient evidence is offered to convince men that the

national church is the true church of God.” To which pray let me add, the national church is so the

true church of God, that nobody out of its communion can embrace the truth that must save him,

or be in the way to salvation. For if a man may be in the way to salvation out of the national

church, he is enough in the true church, and needs no force to bring him into any other: for when

a man is in the way to salvation, there is no necessity of force to bring him into any church of any

denomination, in order to his salvation. So that not to be of the national church, though true, will

not be a fault which the magistrate has a right to punish, until sufficient evidence is offered to

prove that a man cannot be saved out of it. Now since you tell us, that by sufficient evidence you

mean such as will certainly win assent; when you have offered such evidence to convince men

that the national church, any-where, is so the true church, that men cannot be saved out of its

communion, I think I may allow them to be so faulty as to deserve what punishment you shall

think fit. If you hope to mend the matter by the following words, where you say, that where such

“evidence is offered, there men’s not being convinced can only be imputed to men’s not

considering as they ought,” they will not help you. For “to consider as they ought,” being, by your

own interpretation, “to consider so as not to reject;” then your answer amounts to just thus

much, “That it is a fault not to be convinced that the national church is the true church of God,

where sufficient evidence is offered to convince men that it is so. Sufficient evidence is such as

will certainly gain assent with those who consider as they ought, i. e. who consider so as not to

reject, or to be moved heartily to embrace,” which I think is to be convinced. Who can have the

heart now to deny any of this? Can there be any thing surer, than that men’s not being

convinced, is to be imputed to them if they are not convinced, where such evidence is offered to

them as does convince them? And to punish all such, you have my free consent.

Whether all you say have any thing more in it than this, I appeal to my readers: and should

willingly do it to you, did not I fear, that the jumbling of those good and plausible words in your

head, “of sufficient evidence, consider as one ought,” &c. might a little jargogle your thoughts,

and lead you hoodwinked the round of your own beaten circle. This is a danger those are much

exposed to, who accustom themselves to relative and doubtful terms, and so put together, that,

though asunder they signify something, yet, when their meaning comes to be cast up as they are

placed, it amounts to just nothing.

You go on, “What justice it would be for the magistrate to punish one for not being a cartesian, it

will be time enough to consider when I have proved it to be as necessary for men to be

cartesians, as it is to be christians, or members of God’s church.” This will be a much better

answer to what I said, when you have proved that to be a christian or a member of God’s church,

it is necessary for a dissenter to be of the church of England. If it be not justice to punish a man

for not being a cartesian, because it is not as necessary to be a cartesian, as to be a christian; I

fear the same argument will hold against punishing a man for not using the cross in baptism, or

not kneeling at the Lord’s Supper; and it will lie on you to prove, that it is as necessary to use the

cross in baptism, or kneeling at the Lord’s Supper, as it is to be a christian: for if they are not as

necessary as it is to be a christian, you cannot by your own rule, without injustice, punish men for

not conforming to a church wherein they are made an indispensable part of conformity; and by

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this rule it will be injustice to punish any man for not being of that church wherein any thing is

required not necessary to salvation; for that, I think, is the necessity of being a christian.

To show the unreasonableness of punishing dissenters to make them examine, I said, “that so

they were punished for not having offended against a law; for there is no law of the land that

requires them to examine.” Your reply is, That “you think the contrary is plain enough: for where

the laws provide sufficient means of instruction in the true religion, and then require all men to

embrace that religion; you think the most natural construction of those laws is, that they require

men to embrace it upon instruction and conviction, as it cannot be expected they should do

without examining the grounds upon which it stands.” Your answer were very true, if they could

not embrace without examining and conviction. But since there is a shorter way to embracing,

which costs no more pains than walking as far as the church, your answer no more proves that

the law requires examining, than if a man at Harwich being subpœnaed to appear in

Westminster-Hall next term, you should say the subpœna required him to come by sea, because

there was sufficient means provided for his passage in the ordinary boat that by appointment

goes constantly from Harwich to London: but he taking it to be more for his ease and dispatch,

goes the shorter way by land, and finds that having made his appearance in court as was

required, the law is satisfied, and there is no inquiry made, what way he came thither.

If therefore men can embrace so as to satisfy the law without examining, and it be true that they

so “fly from the means of right information, are so negligent in, and averse to examining,” that

there is need of penalties to make them do it, as you tell us at large; how is it a natural

construction of those laws, that they require men to examine, which having provided sufficient

means of instruction, require men only to conform, without saying any thing of examining?

especially when the cause assigned by you of men’s neglecting to examine, is not want of “means

of instruction, but want of penalties to over-balance their aversion” to the using those means;

which you yourself confess, where you say, “When the best provision is made that can be, for the

instruction of the people, you fear a great part of them will still need penalties to bring them to

hear and receive instruction:” and therefore perhaps the remainder of that paragraph, when you

have considered it again, will not appear so impertinent a declamation as you are pleased to think

it: for it charged your method, as it then stood, of punishing men for not considering and

examining, with these absurdities, that it punished men for not doing that which the law did not

require of them, nor declare the neglect of to be a fault; contrary to the ends of all laws, contrary

to the common sense of mankind, and the practice of all law-makers; who always first declared

the fault, and then denounced penalties against those who after a time set should be found guilty

of it. It charged your method, that it allows not impunity to the innocent, but punishes whole

tribes together, the innocent with the guilty; and that the thing designed in the law was not

mentioned in it, but left to the people, whose fault was want of consideration, to be by

consideration found out.

To avoid these absurdities, you have reformed your scheme, and now in your reply own with the

frankest persecutors, that you punish men downright for their religion, and that to be a dissenter

from the true religion is a fault to be punished by the magistrate. This indeed is plain dealing, and

clears your method from these absurdities as long as you keep to it: but wherever you tell us,

that your laws are to make men hear, to make men consider, to make men examine; whilst the

laws themselves say nothing of hearing, considering, and examining; there you are still

chargeable with all these absurdities: nor will the distinction, which without any difference you

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would set up, between the fault for which men were to be punished, and the end for which they

are to be punished, do you any service herein, as I have showed you in another place.

To what I said L. II. from p. 88 to p. 95, concerning those who by your scheme are to be

punished, you having thought fit not to answer any thing, I shall here again offer it to your

consideration:

“Let us inquire, first, Who it is you would have be punished. In the place above cited, they are

those who are got into a wrong way, and are deaf to all persuasions. If these are the men to be

punished, let a law be made against them: you have my consent; and that is the proper course to

have offenders punished. For you do not, I hope, intend to punish any fault by a law, which you

do not name in the law; nor make a law against any fault you would not have punished. And now,

if you are sincere, and in earnest, and are, as a fair man should be, for what your words plainly

signify, and nothing else; what will such a law serve for? Men in the wrong way are to be

punished: but who are in the wrong way, is the question. You have no more reason to determine

it against one, who differs from you, than he has to conclude against you, who differ from him:

no, not though you have the magistrate and the national church on your side. For if to differ from

them be to be in the wrong way; you who are in the right way in England, will be in the wrong

way in France. Every one here must be judge for himself: and your law will reach nobody, till you

have convinced him he is in the wrong way: and then there will be no need of punishment to

make him consider: unless you will affirm again what you have denied, and have men punished

for embracing the religion they believe to be true, when it differs from yours or the public.

“Besides being in the wrong way, those who you would have punished, must be such as are deaf

to all persuasions. But any such, I suppose, you will hardly find, who hearken to nobody, not to